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ABSTRACT:
Collisionsat sea have been a problem to mariners since the
earliest vessels engaged in commerce.whenthe first vessel
was launched, the risk of collision was zero. However,with
the launching of the second vessel there was some degree of
risk that the two would collide. While early records fail
to reveal the fateof these two ships, in more modern times
thousands of vessels and lives have been lost due to colli­
sion.
Several methods have been developed to minimize the incidence
of collision, the Rules of the Nautical Roads, V.H.P., Radar,
Traffic Seperation Schemes,vessel Traffic Services, Auto­
matic Radar plotting Aids, and other measures. Somewere
thought by many to provide the ultimate solution, but the
improvementin the situation is still far behind the accen­
table range .
Hhydormneoftheseuneasures provide the hoped ultimate solution?
This project analyses the collision risk and examines the
major measures taken to reduce it‘s incidence, trying to find
out where the deficiencies could be and present a reasonable
solution.
The examination of the various methods gives a light on the
potential benefits / disbenefits of each with an emphasison
radar and ARPAas considered the most beneficial tools having
a direct contribution to solve the problem.
INTRODUCTION :
Safety at sea has long been a preoccupation of maritime
community. Collision between ships has always been a promi­
nent problem in maritime history and continue to occur with
alarming regularity.
Lloyds Register indicates that during the 2nd and 33g quar­
ter of 1978, 17.8%of the world fleet losses resulted from
collision. The research division of NorskeVeritas indicates
that collision involving Norwegian ships comprises25%of a11
Norwegianship‘s casualties. Liverpool underwriters statistics
indicate that 50%of all ships casualties comprisedcollisions
and grounding.
The developments occur in the shipping industry have led to
this high percentage of collision and pushing strongly to al­
ways give a serious attention to the safety and efficiency of
fleet operations.
Sea-going vessels are increased in number, speed, and size
and becoming more complex. World trade itself is such that
traffic flows lead to congestion at certain areas around the
world.
Larger and larger amounts of cargoes of noxious or dangerous
nature which have the potential for pollution of the earth's
environment are being movedby sea-going vessels every year..
At the same time many vessels in service are old and some are
in questionable condition with respect to their systems and
officers competency.
‘L-'eI‘:L"!-3
The analysis of marine casualities and their distribution
is one of the most important methods to explore ways by
which safety and accuracy can be increased, and the effec­
tiveness of collision avoidance and navigation practices
on board ships can be improved.
Merchant marine casualties are often the result of a number
of factors involving a series or combination of events and
c-1'r,cumst'anC€S.- It has been estimated that the greatest
numberof collisions can mostly be traced to the compli­
Cation in the traffic situation and the errors in human
judgement.
In response to the persistent need to assist the watch offi­
cer in his collision avoidance tasks numerousextensive stu­
dies, research work, and experiments have been conducted and
arestillgohm-onleadhw to the development of several mea­
sures to reduce this risk and put it under control.
The implied promise in this development is that these measures
will provide an answer to the collision avoidance problem.
Someof these measures are related to the ship itself to in­
crease its operational efficiency and someadopted at sea to
improvethe situation, while others are established ashore to
cooperate in increasing the safety standard.
The question is : Howmuch aid in avoiding collisions do the so­
called collision-avoidance systems provide ?
‘El
The rules Of the mautical roads were adopted and revised
to organize collision avoidance actions. The rules are not
a deterministic device, but a set of guide lines to help
the naV193t°r to take the correct collision avoiding action.
Problems arised by the officers whodid not abide by them,
either by negligenceorby tmdngconflicting action which
"Ede the situation even worse and mostly 1ed to collision.
It was found that the best is to make a contact between the
ships engaged in a dangerous situation to ensure a consis­
tent safe action, avoiding any risk. V.H.F. radio telephony
is involved for ship-to-ship communication, but again some
officers neglect this effective tool and others used in­
adequate calling methods.
To ensure the maintenance of a sharp visual lookout, good
attention, and most efficient navigational operations, a
suitable bridge design and arrangement is necessary. Much
effort is given to provide the watchkeepingofficers and
captains with a well arranged operating centre to increase
the nautical safety.
Someattention has been given to other ship systems to im­
prove ship handling characteristics. The rudder effective­
ness to give the required result, the reliability of the
steering gear to avoid any failure in critical situations,
and the akfine procedures and maintenance to always answer
the orders in time.
Whenradar was first introduced to the merchant fleets,
m3“YPeople felt that a practical solution to collision
avoidance problem had been found. However, a review of the
world-widecollision statistics for the past years reveals
that in spite of the expandeduse of radar, the overall
collision rate remains alarmingly high.
Beacauseof radar‘s less-than a perfect record for preven­
ting ship collision, developmentof various types of threat
assessment systems has taken place.
Vessel traffic systems start to contribute to solve the
problem. Vessel traffic seperation schemesstarted in the
congested areas to assist in reducing the encounter rate.
Somecaptains did not accept this imaginary roadways inked
in on the chart and proceed against the traffic causing a
tremendousdanger. Shore based stations for traffic sur­
veillance start to interfere to put the situation under
control and help in the threat assessment process giving
navigational warnings and advices to those ships involved
in a dangerous situation.
The introduction of ARPAhas improved the effectiveness
of these stations as well as the traffic data processing
on board ships.
It basically providesthe navigator with a quicker and better
appreciation of the traffic around his ship which could lead
him to an early and effective action to avoid collision.
All these measures and procedures provide the mariner with
a precious information. and good working conditions to assist
in reducing the work load, minimize the humanerrors, in-'
creasing the ship reliability, and improvingthe situation
as a whole.
However,a great burden still fallsupon the navigator,
requiring to always be attentive, competent, and cautious to
arrive at the right judgmentand take the proper action.
International organizations. national administrations and
various institutions have taken . great steps to provide
the mariners with efficient education and training pro­
grammesto promote the competency, increase the practicle
experience and attain an adequate standards on board ships.
Moreover, due to the IMUrequirements and the efforts of
national administrations, a casualty investigation system
is established in several maritime countries to contribute
in finding general recommendations which could improve the
situation.
Eventhough, somedeficiencies still exist here and there
which should be remedied and somepositive steps still
need to be taken hoping to have a better future and colli­
sion becomes some thing of the past.
SECTION I
I.I COLLISION AVOIDANCE PROBLEM :
Collisions at B83 have been a problem to mariners since the
earliest vessels engaged in commerce.The continous increase
in the volume of marine traffic, the growth in size and speed
of vessels, the increasing numbersof cargoes of noxious or
dangerous nature, and, thenmfier of ships not complying with
internationally agreed standards, all stress the increasing
seriousness of the marine safety problem. This situation has
lead to increased numbersof collisions involving the prob­
able loss of life and or pollution. In addition, if the haz­
ardous nature of the cargoes carried today is taken into con­
sideration, such casualties are no longer only the concern
of the mariner, shipping companies and their insurers. They
have a direct effect on populations and their governments
and therefime these risks have become unacceptable.
The collision avoidance problem is seen as a co-operative
game, involving (most often) two players who have to choose
a course of action independently. The concept of level of
safety is not one that can be defined very easily, it need
to determine the combinations of actions that are good and
those that are bad. The matrix of possible actions for each
ship, and the outcomes of these combinations presents the
general collision avoidance game.
The level of safety in a situation is improvedby consistent
action on the part of both ships, remains the same if neither
ship takes any action, and is decreased if they take con­
flicting action.
Before the wide spread use of the radio and radar on merchant
vessels, the primary collision avoidance tools of the mariner
were:
Look out - The Pelorus
The Binoculars - The Rules of the Road
The pelorus and binoculars were certainly not as the compass
repeaters of today. In fact any stationary object on the ship
was used for determining a change in relative bearing of a
traffic ship-crude but effective.
The rules for manoeuvring to avoide collision at sea were
derived from rules designed for quite a different purpose.
These original rules were primarily commercial lows concerned
with the apportionment of damagesafter a collision had occur­
ed, ruther than guide lines to help ships avoid collisions.
The first record of a specific rule of the road dates back to
Lord Howein 1776. By 1864, a code of conduct for ships at
sea had been defined and agreed to by over 30 maritime nations.
The rules were revised three times in 1948, 1960 and 1972 to
suit the infinite variety of maritime circumstances and con­
ditions after studying most of the collisions and taken into
account the development of technology such as the use of
radar and the introduction of traffic seperation schemes.
The introduction of radar to the maritime communityhas not
brought a definite dramatic reduction in collision freguency.
Manualradar plotting with its several aids was thought by
manyfprovide the ultimate solution but these thoughts were
severely jarred by the Stocholm and Andrta Doria collision
in 1956. The reason could be due to the following fa°t°r5‘
1- The increase in the numberof ships at r15k.
2- The growing number of fast ships.
3- M15086/ misinterpretation of radar information.
4- The tendency of ships using radar to proceed at higher
speedsin restricted visibility.
5- The emergence of large, deep draft ships.
6- Lack of knowledge of the manoeuvring characteristics
of own ship.
7- Failure to keep a good lookout.
8- Technological improvements that, along with scheduling
pressures, increase incentive to risk exposure.
In the period between the two world wars there wasrelatively little
change in the world-wide pattern of marine traffic. The total
number of ships in service and the average size and speed of
trading vessels remained fairly constant. During the last
thirty years considerable changes have taken place. There
has been a six-fold increase in international trade by sea
which has been accomplished partly by an increase of over
100%in the number of ships and partly by increases in the
size and speed of ships and by reduction of the time spent
in port. In 1975, 2530 new steam and motor ships went to
sea compared with 1006 in 1965 and 134 in 1955. In 1978 the
total world ships of over 140,000 tons gross (270,000 tons
dead weight) were 59 ships.
-10­
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The growth in world shipping
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Table (1 ) Numbersof trading ships in service according
to size category (g_r.t1
Year 100-999 1000-9999 10000 and over Total
1950 5.100 11,200 1,100 17,400
1960 7.400 12,300 3,000 22,700
1970 11.400 13,000 6,200 30,600
1980 11.800 13,600 9,500 34,900
The figures are based on the statistical tables of Lloyd‘s
Register of shipping and on data published by the General
Council of British shipping.
Table (2 ) Trading vessels in commission by type
1950 - 1975
Type of ship 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
oil tanker 2,783 3,538 4,146 5,209 6,067 6,577
General cargo 14,598 15,914 18,500 20,540 22,400 22,600
Bulk carriers 300 1,000 2,100 3,400
Table (3 ) Comparisonof the estimated daily traffic flow­
in certain sea areas 1969 L 1980
Ships Per day
Region
1969 1980
English channel 400 340
Coast of Japan 100 190
Cape of good hope 211 225
Strait of Gibraltar 160 180
Malacca strait 85 180
Masqat (Arabian Gulf) 80 180
Increasing the size and speed of ships and the density of
traffic tends to bring greater risk of collision.
During this period various measures have been taken to im­
prove the safety at sea.
A rather comprehensive work was performed to assess human
factors in radar utilization. In this study, the effect of
different types of radar displays were investigated using a
simple radar simulator. A substantial report regarding radar
problem-solving capabilities was published. The results indi'
cated that the reason for unsatisfactory degree of progress
that would be expected with wide spread use of radar could be
due to deficiencies in training, knowledge,attitude, or ex­
perience of mariners. Accordingly, a radar observer certifi­
cate is now required before the award of a second mate's
ticket.
In 1959 Oudet proposed a traffic seplration scheme for con­
gested areas as Dover strait. The establishment of routing
schemescaused a significant reduction in collision where
traffic density is high particularly in restricted visi­
bility.
The first traffic schemewas introduced in Dover strait in
1967, and such schemes have since spread rapidly throughout
the world. IMOrecommendthe use of the existed ones, and its
use became mandatory by 1972 regulations.
Another approach to the problem is the attempt to find a mathe­
metical model of manoeuvringfor collision avoidance, the first
substantial attempt was presented by Hollingdale in 1961. During
the subsequent 15 years, there have been a number of attempts at
analyzing, understanding, and then solving the collision problem.
Manyjournal articles have appeared describing ship manoeuvring
diagrams which purport to provide the solution. However,def­
iciencies have been noted in each of the manoeuvring diagrams
and no particular diagram has gained wide spread acceptance.
In 1975 Liverpool Polytechnic Maritime Operations Unit, (recently
CAORFresearch centre at kings point), has compared the effec­
tiveness of various electronic collision avoidance systems. The
resultsobtained from test subjects in an artificial environment,
indicate that use of a CAScauses a dramatic improvement in per­
formance.
Accordingly, united states required a collision avoidance sys­
tem to be fitted on vessels carrying hazardous cargoes arriv­
ing in their waters since 1982, and it becamecompulsory for all
-14­
De“ 5h1P5 0f 10o000 9-r-t- and over, and all existing tankers
of 40.000 9-r.t. and over to be fitted with an ARPAsince first
of January 1984.
A new concept is "collision avoidance from the shore‘. The
vessel traffic managementservices (V.T.M.S.) offered by the
maritime surveillance centres for preventing collisions is a
newfactor in maritime operations.
The objective of this concept is to provide a shore service
for preventing collision which is a muchmore ambitious task.
The criteria is to alert the operator in the centre before a
rnarmiss and once the operator has been alerted, he himself
interpret the situation and warn the ships concerned. The
officer of the watch on board will naturaly retain full res­
ponsibility for manoeures. Provided the shipsinvolved in an
encounter situation have been identified, the only thing the
operator can do is to warn the vessels concerned and possibly
put them in touch.
The system still under development, and areascovered need to
be extended.
As a result of these analyses, studies, and research work, IMO
have taken effective steps to tackle the collision problem,
some of which are:
l- The amendmentof the collision avoidance regulations to al­
wayssuit the present situation and conditions.
2- The 1974 SoLAS (came into force 25th of May 1980). and the
1978 SoLASprotocol (came into force 153 of May 1981), which
contain a detailed regulations covering ship’s safety, equip­
ment etc.
3- The STCWconvention 1978 which came into force in 28 of April
-15­
1984, which set up the minimumrequirements of training and
certification to ensure a certain standard of knowledgeand
training of seafarers.
4- The significant financial and technical help to newest­
ablished academies particularly those in developing count­
tres to enable these countries to improvethe level of their
maritime industry.
5- IMOrequirements concerning the investigation of marine cas­
ualties by contracting governments, and the regular examina­
tion of these investigations by the Maritime Safety Committe
to recommendactions which increase safety at sea.
6- The establishment of the world Maritime University (NMU)in
July 1983 to help the mariners of all nations particularly
those of developing countries to improve their training and
their practicle background.
Efforts and developments still going on trying to reach a signi­
ficant improvementin the situation hoping that the following
years will showa considerable reduction in casualty figures.
- 15 ­
Table (Q) Annual incidence of collisions of merchant ships in open
sea: Coastal Waters. and narrow straits.
Year Reported Additional mtals Both Ships Detailed
BYL1°Yd'3 Japanese cases over 1000 tons cases
1948-55 _ _ _ _ 13
1956 80 _ 80 46 4
1957 68 _ 68 46 6
1958 65 _ 65 41 4
1959 76 _ 76 45 11
1960 70 _ 70 so 17
359 359 228
1961 77 _ 77 51 25
1962 27 _ 57 41 9
1963 87 _ 87 48 19
1964 83 _ 83 51 22
1965 94 _ 94 41 21
398 398 232
1966 81 6 87 48 28
1967 63 10 73 36 30
1968 77 10 87 45 39
1969 94 11 105 55 52
1970 89 11 100 52 55
404 452 236
1971 80 25 105 41 60
1972 67 18 85 45 45
1973 68 9 77 34 44
1974 70 23 93 40 54
1975 77 17 94 57 57
362 454 217
1976 69 10 79 34 44
1977 61 20 81 36 43
1978 68 7 75 46 24
1979 71 _ 71 43 1
1980 65' _ 65' 35'
334 ' 371' 194 '
Totals 1857 2034 1107 732
' Estimates have been made for 1980 based data obtained for 11 month
17
mszuonuznZOHWHAAOUnozobfimoma<u¢E$_uomo
B-S:0
._L1_.;7
M.T- ­
9.5nEzuouz.JED»
owCSu62“.5m:.H..P..2_BEE;
ANV0.HDm._...m
-13­
1.253 The conce t of collision oint and dan erous area:
In any 9ncounter,risk of collision mayexist. If target true
motion isiutmn the point of possible collision can be esti­
mated and defind as a point on the earth surface. when a cer­
tain passing safe distance is required in a two ship encoun­
ter, the probable area of danger can also be estimated and
defind on the earth surface.
1.2 The concept of collision point:
The collision can be defined and, its position depends on;
a) The speed ratio (E) b) The relative heading (H)
c) The position of the two ships.
1.2.1 Sampledefinition of a collision:
Tnqd :1/f f ‘
Ccnfra pugpt
O.‘&rl/as (1/7 0 ‘
6'-en/rePo/at ‘ \ ’
Figure ( 3 )
6 nan ;.,;.r
0} Q//['5/OI‘
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Consider the dynamic situation of a two-ship encounter in- ­
volved in exact collision.
Such a situation appears in the above Figure which illu­
strates the geometry of a collision situation between two
ships on converging courses. At an instance (t1) the two
ships (0) and (T) are at a distance (R1) and are moving
3C°°rd1“9 t° the 5Peed Vectors (V0) and (VT). For the sake
of simplification the two true velocities are assumedto be
uniform.
The relative bearing of ship (0) in relation to ship (T) is
the angle (Q) or the aspect.
If both ships maintain their velocity they will collide at
point (Pc). The intersection angle at this point is the rela­
tive heading (H), and the following relation holds constant:
V° / VT = So / sT E
where E is the speed ratio
From the two triangles (0 g_K and TQK)
Sin (Q) = b / ST .'. ST = b.Cosec (0)
Sin (H+Q)= b / So .'. S0 = b.Cosec (H+Q)
Then
1 /E = ST/So = sin (H+Q). Cosec (Q) = Sin (H+Q) 1 Sin 0
.'. 1/E= ( Sin(Q). cos (B) + Cos (Q). Sin (H) ) I Sin (Q)
= Cos (H) + Cot (Q) . Sin (H)
And Cot (Q) =(1 - E Cos (H))/ E sin (H)
.'. Tan (o)= E Sin (H) /(1 —E Cos (3))
-20­
This equation gives A sample definition of a collision situa­
tion in a two-ship encounter in terms of two indepentent
variables (E) and (H).
0 is the limiting aspect for collision.
This case is a sample when the relative speed (BLis less
than one. To find the circle of collision points and the
limiting aspect of collision for the different cases of the
relative speed (B) when E«< 1 , E = 1, and E ) 1 the
following technique can be used.
-21­
1.2.2. Locus of future point of collision:
1.2.2.1. when the relative s eed E 13 1355 th n one;
Assuming that, the relative speed 3 = v /VT . o_25o
e.g:
V = 4 V0 and the initial distance between ownship and'1‘
target equal 10 miles.
To find the radious of the circle of the limiting aspect
we can proceed as follows :
1- ST + so = 10 2- sq, — so = 10
s,r = 10 - so so = 0.25 sq.
4 so= 10 - so ' ' 0.75 sT = 10
.'.so = 2 and sT = 13.33
s = 8
Thenthe radius of the circle of limiting aspect of collision
(centra point C) equal (13.33 - 8) / 2 = 2.665
£4’//I/on Po/It
Figure ( 4 )
-22..
Q - 14.5° is the limiting aspect of collision, pc will be
the only collision point where b /a - E =:2.57 [ 10.3.
OPCwill be the course of own ship to produce one colli­
sion which will exist at a distance equal to b.
If the aspect is reduced to be less than Q then collision
will occur at P; or P; where
e/d=g/(d+f)=E
For P; to occur own ship course should be oP; and
For fie to occur own ship course should be ofiz
The principle of the previous method:
£30.35
Figure ( 5)
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If own shiP'5 3Peed - V0 and target speed - VT
_ vo / VT - -%§— - say 0.25
p - P.P.C. the point of possible collision
Q - target's aspect which is the limiting aspect for
collision.
R a Distance between own ship and target say = 10 M
Sin Q = op / TP = v / VT = 3
then Q in this case = 14.5
Tan Q = oc / op = op / R . . oc = op tan Q
but op = R tan Q . . oc = R tanz Q
=0.67 in this case
If TP is made to equal unity
I/;
.'. op = E and R2 = 1 — E2 .'. R = ( 1 - E2 )
u
.'. tan Q = OP / R .'. tan Q = E / (1 -E2)‘
= 14.5° in that
case
..0C=Rtan2Q .'.oc=RE2/(1-B2)=
. = 0.67 in that case
Sin Q = OC / PC .'. Pc = oc / sin 0
but Sin Q = E
.'. Pc = oc / E = R B2 / E ( 1 - E2) = RE /(1 - E21
50 equations to be used are
2 )
2
oc = R E2 / ( 1 - E
Redius = R3 / ( 1 - E )
Sin Q = E
-24­
1.2.2.2. whenthe relative sgeed E is greater than one:
Assumingthat E = 1.25, initial distance between the two
ships 2 M
1- sT + so = 2 .'. so = 2 - 5T
2 = 1.25 = vo / VT .'. v0 = 1.25 vT
.' 1.25 sT = 2 —sT .' 5T = 2 / 2.25 = 0.39
2- so - sT — 2 .' so = 2 + sT
.°. 1.25 sT = 2 + sT .'. sT = 2 / 0.25 = 8
then the radius of the circle of limiting aspect of collision
aqual to ( 3 + o.e9 ) / 2 = 4.445
Figure ( 6)
_ 25 ­
g :7 53° is the limiting angle for own ship (course OP) which
produce one collision at P at a d13tance b where b [ a I E
For smaller angle say 44°, collision point will exist at
different position on the arc ( P‘) producedby different
course of own ship and target but for same value of R and E
which meansthat the position of collision point (for a par­
ticular target course) and the associated ownship course
can be found if 9!5 the limiting angle.
By following the same mathematical procedure as in case of
B-( 1 the needed equations can be found:
Tan 6» - T‘; = %­
.'. CT = TP tan ¢ but TP = R tan ¢
CT = R tanz ¢
gg = E , if OP is made to equal unity
Sin 95 = 1 /E
(o1>)2 = ('r1>)2 + R2 R2 = 1 - --:-2
.'.R =(£:2-1)’/'/B
.'. Tan ¢ = TP / R
. 1 E X E _ 1
. . Tan¢ = ' (E2_1)//,
.'.c'r =R/(E2-1)
s1n¢ =—%'—— pc = si§T¢
but Sin ¢ = 1 / E
.'.1>c =RE/(E2-1)
so equations to be used
c'r= R
E2 - 1
-26­
Radius =
Sin ¢ =
1.2.2.3. when the relative sgeed E = l :
For the case when E = 1, the collision point is always loc­
ated on the bisector of the line between own ship and the
target- There will be only one oossible collision.
E1’!
JL7’ I’ .4’ o7'

Figure (9)
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1- If the target is slower than ownship (e.g. E)1). It is
always possible for ownship to produce a collision
since it can pursue the target if necessary but one and
only one collision could exist. This collision point is
always on the track of the target.
it£0,131' If
4;¢fiaJ.uVl¢ ‘ *
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Figure ( 10)
2- If the target is faster than ownship (E<1): there are
three possibilities:
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—No collision can be produced by own ship if it is not
fast enough to reach the target’s track ( Q>~arc sin E 1.
, not u-_I N]! HI! 5
‘V NI‘ Track4 /up! f“""J
glunl JV: AI /1 lolilo
‘/5 (rock, [tr goal /5 1'.
III’
5/av 5 Idol‘ fnr’c!'r [ruck
_ nu
","¢ of lo: fatal 11:41.
1513
In"
11"
Figure ( ll)
llision point on target‘s track whenthe aspect
_ one co
is equal to the limiting aspect.
e_g_ Q = arc sin E
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In this particular case it is possible if ownship reduce
her speed (e.g. E becomessmaller), the two collision points
approach eachother and emerge in one collision point at cer­
tain value of E.
If ownship stops,E will equal zero and collision could only
occur when the aspect is zero.
If the target stop, B will tend to infinity and the redius
of the collision circle will be zero, collision then could
only occur if ownshipproceed directly to the target.
we can say, the larger the E the greater the radius of the
dangerous circle will be if E < l and
The smaller the E the greater the radius of the dangerous
circle will be if E ) l.
3- If the target speed and ownship speed is the same ( E =
1), only one collision could exist and the collision point
is always located on the bisector of the line joining the
two ships.
The greater the aspect the further awaythe collision point
will be. Theoretically the limiting aspect in this case is
90 degrees, but in that case the collision point would be at
infinity, and hence the aspect of some85° is considered the
practical limit.
4- If E < l the collision points, if any, will be at own­
ship side of the bisector of the line joining the two ships,
but if E ; l the collision point, if any, will be at the
target‘s side of this bisector.
...._...~...—.—.
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5- whenthe target is the faster ship and one collision does
exist it will lie on the perpendicular through (0) the own­
ship position but if two collision points exist they will
lie either side of the perpendicular through (0) and not eq­
ually spaced.
E)! E<I
' g/&u.s4%aa.
i7"" ° ,5aJi stint­
Figure (14 )
6- The movement of the collision point when E > 1 and
Q = arc Sin 1 / E
In the following situation, the collision will exist at
1230
own ship speed = 20 knots
target's speed = 10 knots
E = 2 and limiting angle of collision ¢ = 30°
17
vol
I: -:
/4:’-' 0/: (5,;
Figure (15)
The radar display (Relative motion ship head up) of ownship
(52) will predict the single collision point on the heading
marker movingdownas the collision situation develop.
R SIC rad
9.0 3.0 6.0
. 2.4 4.8
5.4 1.8 3.6
3.6 1.2 2.4
1.2‘ 0.6 1.2
0 Collision Figure (16 I
[=20//a : 2
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7- The movement of the two collision points when E < l and‘
Q<arc sin 8
In the following situation, the two collision points exv
ist
ownship speed = 9
Target's speed = 12
2 = 0.75 , and Q = 4d
,-""1!-‘i("" :2/31.2.» NJ
I‘
no
DI‘
II
J/adcr 0/:
9.63 12.4 16.6
3.30 10.7 14.2
6.92 3.9 11.9
5.54 7.1 9.5
, 4.16 5.3 ' 7.1
2.73 3.6 4.3
1.40 1.8 2.4
0.00 co11151on Figure ( 17)
..p..Ta‘?.-9~—'<
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one of the collision point will movedownthe heading marker
while the other towards ownship on a fixed hearing at fast­
er rate, the two points will always be on the target’: track.
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Example:
A target (T) steering 0500 true with a speed of 12 knots at
a range of 5 miles.
0
The aspect is 40 green
ownship speed is 9 knots
Find: 1- Course (S) for ownship to produce collision (S)
2- Distance (8) at which collision (5) occur.
3- Speed of ownship to just miss the target.
4- Speed of ownship to clear the target by 1 mile.
2
£:=9/12=o.75, R= 5, oc= —1f—E§3—=6.43, radius =
§_§_ = 3,57
Figure (20)
Twocollision points exist with course 330° at 3.3 miles
and with course 031° at 9,3 m11e,
sin 40° - E - 0-64 - 00‘/ To‘- 4.15 / 6.5 - 0.64
since targets speed is constant 12 knots and B - V0 / VT
' 0.64 - V0/12 .'. Ownship speed should be just
less than 7.7 knots.
To clear the target by one mile, B should equal oo*/ To‘
-'- E * 2-9 / 6.5 = 0.446 = V0/12 .'. V0 = 5.35 knots
So to clear the target by one mile own ship‘s peed should be
equal to or less than 5.35 knots.
The following formula fits well for this particular request.
To satisfy a particular miss-distance, Q should be greater
than,arc sin E plus arc sfimr / R
Q.> arc sin E + are sin r/R,iF r<KR then
Sin Q > E + r / R
if we try it here, it gives the correct answer.
0 > are sin E + are sin 1 / 5
sin Q - 1/5 = E
0.643 - 1/5 = E = 0.448 = V0 / 12
V0 :; 5.32 knots
1.3 The concept of dangerous area and the arc of dangerous
COUIIBBI
l.3.l.The arc of dangerous courses:
In a two-ship encounter, there will be two possibilities to
satisfay a required miss distance, either ownship steer to
pass ahead or astern of the other ship. The are between these
two limiting courses is the arc of danger. It ownship course
is within this are the missdistance will be less than that
required giving a close quarter situation except a particu­
lar course which will lead to collision. The dangerous arc
depends on; the speed ratio (E), the desired miss-distance
(R), and the target aspect (Q).
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If two lines are drawnparallel to target’s track at a dis­
tance equal to the required miss distance, the area bounded
by the two limiting courses (the one for passing ahead and
the other for possing astern), and these lines is the dan­
grous area. If ownship should cross this area then she will
be at a distance less than the desired distance from the
target.
U = Target speed for a certain period of time.
V = Ownship speed for same period of time.
R = Required miss distance.
oP = Ownship's course which lead to collision.
P = Expected collision point (P.P.C.)
oB = Ownship’s course to pass ahead of target at dist. R.
oA= Ownship's course to pass astern of target at dist. R.
AoB=Arc of dangerous courses.
uk£= Dangerous area.
Q = Target‘s apect.
B = Point of passing ahead of target.
A = Point of passing astern of target.
So if ownship is faster than the target (E ) 1); only One
collision point could be exist (as previously shown)at a
particular course and a single cross ahead and cross astern
position could be generated.
1.3.1.2 If own ship speed ( V ) is less than or equal to
target speed ( U ):
In Both cases different situations could happen depending on
the speed ratio (E) and the aspect (0). but in case of V < U
or 3 4 1 muchmore possibilities mayoccur.
when V = U ( E = l ) the expected situations are:
a—one collision, one cross - ahead, one cross astern.
b- One cross - astern only.
c- None­
WhenV < U (E < 1) the possibilities are:
a- Twocollision, two cross- ahead, two cross - astern.
b- Twocollision, one cross - ahead, two cross - astern.
c- Twocollision, two cross - astern.
d- one collision, two cross - astern.
e- Twocollision only.
f- Twoastern only.
9- One astern only.
h- None.
1.3.1.3 Case one:
when the angle between the target track and the cross-ahead
motion line (m) is greater than 90°
forIt, /rut I
Figure ( 22)
when: V < U , no collision, no cross-ahead, no cross-astern
(None).
, no collision (at infinity) also no cross-ahead
or astern
(None).
--:....-—..'_ ‘.‘..—.~
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when the angle between target track and cross - ahead motion
line (m) is less than 900 but the aspect (Q) is greater than
90°.
Figure ( 23)
When:
v = U, one cross-astern only
V = U sin m, one cross-astern only
V-< U sin m, none
1.3.1. 5- Case three:
When Q < 90°, but m) 0
Figure (24 )
when 3
v - U, one collision. one cross- ahead, one cross ­
astern
< V’ C sin (Q +er). Twocollision, two cross-ahead.
two cross - astern.
V - U sin (Q +-1). Twocollision, one cross ahead,
two cross - astern.
U sin (Q +'<) > V > U sin Q, Twocollision, two cross­
astern.
= U sin Q, one collision, two cross - astern.
sin 0 > V > U sin m, Two cross - astern.
U sin m, one cross - astern
<C‘.
ll
<~ U sin m. None
1.3.1. 6- Case four:
whentarget aspect is reduced such that;
o( = Q + B , but Q >. 3
Figure ( 25 )
when :
U > V ) U Bin (Q *°<). Twocollision, two cross­
ahead, two cross-astern.
V ' 0 Sin (Q +-¢), Twocollision, one cross­
ahead, two cross-astern.
U sin (0 +04) > V ) U sin 0, Two collision, two cross
astern.
V = U sin 0 , one collision, two cross­
astern.
U sin Q ) V ) U sin B , Two cross—astern only.
V = U sin B , one cross-astern only.
V 41 U sin B . None.
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1.3.1.7 Case five:
whentarget aspect is reduced such that:
Q‘ - Q + Bo but Q < B
Figure ( 26 )
when :
i U ) V ) U sin (o( + Q), two of each
V <1 U sin (a( + Q), two collision, two cross­
astern
V <: (J sin B, two collision points only
V <1 U sin Q, none
1.3.1.8 Conclusion:
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1- If V-< U, two sectors of dangerous course
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Figure ( 27)
AfD 31 i 82 0 A2 defining two dagerous areas.
P and P2 are the two collision points.1
A1 and A2 are the 135 and the Zgg point at which own ship
pass astern of target.
31 and B2 are the 155 and the Zng cross-ahead point.
It is noticed that Al is closer to the target than 31 while
B is closer to the target than A2.2
If V > U,on1y one dangerous area exist and always the cross­
astern point is closer to the target than the cross-ahead
point which even further awaythan the collision point.
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3- Since the two side limits of the dargerous area are the
ownship courses for cross-ahead and cross-astern points,
then the shape of the dangerous area will vary considerably
with:
a- Desired miss-distance (R) b- ne1at1ve ‘peed (3)
c- Aspect (Q)
4- In the two cases four and five (where Q =a< —3), for
ownship to pass astern of the target, course involved steer­
ing awayfrom traget‘s track e.g. the course is divergent.
There-fore, the dangerous area is more easly defined as a
circle around the collision point with a radius equal to
the desired miss-distance,
5- when Q =a¥ - B and V<.U sin B, no collision is possible
but it is also impossible to keep clear from the target by
the required miss-distance.
There-fore, the dangerous area is more suitable to be de­
fined as a circle around ownship with a radius equal to
rthe desired miss-distance.
1.3.2. Real area of dan er:
______.____.3___
In a two-ship encounter, the dangerous area within which
the collision point exist can be defined as follows:
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Figure (28)
COMMENT:
The produced shape for the dangerous area looks like an
ellipse, the major axis is nearly equal to the difference
of the cross-ahead and cross-astern distances as measured
from the target, the minor axis is also nearly equal to
twice the desired miss-distance.
It should be noted that the point of possible collision
(P.P.C.) is not necessarily at the centre of the GIBB­
As time advances, both P.P.C. and the PADwill change their
position on the screen, the target will moveaccross the ra­
dar screen on its relative track with its P.P.C. and its PAD
attached.
If the P.P.C. lie on own ship heading marker only the range
will change but if the PADis not intersected by the H/mit
will change in position and shape as time progresses.
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1.3.2.1 Howthe concept of dangerous area is adopted in
practice:
1.3.2.1.1 ppc / PADFundamentals:
The following figure illustrates a hypothetical encounter
with a slower target detected on the starboard bow. A head­
up stabilized display is assumed. Headingmarker is subdi­
vided into 6 min. elements depicting ownship w.spd / HDG
V€CtO1'S .
Figure (29)
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
Point
(N) '
(N) ­
(B) ­
(A) ­
(D) ­
(D)
(E) =
(s) =
(F) =
(I) =
(H) =
(CPA2)
relative position of ownshipat all cases (
passing ahead or astern, collision, C.P.A.)
relative position of target in case of collision
relative position of target whenpassing ahead
of ownship
true position of target whenpassing ahead of
ownship
true position of ownship whentarget passing
ahead
can be estimated by drawing a line parallel to
(TN) from pont (A) to intersect the collision
course at (c), then taking same distance (NC)
on the course of ownship which let the target
passes ahead.
relative position of target whenpassing astern
of ownship
true position of target whenpassing astern of
ownship
true position of ownshipwhentarget passing,
astern point (P) can be estimated by same way
as point (D)
true position of target at the closest point of
approach when passing ahead.
true position of ownshipat the closest point
of approach in that case
= relative position of target at the closest
point of approach whenpassing astern
Point (CPP1)- relative position of target at the closest
point of approach when passing ahead
Point (J) - true position of target at the closest point
of approach when passing astern
Point (K) - true position of ownship at the closest point
of approach in that case
Point H,I,J and K can be obtained by constuction.
construction of the PAD:1.3.2.l.2 The gractlcle
Figure ( 30)
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At the mid point of the line (AS), a line is drawn perpen­
dicular to the target’: track and extend in both direction
(for a distance equal the CPA) to point X and Y.
The ellipse is drawn passing through (AXSY).
The hexagon is drawn by joining the points A, B, C, S, D
and E.
COMMENT:
The concept of presenting CPAdata in a true motion for­
mat superimposed on a relative motion PPI is beneficial.
The computer aided radar data processor provide the flexi­
bility to display target data in respect to each of the
relative motion lines (passing ahsad,collision, and pass­
ing astern) in a true motion format in relationship to
the fixed single ownship time scale established by the
heading marker.
The critical heading for collision is visualized as being
projected from the PPI centre to a point of intersection
with the target track. This intersection defines the lo­
cation of the PPCwhich represents a future position that
the target will occupy and separated from ownship's pre­
sent position by a specific time interval and azimuth.
Hazard category is established immediately in term of the
location of the PPCin respect to ownship's marker.
A PPC on or near the heading marker represents Real HAZARD
which relates to ownship‘s present motion and will require
subsequent evasive action, while a PPClocated else-where
on the PPI represents. POTENTIALHAZARDwhich must be tak­
en into consideration whenever ownship contemplates a man­
oeuvre. The location of the PPC, there-fore, conveys more
intelligence about the hazard the target is capable to pre- ­
sentto ownship than does any specific target parameter such
as range and bearing,speed, heading or even alphanumeric
indication of CPAdata, which is associated with a specific
value of ownship's motion.
Acharacteristic of the collision heading is that the tar­
get‘s bearing remains fixed if ownship were to adopt it.
Hence: for any future location of ownship on the collision
course, it is possible to estimate the position of the tar­
get on its track. The future location of the target can
thus be related to a specific time, and hence to the loca­
tion of ownship anywhere on the PPI. This permits the fut­
ure passage of ownship in the vicinity of future positions
of the target to be visualized.
The concept of the predicted area of danger emerges from
this visualization. The PADdefines an area about a loca­
tion on the target track that the target will entre at
some future time which if intersected by own ship heading
marker will result in CPAdistance less than stipulated.
Ownship should always steer well clear of PADS.Hazard
representation by means of a PADis independent of own­
ship’s heading at the momentof observation, though the
subsequent motion of PADSon the relative motion PPI is
determined almost exelusively by the reciprocal of own­
ship’s vector. HenceCPAdata can be seen directly, for all
possible headings of ownship at present speed, or on re­
quest at any other trial speed.
A simple evasive manoeuvrerecommendsit-self instinctively;
whenever ownship‘s heading marker intersects one or more
PADS,real hazard is predicted and the heading marker must
be movedawaybyan alternation of heading, or alternatively
the PADSmay be moved off the heading marker by an altera­
tion of speed, taking into account other PADSexist on the
PPI.
The first generation of sperry CASdisplays an elliptical
PAD, but the Zng generation displays a hexagonal PAD.
Information content of PFC/ PADdisglnx:1.3.2.1.3
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Data presented on a relative-motion indicator, stabili­
zed in either north up or ship‘s heading up. Plot inputs
are W. SPD / HDG.
This kind of presentation provide:
CPAdata consisting of; clearing ownship headings to
preserve a CPAdistance and available time to manoeuvre.
Ownship and target 6 mins W. SPD / HDGvectors­
Target aspect and estimate of speed ratio.
Relative track for data confirmation.
Time interval to PPCand crossing target track.
Independent confirmation of PPClocation.
Estimate for time of CPAon clearing heading.
Estimate for future PPC/ PADlocations for any ownship
heading.
Direct and simple indication of Real and potential hazard
and its variation as ownship manoeuvres.
Manoeuvreconvention for hazard elimination by taking
heading marker away from PADS.
Eliminate sequential trial and‘error variation of vector
modesand prediction time, firstly to determine hazard
and subsequently to select an adequate manoeuvre.
1.3.2.2 Movementof P.P.C. with time:
1.3.2.2.l If ownship is faster than target E> 1 :
a- Target passing astern:
(S /-J! I T‘ 3 lo.’ IAJJI:/J.’
fl} vat’
Figure ( 32 )
3 - 2 / 1.5 - 1.33
TC - R / ( E2 - 1 ) - 10.3
Radius - RE / ( E2 - 1 ) - 13.7
a - arc sin 1 / E - 4B.6°
-A...-\4..____Q.4....A
......o——----—­
uQ.~.»<~
1.3.2.2.2
E =
Tc =
Radius
Q
Figure (33
b- Target gassing ahead:
vs“
= 1.5
= 6.4
= 9.6
= 42°
)
%wmawcm
0
1
MuN\wo.mq
mam}-umII
is1.3.2.2.]. If ownshi
slower than
the tar et
)Figure ( 34
1.3.2.3 The movement of the PAD:
Ownship will pass either ahead of or astern of a slower
or a taster target respectively.
These four cases are illustrated in the following figure.
stud-nu -up 6 up lab you not -no I -IncoupnubI Ital '1; 1::I". nu’: I 5% 1%!IcyII.)
Sh-or lapel mung dint In-ov cup! nu-up nun­
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Figure ( 35 )
In the case of the slower target, either sense of passing
produces controlled and predictable event-passing in front
of the PADis equivalent to passing in front of the target
5 vice-versa.
Hazard is established by relating PADlocations to ownship
line of progress.
Comparision of the tips of ownship and target vectors pro­
vides an accelerated forecast capabilities.
Hazard will be seen to diminish before the target reaches
its CPAposition though slower target are classified as non­
hazardous, i.e. displayed with a 6-minutes unit vector with­
out a PAD, only when the PADis beyond the display range of
the P.P.I.
A more complex set of events occurs when manoeuvering in the
vicinity of the PADof a faster target.
In general, if ownship is clearing such a target whose PAD
is off the heading marker, inevitably the target will change
its status during the encounter to non-hazardous and the PAD
will disappear. Prior to this, a dual PADwill comeinto di­
splay range and merge with the primary PAD.
An example of this phenomenonoccurs with a faster overtaking
target which will be declared non-hazardous whenit begins to
draw ahead of ownship. The sequence of events is different
for cases of passing ahead or astern of the target.
The additional complexity in the case of passing ahead of a
faster target is a clear indication of the risks associated
with this type of manoeuvre. The dual PADof the faster tar­
get is an important item of information which can not be
ignored.
High and low speed navigation:
In low speed navigation, where the general sample of tar­
gets is faster than own ship, the dual PADphenomenonwill
come into play.
Manoeuvring in the vicinity of a dual PADfollows the con­
vention established for the single PADof the slower target:
Pass behind the primary PAD, pass behing the target.
Pass infront of the primary PAD, pass infront of the target.
The late situation is equivalent to passing betweenthe pri­
mary and dual PAD.
It follows that passing outside both PADSor on either side
of merged PADSresults in the target passing ahead. A merged
dual and primary PADrepresents the disappearance of the ab­
ility to cross ahead of a faster target.
In high speed navigation, the speed ratio Vo / VTis large,
so the PADlies close to the target at all times. Hence, a
rule of thumb is that by steering away from targets, one is
steering away from hazard. Displaying the PADmakes this ac­
tivity morecertain.
Figure (35 )
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SECTION I I
2 Marine collision causes and reduction methods:
—_jj
2.1 The major Collision causes:
In order to analyse marine accidents and initiate preventative
BCt1°na it 13 "e°°333rY to have a clear understanding, based
on good information, of the causes of the risks involved.
The nature of accidents at sea is rather complicated and to
collect enough information it is not that easy. The actual
sequence of events prior not only to a collision but also to
a near misses should be accurately known. An automatic recor­
ding of the operational data on board could provide a good
clarification of the events prior to a casualty.
Potential causal factors of the casualty are often circumstan­
ces or conditions present to a varyfiuyextent during all ship
transport operations and not only in the cases where casualties
occur. A collection of data on near-misses can there-fore pro­
vide insight into potential causal factors, and should one ma­
ke comparisons with situations that led to that cesua1tY.0ne
then possibly identify the most critical circumstances or con­
ditions that lead to casualties.
Det Norske Veritas research devision carried out a research
work to find out the cause relationships of collisions and
groundings, the project done in the period 1977-80 and has
given a good light on that problem. Vmfitas was interested
in finding out the reason for the large numberof collisions
and groundings on a world wide basis.
Veritas wantedto evaluate its classification rules for ships
in light of the conclusions from such an analysis and to dc‘­
ermine its rate in the endeavour to minimize such casualties.
Collision risk problem could be constructed in three parts:
a- The ship itself with its social and technical system and
man/machine communication.
b- The environment represented by traffic, weather and waters.
c- The society represented by shipyards, manufacturers, natio­
nal and international organizations, marine authorities, ow­
ners, and classification societies.
The latent risk can manifest itself in manyways such as; acc­
idents, incidents or near misses and “lived through" or experi­
enced risks.
In the operation and maintenance of a ship there are men and
machines involved and they cooperate. This cooperation is con­
trolled by a system of rules concerning procedures and the di­
stribution of tasks and responsibilities. Theserules are est­
ablished by authorities, classification societies and shipping
companies and only a fraction of them originate on board. The
rules, the men, and the machines encounter each other in diffe­
rent interfaces, of which the best knownis ergonomic: How
well is the machine fitted to man? The ship operates in an en­
vironment which can be of various kinds.
The casualty can thereby be regarded as a result of the inter­
play between the conditions and situations that the man/machine
system is set to operate under, and the system's inability to
fulfill the requirements.
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2.1 The probability of marine collision could be affected by
many fiactorfla the major ones are:
1- Traffic condition;
a- Ships engaged in the traffic (size, speed and standard)
b- Type of encounter (heading on, overtaking, crossing or
fine crossing).
c- Traffic density.
External influences;
a- Weathercondition (visibility, darkness).
b- Waterways.
c- Other ship fault or deficiency.
Ship technology;
a- Manoeuvringquality.
b- Ship‘s control system.
Navigational system;
a- Bridge design and arrangement.
b- Bridge routines and procedures.
c- Bridge equipments.
Navigational aids;
a- Sailing regulations.
b- Communications.
c- Vessel traffic systems (traffic seperation schemes:
vessel traffic surveillance and services).
Humanfactors;
a- Violation.
b- Comptence and experience.
C- Work load and social climate.
Therefore, the following factors could be considered as the
major factors causing collision risk;
Traffic condition
External influences
Suddentechnical failure
Humanerrors
.2 the major measures taken to minimize the effect
these causes are:
Navigational system
Navigational aids
Greater reliability of ship‘s control system
Education and training philosophy
In addition
Marine casualty investigation technique to check the effec­
tbflfiss of the above measures and explore new adequate ideas.
Nowwe can analyze the items of these measures to highlight
howeach item is contributing in solving the collision pro­
blem, trying to find out the defeciencies, to be able to
present the recommendations which could improve the situa­
tion.
2.2.1. Navigational system:
23.1.1 rid e desi n and arran ement:
The ¢1ffN1”tl€5 facing watchkeeping officers while conducting
safe navigation, particularly in congested areas, are increa­
sing with the increment in ships size, speed and number which
are considered as contributing factors enhanceingthe occurance
of collision risk. These circumstances are pushing strongly
towards seeking for the most efficient navigational opera­
tions. Since the bridge is the operational centre of the
ship, its design and arrangement is very important and must
be optimized to improve the safety of navigation under all
operating conditions.
Several analysis of marine casualties, especially collisions
and grounding, show that manywere attributed to failure to
keep a good lookout, which must be interpreted in the broadest
terms. In addition to keeping a visual lookout it has meant
failure to observe changes in the weather, including visibi­
lity, failure to observe properly the movementsof approach­
ing vessels, failure to observe the radar and /or echo sound­
er, and failure to observe that the course is accurately ste­
ered and that helm orders are carried out correctly.
TOavoid all these possible deficiemfiesmore emphasis on bri­
dge design. layout, and arrangement are needed.
It is probably true in the case of manyvessels that insuffi­
cient attention is paid to the design of the navigating bridge.
design being often left to the builder or, even the engineer
superintendent.
Traditional bridge layouts are shownto be inefficient with
respect to the work utilized by mariners at sea. Massive in­
Ittumfiflt PGDG13Often fiited 50 as to deny the officer of the
watch, the ability to get close to the bridge windows,poor
instrument layout within these panels, and a randomscatter
of equipment making a mockery of ergonomics have all been too
readily accepted by too manyofficers for too long time.
This short coming is very significant today with the current
impact and range of modern equipment and the tendency to re­
duce manning, making it necessary to examine not only the in­
dividual instruments found on the bridge, but to step back and
take an objective look at the whole. The bridge arrangement
should ensure that the officer can more effectively discharge
his duties. There is a need of wide arcs of visibility and a
sensible layout of instrument and equipment for the most eff­
icient operation. The benefits to the operator should be ease
of opcration of instruments, comfort and considerably improv­
ed working environment.
International organisations, national administrations, various
institutions and the navigators themselves are nowincreasing­
ly concerned about bridge functions, layout and instrumenta­
tion for increasing nautical safety. Theoperational safety is
considered as an important sector of the total safety of the
ship and its complement,
The bridge design should be evaluated in relation to the re’
quirements of functional analysis and forthcoming internatio­
nal regulations, it should allow the housing of newtechnology
V1th0Ut n995t1Ve1Y3ff°Ct1n9 existing functions and routines.
If an owner's design is evaluated on the basis of functional
analysis, with consideration to possible future change; ;n 1"­
strumentation, the result should ensure operational effeciency
and safety while being of maximumbenefit to the user.
It isumxaaflne to produce one basic design which will be suit­
able for all classes of vessels as the space available, the
manning and the equipment will vary considerably. However,
it is possible to lay downcertain lines of guidance. This is
best expressed by grouping equipment according to function,
which means having regard to inter alia usage, circumstances,
presentation and back—upfacilities.
The first requirement of a bridge officer is to be able to ke­
ep a good lookout visually, as well as having the ability to
moveabout freely without obstruction and observe such instru­
ments as required. Further, only equipment which are actually
required for the navigation and manoeuvring of the ship should
be placed in front of the navigator and all other equipment
relegated to the back of the bridge.
Before showing one of the proposed bridge design and layout.
it is perhaps desirable to give a few examplesof comon faults:
a- Wheelhauuestructure does not provide enougharc of visibili­
ty and its windowsvertical causing light- reflection prov
blems.
b- The fore end cluttered up with switches and controls, many
of which are not required for navigation, and so placed that
when anyone leans on the fore-end they may be inadvertently
activated.
c- Failure to duplicate controls or place them where they may
be required.
d- Noconsideration to possible future changes in instrumenta­
tion.
e- Instruments sited outside normal reading range.
f- Instrument so sited that the data is not instantly visually
available.
The number of alarms on the bridge is tending to increase, and
to avoid confusion in momentsof stress, a centralised alarm
and control panel is required.
' . . . - hba'Thesketch shows the principles of a bridge destgn arrived at in the Norwegtan SDS projtfl tn the mtd- 70:. Thesolutton meets t e st:
requirementsof todayand the near future
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Dot yorske Veritas has comnfled a drgft proposal for a c1a.s_
ification service entitled “Nautical safety‘, to contribute
in increasing operational safety and to offer relevant pro­
fessional assistance in this field.
Anyway,a continuous contact with ship designers, builders
and operators is essential to ensure that the wheelhousede­
signer is supplying what the user needsfor most efficient
actions. A concern for ergonomics has becomea necessity in
today‘s maritime industry.
A well planned wheelhouse layout is surely a positive step
towards greater safety.
2.2.1.2 Bridge routines and producers:
The causes of manycasualties are found to be related to inade­
quate watch keeping, lack of planning, and lack of systematism
in carrying out the bridge functions. Moreemphasis should th­
erefore be placed on better watch keeping organization and on
greater use of established procedures. This will ensure that
the necessary tasks are carried out at the right time and an
adequate contingency plan is available during critical phases
of the voyage.
Adeguate coverage of the watch, avoiding slovenliness in exe­
cuting properly the vital tasks is a very important matter whi­
ch seriously affect the safety at sea.
Watchkeepingofficer leaving the bridge staying long time in
the chart room, inadequate attention and absent lookout, off­
icer felt asleep on the watch or affected by alcohol, no fre­
quent check of navigation lights‘ course, speed, compasserr­
or, and visibility, not calling the master is case of poor vis­
ibility or in situations where his skill and experience are ne­
eded lack or rong fog, manoeuvreor warning signals, insuffic­
ient distance whenpassing other ships, excessive speed under
thecnrcumstances, neglect bridge to bridge communication, not
listening to navigational and traffic warnings in congested ar­
eas, ignorance of the rules of the nautical roads, neglect vis­
ual observation, and depending on one source of information with­
out considering its limitations, are all dangerous factors gene­
rated by the carelessness and violation of the watchkeepingoff­
icer and affect the navigational safety.
They are contributing factors which lead mostly to serious
accidents and consequently must be completely avoided. That co­
uld be 5Ch1eV°dbY well defined job requirements, extensive br­
idge procedures, and strict watch rules and orders followed by
consecutive check and serious control by the master until he is
sure that all officers obide by them.
Good bridge producers may depend on:
1- Bridge manning
2- Bridge instruction
3- Bridge organization, referring to the division of responsi­
bilities between the persons involved in the execution of
the passages
4- Pre-planning and briefing of sea passages
Safety could be improved to a considerable extent by proper
manning of the watch in various conditions. Double manning of
bridges in certain areas is advisable. Twoofficers on watch
maybe necessary where navigational hazards (ice, several oil­
rigs, severe weather condition with heavy deck cargo etc.), hi­
gh traffic density, or restricted visibility is expected.
These areas can be recognized by the beforehand planning and bri­
efing of the voyage.
The traditional way of pointing only one seamanper watch at
night should also change during these conditions which need
enoughvigilance during all watch period.
Ship's safety and efficiency greatly be rectified and increased
by the issuance of extensive watch instuctions and procedures
for the bridge functions. Formalizing work routines and practi­
ces on the bridge is necessary and not the traditional belief
which is to leave it up to the individual navigator.
shipping has long traditions which often are said to be the
strength of this industry, but from a safety point of v1eu
these traditions in the attitudes are quite often the weak­
ness in shipping.
Shorebased management as well as the masters on board ships
are both responsible for the establishment of efficient ope­
rating procedures on board their vessels.
Captain instructions must be extensive and clear enough, spe­
cially the night orders, taking into consideration all the
watch phases and particulars including; procedures for radar
plotting, procedures of passing other vessels in restricted
waters, checking of marks and lights, alternative references
for positioning, procedures in poor visibility, exchangeof
information whenencountering other vessels, ... etc.
If we shall overcome the wide spread improvisation on the br­
idge which too often results in accidents in the merchant fl­
eet, a change in attitude is of the greatest importance.
Several nautical colleges have bridge-instuctions and prep1ann­
ing of seapassages in their curriculum, but bridge teamwork
training howeverstill seems to be far behind.
Nautical colleges can make a valuable contribution by implemen­
ting bridge organizations in the sense of bridge teamworkin
their education as a special subject and in a modernway.
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2.2.1.3. Bridge equipment:
Navigation is that science which enables a craft to travel from one
place to another in safety. For marine navigator this implies that.
he must be able to obtain and plot ship's position frequently. monitoring
of potential hazards to navigation, evaluating and processing the
traffic situation to avoid collision with other ships. The advent of
electronic navigational aids has alleviated the problems to a consi­
derable degree. particularly in conditions of reducedvisibility.
In the past 50 years there have been increasing developments in elec­
tronic equipment for the operation of ships and manyof them have been
applied in all vessels.
These equipments can be devided into two main categories:
l- Systemswhich have a direct contribution to collision avoidance
procedures, such as V.H.F., Radar. and ARPA
2- Systemsassisting in collision avoidance which either provide ship's
position such as Decca. Loran. Omegaand satellite or help in
estimating the ship's position such as the echo sounder and logs.
V.H.F. radio telephony has been used for ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship
communicationand when used effeciently successfully reduce the in­
cidence of collission. It's effect will be mentionedin moredetails
later in this section.
Radar 15. perhaps. one of the most useful aids that has been given to
the navigator. Despite initial problems, it is recognized today as
an extremely useful piece of equipment which. if used
correctly, can provide an immenseamount of information to the
navigator.
Fixed objects and prominent landmasses are visible on the PPI
display, as well as other ships in the immediatevicinity.
Collision between ships have always been a serious problem,
particularly in poor visibility. weather conditions have lit­
tle effect on the use of radar, so that it can be used in coll­
ision avoidance in both clear and foggy weather. By plotting,
the course of an approaching vessel on the PPI, the closes po­
int of approach and the necessary avoiding action can be deter­
mined.
However, in a multi-ship situation, which is typical of many
coastal waters, the job of plotting the tracks of more than
one vessel can be time consuming. By using the recently intro­
duced computing radars (ARPAS),the navigator is able to ob­
tain rapidly the closest point of approach of up to 20 targets.
Also the proposed change in course or speed, or both, can be
fed into the equipment to check the effectiveness of the manoe­
uvre to avoid a dangerous target and that will not result in
another hazardous situation. FU11 details about radar and
ARPAwill be given in the next section.
The second category of the electronic navigation aids is con­
taining the equipments used in position fixing technique. their
exsistance had increased the ship's safety and efficiency by
obtaining it’s position whenneeded for economical operation
and to avoid knownhazards. Accordingly, they share in re­
ducing the work load of the watchkeeping officer leaving more
time for him to eva1uate the traffic situation and take the
correct action in time to avoid collision or any dangerous
close quarter situation.
Echo sounders are used to get the water depth to determine
not only that the vessel maybe approaching a grounding sit­
uation but also to provide location information using contour
navigation.
Radio direction finders receivers makeuse of the directional
properties of a loop aerial to get the bearings of knownrad­
io beacons.
Conventional logs measure both speed and distance through um wa­
ter while dopplerlogscanmeasure the speed of the vessel over
the ground.
Hyperbolic systems; Decca, Loran and Omegause the concept
of an imaginary hyperbolic grid superimposed on the earth's
surface. The constituent hyperbolea are derived by measuring
the time and /or phase difference between the arrivaldf $"Wh"
onised transmissions from two station pairsgiving a position
line.
Decca, is used for coastal navigation, Loran-c, is suitable
for use in both oceanic and coastal naviagation, Omegais.
normally used for oceanic navigation but it maybe good en­
ough for coastal navigation if the differential modeis used.
The transit satellite systemcan provide accurate position
fixes any where but the biggest drawback of the system is the­
interval occurs between reliable fixes which varies according
to the ship's latitude.Navstar (Gps) satellite system is a mut­
ch heralded system, which is expected to have extremely far­
reaching effects on not just position fixing but on the Wh°1e
spectrum of navigation. The system is still in the developing
stage, but the expected big advantage is its ability to prov­
ide accurate position fixes continuously, in all weather, th­
rouhgout the world. It could becomethe ultimate navigation
system.
Inertial navigation system is a recent introduction in mari­
ne navigation but it is still too expensive for general use.
Thus there is a great variety of systems available for navi­
gational tasks on board ships, which overlap or complement
each other in manyaspects of their application. At present
the task is to reduce those methods to the required extent and
to intergrate them into a navigation system covers extensively
the problems of the operation of the ship and track guidance.
Integration of two system, such as Satnav/Omegaand Loran/Sat­
nav, provides the user with not only all the featurers of each
individual system, it also helps to counteract each one's def­
iciencies.
Therefore, one can say that technology is keeping up with the
navigational system with consideration to increase service ab­
ility and accuracy, display enough and clear information in a
simple form, and provide mariners with all needs and require­
ments during the various circumstances to reduce his work load.
Today a new technique is introduced performing the second half
of the position fixing task to avoid leaving the bridge to the‘
chart roomat possibly vital moments.The instrument is called
the Bowditchnavigator which automatically and continously dis­
Plays the vessel’s current position on a standard nautical chart.
It is used in conjunction with the ship‘s electronic position
fixing aids.
The most important and essential procedure now is the nece­
lsary training for the proper use of all this eQU‘iP|T|enT-­
The mariners have to knowthe correct setting. adjustment, and
reading of these equipments to avoid any faulty operation or
ma1'fUnCt10n Of any system. They must well understand the adva­
ntages and limitations of each and knowhow to analyze and get
the full benefits of the informations available.
The navigators should also check the performance of these sys­
tems prior to sailing, prior to entering restricted or hazar­
dous waters and at regular and frequent intervals throughout
the passage, never rely upon so completely on single electro­
nic navigational device that its failure mayjeopardise the
safety of the vessel.
2.2.2 Navigational aids:
2.2.2.l.5ailing Regulations:
The function of the international regulations for preventing
collision at sea is to direct the actions taken by mariners so
that a safe conduct results. They are the most important means
of avoiding collision. Therefore, the rules must be well desi­
gned to deal with all classes of encounters, very clear to av­
oid ambiguity, and simple enough to be used easfly and correc­
tly. They should also be analysed and amendedfrom time to ti­
me to cope with the development of technology and clarify cer­
tain difficulties if any.
The rules were established in 1864 and revised inl948, 1960 and
1972to suit the infinite variety of maritime circumstances.
The new regulations came into force since 1977, but there is
still a prevalent tendency of the parties involved to disreg­
ard the basic rules. In manycollision cases on which judgments
have been passed, at least one of the two ships involved has
been found to have contravened the international regulations.
Captain/Wylie, Kemp, Hopkins and others said that 1972 rules
are still have somedeficiences, Complex,and the verbiage is
not likely to help matters. Theysaid that; the regulations
allow escape action on the part of the stand-on vessel whenit
becomesapparent that the give-way vessel is not manoeuvring
as it should. The point at which a manoeuvre should be made is
not, however, laid downin the regulations. Since the pog51­
bility exists that stand-on ship could makean escape ac­
tion before the give-way vessel makes its manoeuvre, the give­
wayvessel will be aware of this possibility. The rules also
do not specify what escape action should be taken in that case,
either very drastic escape action is necessary or gone kind of
manoeuvrewhich takes into account the likely action from the
give-way ship. It is desirable that the rules should prescribe
manoeuvreswhich are geometrically and logically consistent.
Moreover, under these regulations the restriction on the beha­
viou9;§hips in collision-avoidance situations in poor visibili­
ty is not enough.
In addition to that comment, they belive that the verbiage of
somerules is poor and if the existing english version is going
to be used as the basis for translation into other languages th­
ere certainly will be dangers ahead unless something is done be­
forehand to improve the text.
The problems developed in the analysis of the role and appli­
cation of a collision avoidance rule are nowbeing approached
experimently. In particular, the extent to which the interpre­
tation of the current regulations varies across individuals,
the way in which navigators in practice overcome the various
logical problems associated with the regulations, and the way
in which the regulations are extended to cover multiple-ship
encounters are under investigation.
To alleviate some of the problems, amendmentstake place from
time to time. In June 1983 several amendments where made, mai­
"1! relating to the carriage of lights and shapes. Twonewpara­
gramwwere added to rule 10, Traffic Separation schemes. to
sxemt vessels restricted in their ability to manoeuvre.which
are engaged in an operation for the maintenance of safety of
navigation or in the laying or servicing or picking up of a
submarine cable, from complying with the requirements for ves­
sels navigating in or near a traffic seperation scheme.
Further amendments are being considered by the IMOSub-Commi­
ttee on Safety of Navigation to resolve someambiguities or to
clarify the Rules. Rule 10 will probably be amendedto make it
clear that, whencrossing a traffic lane, it is the course st­
eered which should be at right angels to the direction of tr­
affic flow, and to give a better indication of which vessels
are permitted to use inshore traffic zones.
There is also likely to be an amendmentrelating to the term
"avoid impeding the safe passage", as used in Rules 9,10 and 18.
At present there is someconfusion as to the respective respon­
sibility of vessels required to avoid impeding the passage and
vessels required to keep out of the way. It will be several ye­
ars before these further amendmentswill be agreed and brought
into force.
Eventually it is hoped that the behaviour of mariners will be
more predictable in the problem encounters by additional trai­
ning and careful adjustment of the rules which will have to se­
rve the mariners of manycountries and the safety of their shi­
ps. passengers and cargoes, and not be a possible cause of some
indecision or confused interpretation.
All ships officers must be well prepared and trained to abide
to these regulations carefully, intelliggntly, and correctly
in time without any hesitation since they are the most impo­
rtant meansfor avoiding collision at sea.
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Course alteration diagram, intended primarily for use in
avoiding a vessel detected by radar‘and out of sight.
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Logic flow diagram for two—shipencounter
in open sea following International Rules
of the Nautical Roads
2.2.2.2. Communications:
Oneof the most important violations for collisions is the in­
sufficient and ineffective use of communication. It was found
that failure in communicationwas either a causal or a contri­
buting factor in manycollision cases.
One example is the Delta Norte/African pioneer collision 18
February 1982 in the Gulf of Mexico, the conclusion indicate
that the accident might have been prevented if the master of
the Delta Norte and the chief mate of the African pioneer had
contacted each other using the V.H.F. radiotelephone and had
established a meeting arrangement.
Another example is the collision between a bulk carrier (14,
000 g.r.t.) from Portsmouth (NewHampshire) and an oil tanker
(17,000 g.r.t.) approaching Boston. The collision occured in
Massachusetts Traffic seperation schemeat 1713 in daylight,
the investigation indicatedthat the methodof calling on V.H.F.
radiotelephony used by the bulk carrier was inadequate, and if
V.H.F. radiotelephony had been used properly by both ships the
collision might have been avoided.
Communication is extremely important, the possibilities of
communicationwith other traffic is a decisive factor. The sa­
fe conduct of shipping can be well improved if ships communi­
cate their intention while approaching each other and exchange
anti-collision advice.
To reduce accidents resulting from navigational encounters in­
volving uncertainty about the other vessels intentions, effec­
tive bridge-to-bridge communicationis required. It will be
valuable if bridge-to-bridge comunications is improvedby.
for instance. regulations and training to ensure greater c1;­
cuit discipline.
During last decade virtually every merchant vessel of any con­
sequence has been equipped with V.H.F. radiotelephony equip­
ment. It had been hoped by many that the emergence of this re­
markable and widely available communication facility would ha­
ve been recognized in the 1972 agreed international regulations
for preventing collisions at sea, as a means of helping to en­
sure that no cancelling actions would be taken by two vessels
trying to avoid each other. This opportunity was not grasped
by the IMOworking party on the collision regulations for a
variety of reasons and consequently was lost at the interna­
tional conference held in October 1972.
It should be noted however, that although the 1972 regulations
do not specifically acknowledge the existence of V.H.F. fhey
do statethat "all available means" should be used to makea
full appraisal of the situation and for determining the risk
of collision (1972, Rules 5 and 7). It is quite likely there­
fore that such "means" could be considered by a court of law
to include V.H.F. communication.
Oneof the possible difficulties related to V.H.F. communica­
tion is the lack of a language commonto those wishing to com­
municate, which could be misunderstanding what was said and
misconstruing intennous and agreements. The international code
of signals provides an International phonetic Alphabet (IPA).
and an International code (INTERCO)to help to overcome this
difficulty, although, perhaps regrettable, an ‘anti-collision
message‘ section has not been included in the cod¢$.Such a sec­
tion could be useful and its content would need to be closely
aligned with the international regulations, it wouldbe nece­
asary amongst other things to be able to describe the class
and aspect of a vessel. Moreover, adoption of a seperate wor­
ld-wide V.H.F. channel for use during ship encounters in in­
ternational waters will ensure that the passing of vital navi­
gational and anti-collision information is not prejudiced.
Communications with other ship can further beimmwvedby
fitting the vessel with adequate equipment and by careful or­
ganization of the layout of the operator's place to avoid di­
fficulties in establishing communications,the problemof id­
entifying other vessels could be solved by using transpoder
system connected to V.H.F. or radar.
However, more restrict regulations and training i5 StlV'fWEd€d
to avoid problems such as, not listening to proper frequency,
not using bridge-to—bridge communication in situations where
it would be 6f help or agreeing to an infeasible passing.
On the other hand, the link between ships and shore must be
promoted to inform the ships off certain coasts of the world
with the necessary intelligence of the traffic and local en­
vironment through which they pass, to knowwhat is going on
around them or ahead of them. This is quite useful in areas
°f heavy shipping traffic particularly whenbad visibility is_
11ke1yto occur such as Dover Strait. Wheretraffic separation
schemes are used, it will be very important to inform ships in
the area about the vessels and ferries intend to cross the la­
nes or moving in unexpected direction. this will help muchin
reducing the possibility of collision and thus ‘Increasesthe saf­
ety of navigation.
One of the new systemlwhich is designed to serve ships and pro­
vide them with needed informations is the Navtex. It is an in­
ternational single frequency system providing vessels with an
edited series of coastal warningsor advisory messagesprinted
out on the ship‘s bridge. The subjects covered include navi­
gational warnings, meteorological forecasts and gale warnings,
ice information, electronic nav-aids warnings and initial dis­
tress messages.
Generally, the developmentof satellite systems give an indica­
tion that satellite communicationin the future will be the
predominant communication tool on board ships.
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2.2.2.3. Vessel traffic systems:
Vessel traffic systems of one form or another have been used for over
thirty years. Early systems were primarily used for ports and canal
approaches.
Due to the considerable increase in the volumeof marine traffic and
the growth in size and speed of ships. catastrophic collisions occu­
red in the congested areas such as English channel. Dover strait, and
North Sea. where shipping situation started to be completely out of
control and a collision was taking place every few days. The loss of
ships and men was both fearsome and senseless and pollution was extreme­
ly high.
In 1959 Oudet proposed a traffic seperation scheme in Dover Strait which
was accepted by IMO.by l964 other schemes are suggested for other areas
such as North Sea. Baltic Sea and the Strait of Gibralter.
The first traffic seperation schemeswere introduced on voluntary basis
in 1967-68 off the coasts of North West Europe and the United States
of America.
Compliancewith the principles of traffic seperation was made compul­
sory for the ships of some countries in the period 1972-77, and for
all ships in July 1977 when the revised Collision Regulations came into
force.
Since the encounter rate bears a relation to the collision rate in a given
area of sea. consequently it is desirable to minimize the encounter rate.
the Effect of routing is to reduce the total numberof encounters in sea
area of a high density of shipping, hence increasing safety of navigation.
Ananalysis of collisions in the DoverStrait area in the se­
ven years period before and after 1967 has been carried out
by the Nautical Maritime Institute. The overall trend shows
a decline in the numberof collisions due to the introduc­
tion of routing.
While it maYbe comparatively easy to pass a law which has
international application, the enforcement of such a law is
quite another matter.
The supervising authorities were up against shipmasters of
manynationalities and varying degrees of competency, all of
them had one object in commonand that was thepmosxmtnma of
their voyage with the utmost dispatch. To them, the shortest
distance between two points was in a straight line and not
via an imaginary roadway inked in on the chart. The incidence
of rogues, or vessels proceeding against the traffic flow, or
otherwise contravening the IMOrecommendations was tremendou­
sly dangerous.
Studies accomplished by US Coast Guard,Brffish and French
authorities and other national and international bodies re­
connendedthe improvementof the effectiveness of the vessel traffic su­
rveillance and services to ensure the safety conduct of ship­
Ping. The justification of thisrecomendation is the continu­
ous increase in; traffic flow in certain areas (in English
Channel it is nowat an average rate of one vessel everY five
minutes). the number of cargoes of a noxious or dangerous na­
turep and the numberof ships not complying with internation­
ally agreed standards and rules.
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The use of radars increased the accuracy significantly. A nulber of
V2558‘ trlfflc Systems» U51"9 specially developed radars. have been
available for more than ten years. However. it has not been until
last few years that standard marine radars have been adopted to pro­
vide low-cost. low-maintenanceand highly reliable vessel traffic
systems.
An example of this new system is that presented by Norcontrol. Nor­
control utilized the related experience gained in the production of
marine automation systems. marine training simulators. integrated navi­
gation systems, and anti-collision radar systems to produce an accu­
rate flexible system that fulfills the requirementsof vessel traffic
management.Tracking targets, together with the display of afterglow.
their course. speed and identity maybe initiated manually or automa­
tically. Additional computer programmesprovide alert or alarm strate­
gies to warn the operator about hazardous traffic situations. such as.
deviation from required routing, excessive speed in a channel. buoy
damage. vessel dragging its anchor, etc.
In addition the display of traffic infonmation, which can easily be
seen in daylight. a data recording system for the storage recovery
of vessel movements at any given time has also been developed. A full
radar coverage of a given area can be obtained through a carefull
assessment of available sites and the deploymentof sensors.
Todaya shipmaster entering a congested traffic area assisted by
V.T.S. no longer has to look forward to a twenty-four hours passage
through bedlam. The rules are strict and the shipmaster prepared
to abide by them need have no fear. A network of
radar surveillance stations monitors his progress, correct
his mistakes and warn him about any possible danger in n13
path.
Vessel traffic systems nowprovide information that will en­
sure the free, but planned flow of traffic in congested or
difficult seaways so reducing the risk to life, environment,
and ecology.
Traffic seperation together with developedtraffic surveill­
ance and services have been found to be very effective in re­
ducing the incidence of collisions especially meeting and fi­
ne crossing collisions in poor visibility and particularly
in the Dover Strait and Southern North Sea, as shown by the
two following tables.
Table ( 6 ) Collisions in the Dover Strait according to
encounter situation
1957-61 1962-66 1967-71 1972-76 1977-81
Opposite directions 45 47 27 7 3
Broad crossing 0 0 0 o 2
Same direction 6 7 8 5 7
Not known 1 2 1 1 0
Totals 52 56 36 14 12
Table ( 7 ) Collisionsin the Southern North Sea according to
encounter situation
1957-61 1962-66 1967-71 1972-76 1977-61
Opposite directions 51 58 46 11 11
Broad crossing 7 6 7 9 4
Same direction 11 9 6 6 3
Not known 10 3 7 3 1
Totals 79 81 66 29 19
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The next steps which could be needed to ensure navigational
safety particularly in congested areas are:
1- Extend the requirement for compulsory pilotage (already
practised in several parts of the world for different re­
asons) to cover all vessels of over, say 100,000 tons, and
all vessels carrying dangerous cargoes, Toxic, inflammable
or nuclear.
2- Extention of shore based radar surveillance system and im­
proved identification methods to ensure the prosecution of
offenders, perhaps including compulsoryfitting of trans­
ponders and more severe penalties.
3- we may also need to improve buoyage. The buoyage system in­
troduced in NW-Europefrom April 1977, based on a combina­
tion of the cardinal and lateral systems removedambiguity,
but the buoys themselves must be mademore reliable.
2.3 Ship's control system:
A particular attention and high consideration has been given
to the ship's systems which have a direct relation to the ef­
fectiveness of the handling of the ship. Rudder, steering ge­
ar, main engine, and auxiliary machinery are very important
systems which need special care. Anyfailure or serious def­
eciency in one of these systems could either be an accident
or a cause of an accident. The risk that a technical failure
could lead to a casualty is especially high in restricted ar­
eas where near-misses are likely to occur.
A vessel‘s ability to avoid collision by manoeuvrecan be ex­
pressed in terms of stopping and turning characteristics. In
the same time the accuracy and success of an avoiding action
will depend mainly on the degree of rudder effectiveness and
the reliability of the steering gear and machinery.
In practice, ships are said to be dynamically stable whenthe
spiral test shows a unique relation between rudder angle and
the rate of turn. A normal ship will becomeincreasingly sta­
ble as the rate of turn incnames, e.g. as the rudder effectiv­
eness increases.
The reliability of steering gear and machinery can be impro­
ved by using a back up or parallel systems which can be acti­
vated instananaxsly , like the stand by spare units or com­
ponents or using an alternative control path.
The navigator must knowthe exact rate of turn of his ship
under various conditions and the forces affecting it, to be
able to determine inadvance the behavior of the ship during
the avoiding manoeuvres. The main engine must be well main­
tflinedo 511 m3°h1"erY Parts are checked frequently, and en­
gine roomroutines are well arranged, clearly recognized,
and strictly followed particularly during stand by periods
to ensure that all bridge orders will be answeredcorrectly
in time.
The advanced technology and the rules and recommendationsof
SOLASconvention have added some improvements to the ship's
process and technique. For example, SOLASamendments require
that the steering systems should be designed to permit isol­
ation of a failed componentand to permit the operator to
promptly resolve lost steering using an alternative control
Path or component to avoid any dangerous sequences due to a
suddenfailure in the steering gear.
Today the standard of computing techniques on the one hand,
and the possibilities of describing the track of ships under
the influence of various forces on the other hand, have rea­
ched a level which enables a system to be developed for the
determination of optimumrudder and propeller handling to
steer the vessel. Thus subjective decisions by the navigating
officer impairing the ship's safety can be eliminated and
the risk of collisions is avoided or reduced.
There is a trend nowadays towards developing alarm and con­
trol systems for marine use which complywith stringent saf­
Qty requirements. Norsk Hydro control systems has introduc­
ed a computerised system-Covac- for data collection. moni­
toring and remote control on board ships.
Accordingly, we may say that the situation can be generally
further improvedby greater use of fault-diagnosis and con­
trol systems, greater use of strict state of readiness proc­
edures, using standardized formats for presenting clear co­
cise manoeuvring data such as basic turning and stopping da­
ta for practical use, readily available in the ship's wheel­
house, and by placing greater emphasis on the ergonomical as­
pects associated with the manoeuvringof the ship.
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2.2.4. Eduction and training:
It is evident from statistics that an extremly high proportion of
accidents at sea are caused by the erronoua behaviour of 3 human
being. A quantitative assessment of the primary causes of maritime
collisions indicates that about 85%of all collisions are due to
faulty humanjudgement of the officer on watch of one or both en­
countering ships. associated with navigational and steering errors.
Therefore. proposals are madeby the authorities of nearly all tra­
ditional nations to prevent collisions by upgrading education and
training of ship personnel.
The risk caused by humanunreliability or deficiences in the social
systemmanifests itself as erroneous. delayed or neglected actions.
The individual may also be unaware of what the situation demands
from him. which results in an omitted action. The bases for a correct
action are serious intention. absence of fatal distractions. adequate
decision and the capability to perform the action. Sufficient and effi­
cient education and training are therefore necessary to fulfill the
need and improve the situation.
College courses and educational tools must be well arranged and deve­
loped to meet the requirements of and keeping abreast the developments
in the maritime industry. The courses must contain the necessary
syllabus and sound as a long-term investment to an industry where tech­
niques and technology are changing rapidly. Entry qualifications must
be high and not less
than "A level" with minimumaccademic attainment in suitable
subjects such as mathematics, english and science and I per­
sonally believe that the "hose pipe‘ system must be stopped.
The first filter for applicants should be the academicpro­
wess together with the physical fitness.
A course for navigators on procedures aimed at the avoidance
of collisions is seems necessary. within that course they ha­
ve to study special cases with the aim of finding causes and
recommendmeasures, plus discussion and analysis of the mari­
ne casualty statistics. Such a course ought to be madeavail­
able in the education programmeat the navigational colleges.
It can be considered as a direct preventive measure.
Continual pressures to reduce manning, bigger and bigger ships
with more and more equipments and greater use of automation
suggest that providing ship crews more thorough training in
ship's equipment, handling and operating procedures would re­
sult in significant safety benefits.
Environmental conditions do not inevitably lead to collisions
but are only causes if the individuals facing the conditions
do not knowhow to handle them or to respond effectively to
their changes due to inadequate skills and training. There­
fore, extensive training is essential to promoteofficers’sk­
ills to be able to act correctly and intelligently as required­
The failure to appreciate both visual and radar aided traffic
information, insufficient ability to interpret data or complete
utilization of information. errors in judgment, faulty ope­
ration of equipment and erroneous/delayed evasive manoeuvre,
are serious deficiencies which considerably increase the pro­
bability of collisionsat sea. These deficiencies can only be
minimized by upgrading mariner‘s qualifications, developing
the teflt materiflls and using advanced training techniques.
Hhatever strict and comprehensive the rules. whateversophes­
ticated the equipment, it is all useless if an incompetent
officer defies the rules or misuses the equipment. Poorly
qualified and trained officers will have insufficient abili­
ty to cross the seas in safe.
Instruction in the handling of collision situations ought to
be an integral part of upgraded and extended training.
Manoeuvring simulators are now accepted as an important tra­
ining tool to promote the practical experience and overcome
the navigator’s failing shiphandling abilities. The training
is close to reality and can be done under different environ­
mental and ship condition. Simulators can makesignificant
progress in identfiwing and improving the navigators skill to
effectively handle their ships and avoid collision risk.
The Internatinal Convention on Standards of Training, Certi­
fication and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCWConvention)
recently came into force and may eventually bring about some
improvement but now is the time to look at the problems of im­
plementation. IMOis trying to assist memberstates to ensure
that all ships will maintain the required standard. Flag State
and port state should also give a hand to find out any sub­
stsndard ship.Sn1ps not Complyingwith internationally
agreed standards can be considered as a moving h.z.,¢
and must be stopped.They can easily cause disasters and
often not only to themselves.
2.2.5 Marine casualty investigation technique:
Effective and competent investigation of accidents at sea are
the fOUnd3t10fl50! 311 Buccessfull safety work. A reduction in
the probability of collisions can not be achieved to a signi­
ficant extent unless a serious investigation for collision
cases is carried out, which should be based on accurate infor­
nations. so thatreconnendations can be made which are likely to
lead to the adoption of effective measures to prevent a recu­
rrence of similar accidents.
Developing a successfull system for collecting, analysing and
presenting marine casualty data is necessary to recognize wh­
ere and howthey occured to arrive at a quantitative and qual­
itative description of the causal factors, and accordingly de­
termine the possible preventative measures.
Investigations are seen as a form of preventing Fmdlchwthr­
ough the processes of finding out the causes of the occurren­
ces, acquiring knowledge there from and recommending or some­
times imposing ways to prevent recurrences. Such investigatio­
ns have resulted in major improvements in areas such as ship
construction, navigational aids and equipment, levels of com­
petence of seamen, saerch and rescue, traffic and other rules.
such as the Internatinal Regulations for the Prevention of
Collisions at Sea.
A modernsystem of casualty investigation can be characterized
as follows:
1- The investigation system must be flexible and suitable for
the country.
2­
3­
5I
Independent investigation team. e.g. not belonging to the Marine
Safety Authority.
The investigation team should consist of professional casualty
investigators. the best qualified for getting as close as possible
to the truth of howand whyan accident occured. The investigator
should have an open mind, able to express himself in speaking and
writing. and clever enough to getuzontact with peopie built on
confidence.
The type of casualty should determine the composition of the inves­
tigation group who should then have a specialzed experience about
this particular type of casualty and have sufficient knowledgere­
garding the environment where the accident occured. The investiga­
tion team should also invite, if necessary, someorganizations to
join the workwhenit is related to their speciality.
It is vital that the investigation starts rapidly while the mate­
rial to be investigated is fresh and before time has changed or
wiped out important evidence, e.g. accurate recall of witnesses.
The investigation does not seek to be incriminating, i.e. the pur­
pose is not to look for a scape-goat. The investigation board can
be flexible about personnel and method of work. The investigation
can take place on board the ship or elsewhere in informal surround­
ings. The witnesses should be more relaxed and co-operative. It will
be easier to get at the complete truth.
The method of investigation also permits the examination
of witnesses to take place at the same time as the techni­
cal inquiry. In this wayfindings at the casualty site can
influence the interview of witnesses, and evidence given by
a witness can influence the orientation of the investiga­
tion.
Public reports on investigation results should be given
rapidly to the Marine Safety Authority.
A proposal for.measures to be taken to prevent a recurren­
ce is made as soon as the necessary facts have been gath­
ered. The investigation board ensures that the Safety Auth­
ority gives further instructions about what steps to take
on the basis of their proposal.
A suitable investigation technique could be as follows:
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Obtaining all the facts which will be needed to explain the circum­
stances of the accident. making a thorough analysis of the issues
what may be related to the causes of the accident and determining
adequate recmnmendations which are practicable and economically
acceptable while considering the existing standards and howthe
ship was complying with them. then presenting a fonmal report
including the proposals which could improve the standards and/or
prevent the recurrance of such type of accident.
Actually, the objectives of casualty investigation systemsdiffer
considerably from one country to another and vary from strictly
penal systems to systems solely oriented towards safety. with many
variations in between.
The investigation processes, as well as the reports and their use.
are directly affected by the nature of the objectives pursueud.
depending on whether strictly safety purposes or whether discipli­
nary or civil considerations are taken into account.
Most countries have two types of inquiries, preliminary investiga­
tions and formal hearings, with some of the countries placing empha­
sis on the former, and others on the latter, at least with respect
to the numberof investigations.
IMOhas undertaken a somewhat limited role as regards marine casual­
ties. at least comparedto the International Civil Aviation Organi­
zation (ICAO).which has established a well structured and active
international systemfor investigation and reporting aircraft acci­
dents.
1)
The f0110U1fl9extracts from international Conventions (which
are binding once adopted by a country) and Resolutions (which
are only recommendations) indicate the extent of IMOrequire­
ments .
International Convention on Load Lines, 1966.
Article 23, Casualties:
1-Each Administration undertakes to conduct an investigation
of any casualty occuring to ships for which it is respon­
sible and which are subject to the provisions of the pres­
when _
ent ConVentiofiV1tJudges that such an investigation may as­
sist in determining what changes in the Convention might
be desirable.
2-Each Contracting Governmentundertakes to supply the Organi­
zation with the pertinent information concerning the find­
ings of such investigations. No reports or recommendations
of the Organization based upon such information shall dis­
close the identity or nationality of the ships concerned or
in any manner' fix or imply responsibility upon any ship or
person
2) Resolution A. 147 (November 26, 1968). Reports on Accidents
Involving Significant Spillages of Oil:
‘The Assemlbly‘
For the purpose of promoting rapid action by the governments
concerned in cases of significant spillages of oil following
accidents,
Having in mind the recommendation of the Council of the Inter­
national Maritime °'9anization at its third extraordinary
session.
Recommendsto governments that they
Require masters of all ships to report immediately through
the channels which may be found most practicable and ade­
quate under the circumstances, all accidents in which their
ships are involved which have given or maygive rise to si­
gnificant spillages of oil. Suchreports should, if possi­
ble, include details on the nature and degree of pollution,
the movementof the oil slick and any other useful infor­
mation as appropriate;
Appoint on appropriate officer or agency to whomsuch in­
formation may be referred. Such officer or agency would al­
so be responsible for transmission of relevant details to
all governments concerned;
Ensure that any such reports received by any authority in
the country be forwarded to such an officer or agency with
all despatch;
Provide the Organization with information concerning the
appointment of such officer or agency for circulation to
governments."
Resolution A. 173 (November28. 1968). Participation in ott­
icial Inquiries into MaritimeCasualties:
‘The Assembly,
Noting that there is a variation in the practices of Member
States with regard to official inquires into maritime casual­
ties, and other proceedings directly consequent upon such in­
quires,
With a View to ensuring that States SEVNWSIYaffected by or
having a substantial interest in maritimecasualties, parti­
cularly whereoil pollution to their coasts has resulted, sh­
all have an opportunity of being represented at inquires in­
to, or other such proceedings relating to, such casualties,
and
Desiring to encourage international unification of practice in
relation to such inquiries and proceedings,
Recommendsto governments that if a State other than the State
of the flag is knowto have been seriously affected by or to
have a substantial interest in a maritime casualty to a ship of
the flag State (particularly where the coast of that other State
has been polluted by oil) as a result of the casualty:
1)a) The State of the flag should, unless an inquiry is he1a
by the State as a matter of course. consult Uiththat ot­
her State as to the holding of an inquiry into the casua­
lty by one or other of the States, complying u1th the Pt.
ovisions of sub-paragraph (2);
b 3 If such an inquiry is held as a matter of course by the
flag State, the other State should be informedof its ti­
me and place;
2) Such an inquiry should be so conducted that, subject to the
national rules relating to the special conditions under which
inquiries are held in camera,
3) The public is permitted to attend; and
b) Arrangements are made which would, subject to the discre­
tion of the authority holding the inquiry, allow a repre­
sentative of the other State concerned to attend and par­
ticipate in the inquiry at least to the extent of:
(1) questioning witnesses or causing questions to be put
through the authority; and
(ii) viewing all relevant documents;
3 If an inquiry is held by a State seriously affected or haves
ing a substantial interest, a representative of the State of
the flag should be given similar facilities.
If one or other of the conditions of sub-paragraph (2) above
cannot be complied With 3‘ the 1nQU1rYitflelf. this recommen­
dation shall be treated as being complied with if the condi­
tion not previously satisfied in proceedings directly conse­
quent upon the inquiry. Nothing in this recommendationshall
affect or apply to holding of any preliminary or informal in­
quiry or any other proceedings.
A State shall not be treated for the purposes of the recommen­
dation as being affected by or having a substantial interest
in a maritime casualty by reason only that it is the flag State
of one of two ships in collision, nor should the fact that one
or more of its nationals has a commercial interest in the ship
or its cargo in itself confer such an interest".
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS)1974. Regulation 21 - Casualties:
a) Each Administration undertakes to conduct an investigation
of any casualtyeccurring to any of its ships subject to
the provisions of the present Convention whenit judges that
such an investigation mayassist in determining what changes
in the present Regulations might be desirable.
b
he Each Contracting Governmentundertakes to supply the Orga­
nization with pertinentinformation concerning the findings.
of such investigations. No reports or recommendationsof the
Organization based upon such information shall disclose the
identity or nationality of the ships concerned or in any man­
ner fix or imply responsibility upon any ship or person­
-¢.-.-.-—­
Resolution A. 322 (November 12, 1975). The Conduct of Investi­
gations into Casualties:
‘The Assembly,
Drawsattention to the obligations of Contracting Governments
concerning the investigation of casualties set out in the ab­
ove-mentioned Conventions.
Urges Contracting Governments to provide the Organization with
relevant information regarding lessons to be learnt and conclu­
sions derived from the investigation of casualties.
Requests the Maritime Safety Committee to examine regularly such
reports supplied by Contracting Governments and to recommendac­
tion as necessary;
Further requests the Maritime safety Committeein consultation
with the Secretariat to consider whether the Organization should
take the initiative in listing serious casualties and in reque­
sting Administrations to give information regarding the inquiries
held into them end their findings and thereafter to take any ap­
propriate action to this end."
Resolution A. 440 (November 15. l979)- Exchange Of IDf°rmat1°“
for Investigations into MarineCasualties:
‘The Assembly,
Nothing that the Maritime Safety Committeehas considered reports
of investigations into serious marine casualties and has recog­
nized the importance of a free exchange of information between
Governmentsand, in particular, the need for providing details
of those casualties.
BeingAwarethat investigations into casualties, especially in
the case of collisions, are often hamperedby lack of exchange
of information where ships under different flags are involved.
Having considered the recommendation made by the Maritime Safe­
ty Committeeat its thirty-ninth session,
Urges Governments to co-operate on a mutual basis in investiga­
tions into marine casualties and to exchange information freely
for the purposes of a full appraisal of such casualties.
It should be been noted that in the Load Line and 50135
Conventions, the obligation of the participating to investigate
and to report to IMOis conditional upon their sole judgment as
to whether or not an investigation mayassist in bringing about
changes to those Conventions. In the case of the Resolutions.
only recommendations are made which are not binding although the
majority of participating countries wouldgenerally feel morally
obligated to comply.
Resolution A. 173, which recommendsthat participating of a for­
aig State be allowed, particularly whereoil pollution to the
coasts of that state has resulted, is applicable only wherea
public inquiry is held and not where preliminary or informal in­
quiries only are carried out, nor in the case of collisions nor
where a national of the foreign state has a commercial interest
in the ship or its cargo. In aviation, foreign countries repre­
sentatives are given at least an observer status at all investi­
gations where they have an interest.
On July 1, 1978, IMOstarted to require reports on ‘Serious cas­
ualties', which are defined as "casualties to ships of not less
than 1,600 gross tonnage which are a total loss (including con­
structive total loss) and casualties to ships of not less than
500 gross tonnage involving loss of life", excluding pleasure
boats, The process followed is that first a list of serious cas­
ualties is prepared, based on information contained in Lloyd's
Register of Shipping Quarterly Casualty Returns and the Liverpool
Underwriters Association Monthly Returns, and then a report on
each casualty is requested from the Administration concerned.
The report Form requires only a brief summaryof the casualty,
the probable cause, search and rescue assistance, damage, lives
lost, and certain other particulars. FromJuly 1, 1978, to Decem­
ber 31, 1982, 4l7 serious casualties were listed, of which only
123 reports (29%)were recieved from Administrations. A list of
such reports has nevertheless been prepared indicating the prin­
cipal findings and recommendations.
The only analyses carried out by IMOover the last few years
have concerned serious casualties to seagoing tankers of 6000
deadweight and above; until 1980 the analyses were limited to
l0,000 deadweight and above, The casualty data upon which the
analyses are based are provided by Lloyd's Register of Ship­
ping and not by the participating_countries. Proposals to carry
out analyses of casualties to all types of ships have so far
been turned down, apparently because of budget considerations.
Accordingly, the role of IMOhas been very limited and no succ­
ess has been achieved in standardizing casualty investigations.
with very few exceptions, the efforts madeby various mari­
time countries and their achievements in improvingsafety asa res­
ult of casualty investigations are not communicatedto other
countries. Thus, there must exist considerable duplication
of investigations which might not otherwise be needed except
to the extent required for statistical purposes.
SECTION III
3.1 RADAR:
Radar was invented in 1922 and rapidly developed in the ye­
ars leading up to. During world war II, it was used origi­
nally to detect and track hostile vessels and aircraft.
Following world war II it became standard equipment on mer­
chat vessels and soon becamerequired navigation equiment
internationally.
It was considered by many as the ultimate system to deter­
mine the correct action to prevent collisions using plott­
ing technique, but ships continued colliding and in many
cases the collision could actually be traced to the use of
radar.
Analysis of manycollisions indicate that the main problem
is the lnmited capability of humanbeings in operating cor­
rectly and utilizing the information available on the PPI
with an adequate speed and accuracy. As the radar picture
is a present-value presentation only, and as the measure­
ments normally are relative to a moving reference (own
ship). the humaninterpretation of the situation is depend­
ing on considerable skill and concentration.
Manyinvestigations have been-done which led to the deve­
lopment of many devices, some of very simple design and
others are highly sophis-ticated, to provide the navigator
with a quick and better appreciation of the situation whi­
ch can led to an early and effective action to avoid colli­
sion.
During.the early years of development, effort was pri­
marily directed towards improving componentand unit re­
liability. Factors of immediate importance were seen to
be the simplification of unit control to allow cmpara­
tively unskilled operators to obtain operable informat­
ion, improvement in data accuracy by increased tube size,
gyro stabilisation, scanner design and variable range me­
asurement, and attacks on the rain and sea clutter pro­
blem to enhance the detection of marginal targets.
As time progressed, the ships increased in number, speed
and size associated with high traffic density, and pro­
blemsdue to the difficult interpretation of radar data
and the unadequate manual plotting on a plotting diagram
became more prominent.
The second stage in radar development thus directed to
solve these problems. Improvedplotting faciities and true
motion presentation were then introduced.
True motion used simple analogues to convert the log speed
and compass course of own ship to a steady scaled deflec­
tion shift in the cathods ray tube origin. This shift could
then extract ownship motion from the relative motion of
the echoes. leaving displayed the real motion of the target.
It was supposed that since most manoeuvres in clear weather
were based on the real motion of the target ship, equal succ­
ess uould accompanymanoeuvres madtin fog if the real aspect
of the target was available; This supposition was, unfort­
unately, not true and the advent of true motion made no not­
iceable impacton the radar collision statistics. Intact
500 ‘O 309° Original operator misconceptions, true motion
was often wiewed with suspicion and was only slowly accep­
ted.
Muchmore significance was apparent in the introduction of
plotting aids. Most wide spread influence in this area was
due to an on-screen manual device termed the reflection plo­
tter. Perhaps an unforseen but important feature of the re­
flection plotter was the contribution which it madeto a
wider appreciation of gyro stabilised displays and their re­
lated north-up presentation of the radar picture.
Amongother plotting aids which were introduced were those
which automatically recording the position of any echo, se­
lected by range and bearing marker on the display, on an
ancillary plotting surface.
Another more sophisticated equipment used a photographic
record of the targets motion over a period of several min­
utes which was then made available for immediate presenta­
tion as a larggségbjection on a plotting screen.
Apart -from reflection plotter, none of these systems pro­
ved universally popular. They were followed by a second
generation of what may be termed appraisal aids. These were
installations which allowed the operator to asses the track
of a target in either true or relative motionand to deter­
mine whether a collision risk existed without being requir­
ed to produce an actual plot.
Most luccellful among these were the Decca Ac-marker
system and the Kelvin Hughes S.D Radar.
Both these enj°¥ed a popular acceptance because they re­
movedmuch of the drudgery normally associated with man­
ual plotting but left the watchkeeperand his decision
firmly in the loop.
In the late sixties microcircuitry and coputer availa­
bility opened another developmentarea in the radar field,
and generated equipments which have been termed computer
aided or collision Avoidance systems (C.A.S.) ORAutomatic
Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA).
The first of these systems, which transfer radar data into
a computer and play out a synthetic picture on the display.
was produced by the Norcontrol company (Databrideg). The
system used dedicated computer. trackers units and synthe­
tic display to showvectors attached to echoes.
Since that time, advances in both computer and display
technology have been exploited by a number of companies who
preduce systems with a wide variety of alternative combina­
tions of facilities showingtarget vectors except a single
company (SPERRY)which produced the Sperry C A S system
which addresses the avoidance problem more particularly
by difining the possible point of collision (P.P.C.l and
showing the Possible Area of Danger (P.A.D.l.
At the same time some small computing power was used in an
advanced appraisal aids. This equipment stored the track of
targets by recording on a video tape a coplete series of
past radar pictures. The operator could play these back
to snvisags the positions Vhich all echoes had occupied
over a discrete historical period. At the sametime. the
history of ownship‘s motion is stored so that either true
or relative motion may be played out.
Development still keep going on to improve the use of ra­
dars for both navigation and anti-collision purposes.
The Kelvin Hughes produced the Anticol ARPAwith a ground­
stabili8ed.fairway chart formedby a series of parallel
straight lines and with channel widht and length set by the
user, similar but more detailed charts of selected port
approaches can also programmedand stored in the computer
memoryfor subsequent recall when required.
Atlas 7600 produced by Krupp Atlas Electronik with mem­
ory-backed rasterscan colour display on 67 cmhigh-reso­
lution screen. Brilliant. steady presentation of all in­
formation on one display of excellent daylight quality,
avoiding fade-away of radar signals and need for viewing
hood.
Furuno has introduced a combined colour picture and plo­
tter on one screen. With this system the vessel’s posi­
tuion moves across the screg§%f§iormation from position
finding equipment and, at the same time, the radar dis­
play indicates land masses and other vessels.
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However, to give a clear presentation of the developments
in commercial marine radar and its devices, He may devide
its lite into three periods.
During the first two periods. evolution rather than revo­
lution was the established pattern or marine radar deve­
lopment and plotting devices improvement,believing it is
the best procedure for achievement of the high standard of
reliability demandedby the mariner, at an acceptable op­
erational cost.
In the third period, the majority of the equipents fall
into the revolutionary category, using digital computers
to track target movement, to process information and pro­
duce simulated graphics on the screen.
Wemay, therefore, distinguish three successive contri­
butions to the present state of the art:
1- Traditional radar sets assisted by plotting aids such
as; Track plotter, RASplotter, Reflection plotter, Auto­
plot, and photographic radar plot.
2- Radardisplays with built-in plotting devices not assis­
ted by computer such as; Decca 66 Ac, Raytheon TH/CA,
Kelvin Hughessituation Display, and Marconi predictor.
3- Computerized systems for automatic tracking and process­
ing of data such as; Data bridge, Digiplot, Raytheon
Raycas, selenia, sperry CA5. Racal Decca.
3.1.3 Manual plotting:
The traditional radar screen does not give a complete pic­
ture. Ships appear on the screen as points, both their bear­
ing and their range can be observed and the observer must
plot to complete the picture as given by the eye. This te­
chnique vill provide the navigator with a detailed informa­
tion upon which he can make decisions.
This detailed information is of two kinds, relative to own­
ship and true.
The relative data gives the degree of risk of collision of
the target in terms of the closest point of approach (C.P.A:)
on present course and speed, and the time interval before
this point would be reached.
The true information comprises the course and speed of the
other ship.
Therefore if the radar is properly used, accurate manual
plotting can enable the navigator to appreciate the situa­
tion around the ship and recognise the collision risk by
comparing the distance of the closest point with the accep­
ted minimumsafe passing distance and that will help him
to find the effective action to avoid close quarter situa­
tions and collisions.
Relative motion presentation will be appreciated for coll­
ision avoidance in open waters while true motion may be
preferred in narrow waters.
This method of tackling a collision avoidance problem may
help the.mariner to overcomethe disadvantages of the y;.­
ual observational method.
The manual plotting technique, however, have disadvantages
of its own:
1- Inaccuracy:
pr(a Errors in reading the ranges and bearings of
targets and the time. '
(b hr Unsteady course and speed of own ship and tar­
gets during plotting interval.
3(c Errors in marking positions and in drawing lines
on the plotting sheet.
2- Plotting is time consumingand requires the full attention
of the navigator for several minutes per plot.
3- An unfortunate limitation in the numberof echoes that may
be satisfactorily handled.
4- The technique provides poor protection against humanblun­
ders. I
5- A necessity for continous and regular plotting to detect
any change in the situation.
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3.l.l.L Errors in manualplotting:
Errors in plotting can be due to;
1- Errors in the bearings taken.
2- Errors in the ranges measured.
3- Wrongestimation of course and speed of own ship during
the plotting interval.
4- Errors in the time of the plotting interval.
Effect of inaccurate bearings and ranges:
The relative plotting normally done by taking three range
and bearing of the target at regular intervals to construct
the relative vector of the target (oh). If any of these ran­
ges or bearings is not correct, the resulted (oh) will be
inaccurate causing error in the estimated nearest approach,
the time of nearest approach, and the aspect.
whenthe vector triangle is completed, the true motion vec­
tor of target will also be affected leading to inaccurate
estimation of target's true course and speed.
Therefore, it is advisable to take at least three ranges
and hearings whenplotting and if the three positions of
target were not laying on a straight line an average line
should be used to reduce the error as muchas possible.
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Figure ( 43)
Joining (0 0‘) indicate that the target should pass astern
of ownship joining (o‘A) indicate that the target should
pass ahead of own ship, while the situation is most pro­
bably a collision case.
In the case of true plot, the true vector of the target
(WA)will be inaccurate causing an error in the calculated
true speed and course of the target and also the aspect.
Whenthe triangle is completed. the relative motion of
target will be affected leading to inaccurate estimation
of nearest approach and its time.
Figure ( 44)
The existence of such type of error is always possible,
its amount will depent on the accuracy of the means used
for measurementand the observer skills.
rertorloance standards for navigational radar equipmentre­
quire:
Radars installed before 1.9.84
ruad range rugs shouldarable
the range of an daject, whoseer.­
ho lies on a range ring, to be
measuredwith an error not excee­
dirfl 1.5 percent of the maxinun
range of the scale in use, or 70
metres, whichever is the greater.
Anyadditionalmeans of measur­
ing range alnuld have an error
mt exceeding 2.5%of themax1­
nunrange of the diqalayed scale
in use, or 120 metres whichever
is the greater.
'I‘hemeanspIOvidedforobta1.n:l.ng
hearingelnuldenablethebearing
ofatarvgetwhoseechoappears
attheedgeofthedisplayto
hemeasuredwithanaccuracyof
1 1° or better.
Radars 1nBtn.11a:!after 1.9.84
';‘hetixedrangeri.I'Igaandthevari­
ablerangemarku'a|:nu1denablethe
rangeofanobjecttohenaasured
withanerrormt exceding1.5\
of thenaxixnnrangeofthescale
inuse, or 70nete.rs,\h.icheveris
the greater.
um“ estimation of own ship course and speed:
This kind of error will Cause incorrect true vector of own
|h1p. In case of relative plot, the position of point (R)
will be incorrect affecting the accuracy of the true course
and speed of target. The aspect will a13o be gffectgd,
In case of true plot, the position of point (01 will be in­
correct affecting the relative motion line of target caus­
ing error in the estimated nearest approach, time of near­
est approach, and the aspect.
The estimation of own ship speed will depend on the accuracy
of the means used for calculation, (log, fi.P.M. of the pro­
peller, ship's positions).
The estimation of ownship course during plotting interval
will be difficult if the ship was yawing. The skill of the
observer is also important.
Rljgfyye‘
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Figure ( 45 )
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Figure (46 )
3.1.1.2 égguracy of manua1_p1ott1ng:
Hhenradar plotting is used to find out the target course
and speed, and the risk of collision it any we proceed as
follow in case of relative motion:
Auauming own ship course is 36;. 1tB BPeed 15 knots.
and plotting interval is 20 minautes. Initial range of
target is 12 N.
Figure (47 1
A- The ‘accuracy of own ship yector (Ho) will degnd on;
1- The accuracy of own ship course during the plotting
interval.
2- The accuracy of the estimated own ship velocity dufing the
plotting interval.
The ggssible errors in heading are:
1- Constrtntive error .
2- Roundingoff error (error in gyro alignement).
3- Drift error.
1- Sgnstmctive error:
The frequency distribution of error can be considered as
normally distributed with a maximumva'lue of 1°
«B-9. 5- _.._z 1/3°
because the probility of plotting
of an error of 1° is considered
to be the maximum.
n...
‘I r——-.
2- Roundingoff error:
The frequency distribution of that type of error is uni­
form also with a range of 1°2.9-fi . n.­
3- Drift error:
'h
I(initialy 3°, thena--= 3/3 - 1°) ' '
Where : C3 is constant depend on ship‘s form assumed to be 1°
H is wind speed assumed to be force 7 BF - 28 knots
V is ship's speed assumed to be 16 knots
AUis lateral surface over water
ALis lateral surface under water
W %(AU/AL) is assumed to be (1)
¢><is wind direction assume uorst condition 90° or 270°
.'. sin a< = 1
.'. 5- = 1 . —%%—' (1;h . 1 = 1.7s°
then 6-3 of total heading error is ((1/3)2 + (1/3)2 * (1.75)2)
= 3.2a°°
and c‘ = 1.a°
accuracy M95 = 2!‘ = 3.60
6-; = V.T. tan 1.80
= 15- %% ° tan 1.8° = 0.1676
Uhere T is assumed to be 20 minutes.
The possible speed errors are:
1- Log error
2- Constructive error
0
Log error can satisfactory be taken as 2%of own ship speed. \
and estimated constructive error about 0.1%of the speed. qt-I|
.'. = 0/ knt
‘;';beed 2 X of v ___ 1/3 0 s ‘
then the accuracyrcfi 0.7 knots. \
\
.'. = 1 3 .T = (1/3).(1/3) = (1/9) miles \5‘)! (l) I‘
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3.9. R68 Of P011112W3 1.1 +63) / 311-;90
- 1.1 ((o.1e7e)2 + (11912?
- 0.22
2
and R68 = 0.048
accuracy of point W= R95 = 5/3 R68 = 5/3 X 0.22 - 0.37
fgr T=20 minutes.
3- The accuracy of oA will degend on:
1- Bearing accuracy.
2—Range accuracy.
Bearing accuracy:
The disturbances and their contribution to the error are:
1- Azimuth error scanner / sweep max .£—°
p2= 1/3e°°
2- Heel or list of ship max heel 15°
d_3= 1/900
3- Bearing cursor/EBL error max 1°
6_3= 1/900
4- Roundingoff to the nearest half degree
6-3: 1/4a°°
5- Error in total correction
6_3= 6/looo
- Error in plot the lop into the plotting sheet01
6_}= 1/3600
Total variancein Lop 6-2= 0.900
¢r~= o.95°
TM:nonna1y.distributed error in the direction of the bearing
Hnecauses an error equal to:
cf(Tangentl- tan 0.95 X Dist. of target NM
= 1 / 60 X Dist. of target ­
O.2NM
= 30.87 X Dist. of target =
370.4 metres
Range accuracy:
The disturbances and their contribution to the error are:
1- VRMerror with a max of 1.5% of the range
6‘2$ 25 m"
62-= 625 m2 , or
in use, or 70 metres, whichever is the greater
6"~\<0.5%. range
0.25 (1o)" (range)2
2- Observer measuring error with a naximun
a"“=0.5%. range
2 -4 2
6-— = 0.25 (10) (range)
of 1.5% of the range in use
3- Rounding off to 0.1 M readout of VRM
2 1 2 26%-#7 M
The sumof these variances does not give an easy expression
for the Lop error, the following approximation can be made:
J_fran3e1.nuse<6Mt.hen¢'=5xrange1.nm1.1es+50 metres
11;-ange1nuse>6Mt.hen6'=0.75%oft.herange 14.)!
For our case fro H = 0.0075 X 12 = 0.09 N.H
=l3.89 X 12 = 166.7 metres
Figure ( 48 )
R68 (one plot) - 1.1 ( 6-%—tangent) + fiaormangw
- 1.1 ((30.87l2 * (13.B9)2 V’ X Distance (metres)
Since best fit relative track will be used, there-fore, it
canbe stated that the error in this regression line will
obey to the Average law. If the numberof plots is indi­
cated by (n) and the radius of the 68%confidence of plot
by R then the cross track error (CTE)in the relative68'
ugg%F¥aPn ;track will haVe 3 5t D 3 GTE which can be expressed
Figure ( 49)
R
__6u1_z1o_n_ R at¢y" ' ' point (A).
CTE 2/3 ( n fa 68
From geometry
(rain I (féTE = ( TCPA+ plotting interval in minutes)/
plotting interval in minutes
.'. cfE}A 8 crETE . ((TCPA / plotting interval ) + 1)
V
In our case R68 ( 1 plot ) = 1.1 ((3o.a7)2 + (13.e9)2)'x 12
= 446.8 metres
6CTE = R68 (1 P1011-)/ 1.15 = 397 metre = 0.21 14.!)
= R 8 at point (A) .'. R28 at (A)= 0.04 N.M6
‘rEbA = 387 (( T.CPA / 20) + 1)
= 387 ((21.2 / 20) + 1 )= 797 metres= 0.43 N-”
accuracy M95 = 2(T‘= 0.9 N.M
Taking 0.01 N.Mas a safety margin
then total R268 at point (W) = 0.048 + 0.04 + 0.01 = 0.098 N.M
.'. Total R at (W) = 0.3 N.M68
total occuracy of point (W) = 5/3 X 0.3 = 0.5 N.M
Figure ( 50 )
(x1 U111be the error in the true couse of target
lino‘: '
since (X) is small, then 6-’-‘(redl
target
0.3 / distance of target in 20 minutes
- 0.9 1 velocity or
In our example distance of target is 7 N.H in 20 minutes
-2.5° the accuracy = 5O
0.3 ‘.1’1.1 (G3 dist. of target + 5-2 dist. of target)": =’
2 '41.1 ( 2 5‘ dist. of target)
2
.°. 0.09 :1 1.2
gz'dist. of target =
G dist. of target =
6 vetocity of target
accuracy = 1.14 knots
( 2 a- dist. of target)
0.09 / 2.4 = 0.037
(in 20 minutes)
0.19 ( in 20 minutes )
= 0.57 knots
3.1.2 Manual Plotting aid :
To assist the navigator in speeding up radar plotting to
handle a greater numberof targets and increase plotting
accuracy, several types of aids have been developed.
3.1_2_2_ Track plotter:
It can be used for either true or relative plot on pla1n
paper. The device enables the mariner to carry out the
plot without the need of using parallel ru1ers.divflkrS
or compass roses.
A fitted light over the graduation pointer permits its use
without other lights at night.
Figure ( 51 )
3.1.2.2 The R.A.S. Elotter:
It is a mechanical compass-datumplotter, designed by the
erstwhile Radio Advisory service of the Chamberof Shipping.
Plotting is carried out on a disc of transparent material
free to rotate about its centre abovea slightly larger
circular disc. Attached to the axis of the plotter and
free to slide over the face of the disc, a transparent pro­
tractor which can be used to draw the bearing lines and to
obtain the direction and distance of any point.
The ship's true course on the inner scale must be set ag­
ainst the 000° on the outer scale each time the course is
altered.
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Figure ( 52 )
The two main advantages of the R.A.s. plotter are; it is
more durable, the true and relative bearing scales eliminate
the need to convert bearings mentally, and the rotating plo­
tting aurface fI|C111"-M’-1?-9predictions and continued plotting
whenown ship alters course.
- 153 ­
3.1.2.3 The Anti-parallax Reflection plotter;
It is a simple optical system which removes the parallax
normally associated with plotting on the protective screen
over the C.R.T., and permitted vector analysis to be con­
ducted immediately over the echoes on the radar display.
The advantages are:
1- Reduction in errors of data transfer.
2- Quick and convenient marking on the screen directly.
3- Muchlarger number of ships could be handled.
However, its disadvantages are:
1- The need to use crude instruments as wax tipped pencils
and soft rulers,
2- A new plot is always required when the range scale is
changed.
3- whenusing a ship’s head up display and a reflection plo­
tter with a non-rotatable plotting surface a newplot may
be required whenownship alters course, and predictions
will be difficult.
4- whenusing an unstabilized display, for the sake of accur­
acy, it is essential to makesure that the ship is right
on course at the momentthe positions of the echoes are
being markedon the reflection plotter. which is diffi­
cult when the ship is yawing.
“"95. A‘II­C.’
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rigure ( 53 )
3.1.2.4 Autoplot Ltd:
Its principle is based on plotting by meansof transpar­
encies. It is a seperate pedestal mounteddevice which
can he used to record both true and relative plots simu­
ltaneously from an existing radar.
It provides a simple and quick method of making a com­
plete plot but practicaly not sufficient, need careful
adjustment and training for accurate results, and still
not efficient to deal with high traffic situation.
3.1.2.5 ghotggraphic Radar plot ( P.R,P. 1
This system was presented by Kelvin-Hughes and provides
the observer with bright radar picture. The radar screen
is photographed at regular predetermined time intervals
and projected on the under side of a flat, horizontal squa­
re trasparent plotting surface.
The basis of the plot is madeby pencilling periodically
the projected echoes on the plotting surface.
The advantages are:
1- Bright radar picture which can easily be viewed in day­
light without the aid of a viewing hood, so it is possi­
ble for several officers to view the picture at once.
2- Plotting can be carried out easily and large numbersof
echoes can be detected at the same time and at regular
time intervals which eleminate time errors.
3- All information over a time period may be viewed at one
time and no chance of an echo being lost through inatten­
tion.
4- Weakechoes which may only point on infrequent sweeps of
the scan have a better chance of detection due to contin­
ous exposure in the same position on the film. This also
true to someextent for echoes in clutter.
The picture renewal rate selected by the observer must de­
pend on the circumestances prevailing at any time. e.g.
faster rate should be selected in congested waters.
The system is reliable and simple to operate but it is
acknowledged that it has some disadvantages such as stocks
of film and chemicals must be available for its operation.
2*‘ L '7" -- u. - . M‘-«'1
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Figure ( 54 1
Figure ( S5 )
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3.1.2.6 Improving in accuracy using previous aids:
The use of these aids have improved the accuracy of manua1
plotting by avoiding someof the error sources.
For example, if the reflection plotter is used instead of
the P1°tt1n9 diagram the accuracy will be better as follows:
1- The radar-bearing error differs from the value derived in
the previous example, only the first two disturbances
mentioned before will contribute to the bearing error in
the plot.
The variance in the bearing thus amounts to 5/36°°from
which it follows that the error in the target position
in a direction perpendicular to its bearing has
Gwanget) = 12 X distance in _N.M(metres).
The radar-distance error is only composedof the first
two errors mentioned before for the distance. It follows
that the error in the target -.djstance has a variance =
40.5 x (1o)' x (Range)2.
Andfrom this the standard deviation in the distance of
the target can be derived to be Gomal) = 13¥R3n9e
in N.M (metres)
2 2? . _Then R68 (one plot) = 1.1 x( (12) + (13) X d1st- ­
19.5 X dist. (metres).
If the target distance is close to the range in use which
is always advisable.
VfcTE - 19.5 1: Diet. [(2/3(0)‘) at point (A)
(Eh . ((19.5 x Dist.i[ 1.155 X(('l'C1-‘A/plotint.) + 11
S ¢rE§A- 202.6 K 2.06 -417.46 metres0
- 0.225 N.M
and the gccuracy M95 8 OAS N.Mwhich is much better, since
the accuracy at point (A) will be affected, the accuracy of
true course & speed of target will also be better.
3.1.3 Appraisal aids:
In 5 gurvey of collisions and from experience on board shi­
p., it has been proved that in congested waters particularly
during restricted visibility a great deal of time and exper­
tise is demandedfrom the radar observer to evaluate the tra­
ffic situation correctly by plotting.
To reduce the load of work, the possibility of humanerror,
and to give the observer more time to use his intelligence
in appraising the situation and keeping it under review,
radar engineers kept trying to develop the plotting devi­
ces and presented more advanced ones got the name apprai­
sal aids which, in one way or another, produce information
in the form needed.
The concept of these devices is generally to adopt some
available technology to enable a history of the target mo­
tion to be examined without the need for the observer to
physically take ranges and bearings in the conventional way.
This type of display is sometimesreferred to as a history
display. The following give a brief mention of someof the
more commonlyinstalled equipments.
3.1.3.1‘ Raytheon TM ( C :
This device has an electronically aided manual plot. A
lmall processor allows dual markers to be placed on echoes
of the observer's choice one of the markers remains at the
original position of the target while the other records
own ships displacement. These two marks and the current po­
sition of the target provide the three corners of the vector
traingle of manualplotting.
Anelectronic digital clock indicates the plot time for each
echo separately whenselected by the operator. To facili­
tate measurement, A more sophisticated electronic bearing
line has a movable point of origin is madeavailable to help
in measuring true tracks or evaluate miss distance of the
target. The equipment is able to deal with 8 targets in the
same time. A trail course and speed shange can be carried
out on the most dangerous target, and is automatically app­
lied to the other 7 targets.
Althoughcomputation is facilitated in this way, the plot
is basically manual and will suffer from the delays and dis­
continuities of a plot on a reflection plotter, there is no
delivery of quantative information without the intervention
of the operator.
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3.1.3.2 Anti-collision radar of Decca (66 AC) :
The equipment provides five markers which can be placed in­
dividually on echoes whose movements need to be watched.
Each marker is a bright line, one inch long, and having a
bright spot at one end which is placed on the echo. The line
points directly towards ownship, so if an echo diverges
from the line, it showsthat the target will pass either
ahead or astern of ownship‘s centre, but if the echo re­
mains on the marker, or very neafsit, a collision risk then
exist.
The line connecting the bright spot on the marker to the ac­
tual position of the echo portrays the relative motion line
so that the predicted nearest approach can be estimated.
The tail of the echo gives an indication of the true motion
line. This information can noweasily be collected and com­
pleted by meansof reflection plotter.
With true motion mode the markers are moved in step with
the picture origin to preserve the collision line integrity.
This way has a simplistic approach which permits the observer
to behave in exactly the same way as he would in the use of
conventional radar.
Since little computation is done, errors of the system are
not significant, but it is necessary to maintain a careful
watch on the echo track during the observation period to en­
sure that it is constant.
There will be discontinuities whenthe true motion resets
and when scale or mode are changed. It own ship alters
course or speed all the markers in use will have to be re­
positioned on their echoes, also if a markedtarget alters,
its marker will have to be reset­
In each case there has to be a hiatus while the echo moves
awayfrom the newly positioned origin, this will take bet­
ween 1,5 to 3 minutes.
The figure shows the extra controls for anti—collision ra­
dar, above the display.
1777 *'lfi.§FL3ih«
7r‘
9:1-'c‘.v«_-..5.:..'.-.*-<.r’.’;'-"" ­mom-u '- ' ~rune.
Figure( 57 )
3.1.3.3 K.H. Situation Display:
The purpose of this unusual radar is to provide enhanced
true or relative echo trails. The radar picture is produced
on a non-persistent 3-inch cathode ray tube and is projected
on to a sensitive screen called ImageRetaining panel (I.R.P.).
The I.R.P. is scanned by a television camera and the picture
thus obtained is shownon the bridge display, which is non­
persistent.
This gives clearer daylight viewing, but does not use the
signal processing adopted by the other systems previously
mentioned.
Relative or true motion can be obtained, and the extending
afterglow of the target’s history permit assessment of coll­
ision risk or true course of target respectively. The length
of the trails give someindication of the target speed.
One advantage of this system is that any change in track,
either relative or true, due to target's manoeuvreis clearly­
defined. Another is that when true motion is used ownship
center remains at the picture centre.
Discontinuities are numerousdue to IRP reset (the reset per­
iod is 3 minutes when the range scale is 3 miles or less and
6 minutes for 6 miles range or more). The discontinuity will
last about twominutes while the trails build up sufficiently
and the picture is again displaying a full track information.
The IRP resets with similar effect whenthere is a change of
mode or range scale.
The operator can draw A crude plot on the tube face an on
a reflection plotter with all its time delays.
3.1.3.4‘ Marconi Predictor:
This is the most sophisticated of this group of systems.
It is an automatic electronic plotting system, but not 1n
the fully computerised sense.
The whole picture of the radar is stored on a videotape
End the“ ¥eP13Yed 1" 3 °YC1ic fashion to give indication of
the echo movement.
It displays a continually up-dated three position track for
all echoes on the screen simultaneously. Using videotape
means that all viewed targets will appear on the history
display, this includes land, rain and sea clutter. The to­
tal duration of the track is1.S,3, or 6 minutes.
Choice of these alternative speeds is under operator control
to suit the range in use and the urgency of the situation.
The track are up-dated every 10 seconds.
The presentation is permanently centred and will showeither
true or relative tracks. There is no display of quantitative
information and any needed values have to be measured by the
operator.
Trialmaneuveris possible, the relative tracks predicted as
a result of a proposed change of course and speed can be dis­
played. Manualextrapolation will showthe result of the tria1
manoeuvre in terms of achieved nearest approach.
The predictor display has a number of advantages above the con­
ventional display:
1- Automatic solving of velocity triangles for past and fu­
ture occasions for a determined time interval, enabling
9°05 ammimxxuappreciation of the situation.
2- Bright echo track.
3- No re-setting has to be employed when using a true motion
display.
This indeed, eliminates the danger of the frequent occurrume
of late re-setting and makes the display also eminently suit­
able for fast movingvessels in clear weather.
4- The ability to moveinstantaneously to view either true
or relative motion is muchappreciated by the operator.
5- Information is represented in a form which is as easily
simulated as possible.
Although, the system has somedisadvantages:
1- Nodiscrimination between targets and clutter echoes,
these unwanted echoes appear on all pictures and hence,
in relative motion particularly, makea considerable con­
fusion on the screen.
2- Wheretraffic density is high, intersecting tracks of tar­
gets sometimesmakepossitive indentification difficult
despite the cyclic brightening that occurs on the target
train.
COMMENT:
However, electronically aided systems give some informa­
tion more qu1_,_-guythan manual methods, but when using in a
collision risk situation, one has to dependeither upon
visual interpretation unpunctuated by numerical facts,
or on manual plotting to supplement it. Either way, the
time scale will be, or will approach, that of 3 or 6 min­
ute track duration, which may not be quick enough.
With predictor, velocity triangles are solved automati­
cally saving time and reducing humanblunders- (Ner,no
resetting when using a true modewhich eliminates the dan­
ger of the frequent occurrence of 1ate resett1'n9­
But since the appreciation of a change of target move­
ment is dependent on visual discrimination of its com­
puted track, the renewal rate will equal the plot interval
in use0-5, 1, or 2 minutes which still need to be removed.
3.2 Automatic Radar plotting Aids (ARPA):
up to this stage, the extraction of the information required
from marine radar in time and with adequate accuracy to aid
decision-making, was still one of the prime problems which
needed to be solved by the mariner. This is especially so in
dense traffic and in confined waters under poor visibility
condition.
There can be no doubt that man is unable to derive the amount
of knowledge necessary to handle a complex situation from man­
ual appreciation of the radar data. In low traffic density,
with the aid of reflection plotters or other appraisal aids,
there maybe sufficient time available for an experienced and
dedicated man to conduct a formal plot, analyse the data and
implement an avoiding action. whenthe density of traffic and
the complexity of the situation increases, manualappraisal
is no longer adequate and the level of plotting must necessar­
ily be reduced to accommodatethe increasing numberof thre­
ats until, ultimately, little more than a cursory tracking of
supposed most dangerous targets is achieved.
The problem may be divided into five principal functions:
0-‘- Determine which echoes are to be suppervised.
2- Keeping track of these echoes.
U
- Analysingcollision risk.
§
- Determine escape manoeuvres.
5- Execute the escape manoeuvre and re-establish main course.
This demonstrable need has accelerated the application of
tschnologyin commercialmarine radar to satisfy, accelerate
and simplify, this task. Hence, more sophisticated equip­
ment started to appear usfim computers and displays for
automatic tracking and processing of data.
The designers faced manyconstrains, no least of which is
the shipowners concern with cost benefits, problems of ship­
borne maintenance and the upgrading of training methods for
proper and effective use of the system.
In 1965 the idea was conceived to establish an installation
project for evaluating howcomputer technology could be used
on board ship to increase safety at sfiflgreduce operational
costs. Norcontrol was the project manager in this Norwegian
research project which started in 1967 as a co-operation bet­
ween the Norwegian Ship Research Institute, Det Norske Ver­
itas and Norwegian shipowners.
Twoyears of extensive research and development began, and
in 1969 the world‘s first shipborne computerized collision
avoidance and integrated navigation system ‘Data Bridge‘ was
installed on board of Hi1helmsen's M/ S Taimyr.
The design goal was to obtain a system that:
1- Is accurate and easy to handle.
2- Mayfollow a number of ships simultaneously.
3- Is easy to interprete.
4- Is up—datedautomatically.
The more recently introduced computerized systems for colli­
sion avoidance promise not only a lighter work load for the
navigator in times of stress and a more timely warning of im­
pending danger, but a fuller and more up-to-date and objec­
tive presentation of the data on which he must make his de­
cisions and a facility for assessing the outcomeof any int­
ended manoeuvre.
The computerized collision avoidance system was a radical
innovation in the marine field, comparedto unassisted rad­
ar. These systems represent a significant investment by the
shipping industry.
In general, such systems can be described as automatic radar
plotting devices which possess the ability to deal with den­
ser traffic situations than could be accommodatedby manual
plotting alone. It can tirelessly producecorrect data on a
large numberof selected targets and widening the apprecia­
tion of target behaviour.
User satisfaction has varied, muchmore has been said in its
favour than against it. It maybe danger to relinquish the
tracking duty to the computer, since errors are always pre­
sent in the radar system approach, but appreciation of these
errors and their sources will permit a useful level of infor­
mation to becomeavailable.
Typically the first comparative study by Liverpool Polytech­
nic of theprnrup al plotting systems, a practical examination
by a group of 68 officers of widely different eiperience and
nationality involving only very brief tuition and using simu­
lated displays without the ergonomicadvantages of the actual
equipment, showeda very definite consensus in favour of the
A.R.P.A.- A study by quite a different source carried out on
the computer-aided operations research facility of the u.s.A.
Maritime Administration reached a similar conclusion.
The trend towards the concept of using computers in a fully
automatic radar plotting system was supported by extensive
research projects. This provide that the need for such a sy­
Item is essential to meet the contigencies which always ar­
ise due to the continuous increase in speed, size and num­
ber of ships.
Evidence in court cases indicate that the time which passed
between the momentof realization that a high risk of colli­
sion existed and the collision was between five and fifteen
minutes, with the average below ten. This time interval can
be called "escape time" which may be divided into the time
required for accurate observation, plotting (computation)
and appraisal, (called planning time), and that available to
manoeuvre clear. As the manoeuvre required.will not be known
until the planning is complete, it will be obvious that the
planning time must be as short as possible.
In the interest of reducing the planning time to an absolute
minimum,the information required by the observer is as foll­
ows:
Firstly, it should reach him at the earliest possible moment
after the need for it is established.
Secondly, on arrival it should be as up-do-date as possible.
Thirdly, it should be renewedat the shortest possible inter­
vals.
with an escape time of less than ten minutes, the paramount
need after manoeuvringaction is initiated, will be to watch
closely and continously the behaviour of the other ship.
Obviously, these can only be achieved by using caputers
with a very short renewal rate, in a full automatic radar
plotting system with graphical and numerical displays. More­
over, this system could have the possibility of securing
earlier recognition of high risk of collision and so increas­
ing the escape time.
In December 1976 the Liberian registered tanker Argo Merchant
ran aground on Nantucket shoals, producing a large oil slick
which brought the threat of heavy pollution on the coast of
Massachusetts and, althoughthere was no appreciable damage
to the environment, this casualty brought considerable pres­
sure in the USfor action to reduce the risk of similar ac­
cidents. In March 1977 th US president announced his inten­
tion to develop a series of regulations which would include
a requirement that large tankers entering USwaters be fit­
ted with a collision avoidance system conforming to speci­
fied standards. The USCGrequested the IMOSub-Comittee on
Safety of Navigation to develop performance specifications
and to prescribe carriage requirements for collision avoi­
dance systems.
The US request was first considered by the IMOSub-Committee
in September 1977 but it was not until September 1979, after
several meetings, that agreement was finally reached on per­
formance standards and carriage requirement.
As a result of the IMOagreements, the regulations for the
fitting of an ARPAare as follows:
1) Mandatory for all vessels of 10,000 tons gross upauus
constructed on or after September 1 1984
11) Tankers constructed before September 1 1984 shall be
fitted with an ARPAas follows:
a) by January 1 1985 if of 40,000 tons gross and upauds
b) by January 1 1986 if of 10,000 tons gross and upauds
but less than 40,000 tons gross
iii) Vessels constructed before September 1 1984 that are
not tankers, shall be fitted with ARPAas follows:
a) by September 1 1986 if of 40,000 gross tons and up­
wards
b) by September 1 1987 if of 20,000 gross tons and up­
wards, but less than 40,000 gross tons
c) by September 1 1988 if of 15,000 gross tons and up­
wards, but less than 20,000 gross tons.
ARPASfitted prior to September 1 1984 which do not con­
form to the performances standards adopted by IMOmay be
retained until January 1 1991. Also ships may be exempted
from the ARPArequirements in cases where IMOconsiders it
unreasonable or unnecessary for an ARPAto be carried, or
when the ship will be taken permanently out of service
within two years of appropriate implementation date.
The USAuthorities were not satisfied with the progress at
IMO, towards early implementation of ARPAcarriage require
ments. In October 1978, congress passed the port and umer
safety act which require tankers of over 10,000 gross has
entering Americanports to be fitted with automatic pknthg
aids satisfying USspecifications by July 1 1982.
To meet both specifications, collision avoidance systems
must incorporate digital computers for radar data processing
and display driving purposes. Synthetic predictive and time­
history graphics are superimposed upon a slave radar display.
Alpha-numeric readout of data for a selected target will be
madeavailable in addition.
By the end of 1979 the number of ships fitted with comauter­
ized plotting aids was approximately 900, indicating a rate
of installation which has avereged about 100 per year. Under
the pressure of IMOresolutions and Us regulations on the fit­
ting of ARPAsthere is a potential market for some 10,000 at
the rate of 1000 a year until 1990 or thereabouts after which
it maydecline but still exist for newbuildings. This con­
stiunesa very tempting cake around which manufacurers in var­
ious countries are each reaching out for a slice.
As considerable number of manufacturers became interested in
this field of technology, this led to several types of sucha
system. All products must of course comply at least with the
minimumpreformance standard laid down in IMOresolution
which forces the producers for a commonidentity in respect
of main features. This could lead to a reduction in the cost
of equipment to be available at a reasonable price, but for
added attractions suppliers have tended to produce equipment
surpassing the minimumrequirements, which could lead to a
complicated system not simple enough for proper use and
could overwhelma watchkeeping'officer whenhe joins a diffi­
rent ship fitted with such equipment.
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Adequate training in the proper use of the principle types
of ARPAsystems and their display ChAraCter13t1cg ;hou1d be
a requirement for all masters and officers serving on ships
carrying such equipment. The IMOSub-Committee on Safety of
Navigation has recommendeda training programmein the opera­
tional use of ARPA(Resolution )\.482 x11 adopted on Nov.l98l) .
The Sub-Committeeconsidered that training should, in addition
to basic radar training, include the use of simulators cap­
able of demonstrating the capabilities, limitations and poss­
ible errors of ARPA.
However, there is a aggm to achieve an adequate improvement
in world-wide radar training standards in the near future.
Somecountries still do not have the ability to provide all
masters and mates with an extensive radar simulator course.
It seems probable that adequate improvements will not be made
in time to satisfy training requirements whichwill result
from the expected increased rate of installing ARPAto ships.
The automatic plotting aids offer advantages comparedwith
basic radar which could result in a significant reduction in
the incidence of collisions.
It remains to be seen whether, as happened when radar was in­
troduced, such advantages could be lost due to improper use,
lack of understanding, tendency to proceed at higher speed
and over-confidence. Toachive the full benefits it will be necessary
that effective action has to be taken to implement the IHOrecommendations
on world-wide standards of training.
A look at ARPAsfrom some of the major suppliers may be 1“­
teresting, though within confines of this thesis description
must necessarily be brief and therefore superficial.
3.2.1 ARPAtypes:
ARPA‘scurrently available are based on two different design
philosophies.
One, which at the same time serves a need for a second radar,
is a stand-alone single-screen system which is basically a
navigational radar incorporating full ARPAfacilities.
The other, aimed at ships that already have tworadars, consists
of a separate ARPAdisplay unit deriving its video input fr­
omone of the existing navigational radarsor, if interswich­
ing is provided, from either, whether s- band or x- band.
The latter configuration is in the majority and is adopted
by among others.
- Radar Devices, Inc. of San Leandro, California; in devis­
ing their Radar Watch Series of add-on automatic plotting
systems for interfacing with virtually any type of conventio­
nal radar on the screen of which it displays computer-gene­
rated graphic symbols.
- The Digiplot ARPAfrom the Iotron Corporation of Bedford.
Hass.; is also an add-on system but has its owndisplay unit
separate from that of radar with which it is interfaced.
Iotron were recently acquired by Radar Devices, Inc., whohave
thus added the Digiplot to their armouryof plotting systems.
bolstering the Radar watch which has only limited acceptance
by the USauthorities.
There are two Digiplot models, the RMand RR. Both analyse
all echoes observed by the radar within a range of 11 miles
and track and plot the 20 nearest to ownship in the case of
the R.Mand 40 in the R.R.-The 16 in. PPI picture presents
echoes in green with the synthetic display of alpha-numerics,
plotted circles, and ship vectors superimposedin orange.
Targets are acquired automatically on the computer's assess­
ment of threat and tracking is also fully automatic.
Alternatively, targets can be manually acquired by joystick
control which can also be used to select targets on which in­
formation in the form of a display of range and bearing, co­
urse and speed, CPAand TCPAis required. A target selected
by either means is indicated by a circle in orange around it
on the PPI.
On the 3, 6, 12 and 24 miles ranges the display can be swit­
ched head-up or north-up, relative or true. Target positions
are stored in the true motion mode in the computer and any
outside an arc of 22.5 degrees on either bow and moving away
are discarded. A trial manoeuvrefacility as required by the
specification is provided and fairway "charts" of harbours
regularly visited can be programmedand stored in the com­
puter memoryfor recall when required.
Figure ( 58 )
Another ARPAof American origin is Raytheon’s Raycas. This
too has a separate display interfaced with a standard radar
and acquisition of targets for tracking is automatic on the
ranges from 3 to 24 miles. Any target of potential hazzard
is indicated by a flashing vector and when the system is op­
erating in true motion a small circle on the screen ahead of
its vector shows where collision could occur if ownship were
to steer for it. A joystick is used for a manualacquisition.
A guard zone within two adjustable boundaries can be placed
around own ship anywhere between the 6 and 24 mile radii and
the range and bearing of any target entering this zone, to­
gether with other necessary target data, will be presented
in an alpha-numeric display.
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Figure ( 59 )
In addition, Raytheon have recently introduced a lower-cost
ARPAIthe RaYPath capable of acquiring and tracking up to 10
targets simultaneously within a range band between 1.5 and
12 n.m. Acquisition is manual by roller-ball and as newtar­
gets in excess of 10 are acquired earlier ones presenting le­
ast hazard are automatically erased. A guard zone maybe set,
target entry into which activates alarms, and the display can
b .
e switched between true and relative and between head-up and
north-up while ownship's position can be offset in any dir­
ection.
Although only 10 targets can be simultaneously tracked the
Raypath still complies with the IMOspecification since acq­
uisition is manual and the Performance Standard demandstra­
cking of up to 20 only when acquisition is automatic.
Tho Rayparh ISRay1hoon's Iona!-cos!
ARPA
Figure ( 50 )
- Sperry Marine Systems, a British American firm with Euro­
pean headquarters at Camberley in Surrey, have again opted for
the separate-unit ARPAin their CASII. This provides for man­
ual acquisition by joystick of up to 20 targets within the
maximumsearE%5%?36 n.m., with automatic acquisition as an
option.
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All targets are tracked and the microprocessor generates a
hexagonal PAD(Predicted Area of Danger) for each and since
these are not related to own ship the navigator needs mflyto
steer clear of PADsdisplayed to avoid any possibility of
collision. A PADis computed and put on the screen after 30
radar 5°a“3 °f the target - about 90 seconds - from acquisi­
tion. Its appearance being preceded by a dashed line vector
the targets ship's true course and, by its length her speed
calculated on the basis of distance travelled in six minutes.
The ARPAdisplay is offset to show own ship head-up or north­
up a quarter diameter from the rim of the screen and the user
can erase any PADSclearly seen to pose no present or future
threat. Alpha-numericreadouts of individual target data are
shownon demandon a separate rectangular display to the ri­
ght of the PPI.
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- The ARPAproduced by the Italian company Selesmar, based
in Florence, is again a separate unit capable of being inter­
faced with any navigational radar.
Designated the Prora Autotrack. Its PPI displays true or re­
lative motion target vectors, targets being acquired manually
at any range or automatically within a guard zone variable
from 0.2 to 23.9 n.m. Any target penetrating this zone acti­
vates alarms and then projects a vector. Electronic plotting
of target course and speed, CPAand TCPA,can be carried out
automatically or manual selection, and channel tracks can be
superimposed on the display.
Figure (62 )
- Japan Radio Company's JAS-B00 ARPAis again a separate un­
it system. with either manual or automatic acquisition of up
to 20 targets which can be simultaneously displayed with
C°Ur3eo ‘Peed find other data continually updated. A guard
ring can be set at a selected range and audible and visual
alarms also comeinto action if a target judged potentially
dangerous by the user closes to a distance and time consid­
ered to present an active threat. Vectors can be displayed
in relative or true modeswith the picture stabilised head­
up or north-up and the ARPArange scalesaxe 1.5, 3, 6, 12
or 24 n.m. independent of the associated radar. A pair of
navigation lines can be set up on the display to represent
a navigable shannel or ownship's track.
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Figure ( 63 )
- 191 ­
- Mitsubishi's MARACIIIA. is yet another separate ARPAdis­
play to be interfaced with a standard radar. This is capable
of tracking as many as 60 targets simultaneously though no
more than 30 appear on the screen at once, the remainder be­
ing displayed only so long as a call-up switch is pressed.
Targets may be acquired automatically or manually by use of
a roller-ball. with range scales of 3, 6, l2 and 24 n.m. the
display can be presented north-up or head-up vectors indica­
ting the course and speed of targets. A readout of required
data on any particular target is obtained by pinpointing its
echo using the roller-ball while if no one target is selec­
ted in this way the relevant data of that presenting the
earliest and clearest threat remains on display. Markerlin­
es can be brought up on the PPI to show the limits of any
area of the screen deserving particular study.
- Krupp Atlas of Germany, produce their Type 8500 radar ser­
ies in three versions, the AC / RM,AC / TM. and A / CB5: the
last-named constituting a stand-alone ARPAin its ownright
although the others do have a more limited collision-avoidance
capability. The 8500 A / CASsuperimposes a synthetic compu­
ter-generated picture on the normal radar traces and acquisition
of up to 20 targets can be achieved either automatically or
manually by roller-ball manipulation.
Automatic tracking of targets acquired by either means is
Carried out while they are within 19 miles from ownship's
position which can be off-centred in the relative motion mode.
A guard zone can be set and target vectors presented relative
or true. Data concerning any target Selected by “Sing the
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roller-hall is shownin a three-line LEDreadout and sectors
of the display in which potentially hazardous situations ex­
ist are automatically computed and are marked by arcs of
brightness round the circumference of the PPI.
Tha Krupp-Allan
Elahronil 0500
rnicloplocouor
conlrollad radar
ayuam. Tha is in
brightdisplay unit:
cove! relative
motion. lruo
motionand
automatic collision
avoidanca.
Figure (64 )
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- In the U.K. Racal-Decca, have also opted for the stand­
alone integrated radar / ARPAsystem. The radar uses the
clearscan clutter-suppression technique and operates in true
or relative motion with 10 range scales from 1/4 to 96 n.m.
Up to 20 targets may be acquired either manually by joy­
stick manipulation or semi-automatically on entering either
of two adjustable guard zones, target data being stored in
the true motion mode though the basic radar presentation
maybe in either true or relative. Vectors are drawn for
all targets being tracked and an alpha-numeric display of
data can be called up on the screen alongside the target
to which it refers. Gain level is automatically reduced
on large or close-to echoes so that all targets are opti­
mised in viewing terms, and a feature of this ARPAis auto­
matic stabilisation of the display relative to progress ov­
er the ground - a facility useful in providing anchor watch
information on any movementof own ship or of other vessels.
Rural-Du 4u ARI‘.4
dupluy.
Figruer ( 65 )
- A joint design by Norcontrol of Norway and Kelvin Hughes in
the U.K., has resulted in the ARPAdesignated the DB7by the
Norwegianfirm and the Anticol by its British manufacturers.
Based on the KHRadpak radar which is the commercial counter­
part of the naval type 1006, this is a stand-alone single­
acreen radar-cum-ARPAcapable of acquiring up to 20 targets
by manual joystick control, or up to 50 automatically for
tracking in true motion whitin a radius of 24 n.m. on a PPI
which for radar purposes can be switched to nine ranges bet­
ween 3/4 and 96 n.m. No more than 20 vectors are however dis­
played at any one time, each having a time-length of up to 30
minutes of travel. Information on individual targets of choice
is shownalpha-numerically in a panel above the PPI.
The display can be switched to relative or true motion and
the KBautomatic clutter control system employedadjusts the
amountof suppression to suit the general clutter level which
under wind influence may be higher on one bearing than on oth­
ers. A separate system controls the clutter return around each
target by setting a threshold level based on the numberand
repetition rate of clutter echoes received. Adjustable safe
limits for CPAand TCPAare incorporated and alarms warn of
any intrusion on these. Warningof collision target loss is
Qiven by other alarms which also signal system or computer
failure.
whennavigating in restricted waters a fairway ‘chart’ con­
sisting of a set of parallel straight lines can be brought
up on the PPI. channel length, width, and location relative
to fixed objects being determined by the user. Groundstabili­
sation of the channel ‘chart’ is by tracking ffam fixed 13"d
or seamarks or by DRderived from gyrocompass and speed 109 1"‘
puts.
Figure (66 )
Figyure (67 )
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On the other hand, the alternative systems can be divided in­
to two main categories according to their method of data pre­
sentation:
1- Time based automatic plotter systems presenting time related
vectors. These systems produce the same kind of plot as the ma­
riner would manually generate. They display time related vec­
torgfl§¥21terminated at the end of the selected time interval,
drawing tracks from the immediate target position up to the
point the target is supposed to reach in the time period.
The track may either indicate the apparent motion and hence
a means of evaluating the nearest approach, or the true mot­
ion of target. The latter, in comparisonwith the vector whi­
ch is necessarily attached to ownship, also allows the true
speed of the target ship to be evaluated.
As in the case of the history presentation the facility of
being able to switch from relative to true motion continously
is one of the greater advantages of the vector type of dis­
play.
However, in using these systems it is always necessary to be
aware of the mode in which the system is operating before ta­
king informations graphically from the display.
Errors arise when, for instance, observers attempt to establ­
ish distance of nearest approach by reference to true vectors.
Dueto the fact that most computations of relative track are
based on a number of positions which have been smothed into a
best fit and the true motion is derived from this relative tr­
ack by applying the immediate value of own ship's course and
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speed to it, the vectors portrayed during the period that own
ship is altering course or speed maybe in error.
Tracks made while targets are manoeuvring may also be in err­
or and some delay in taking up the new direction may be appa­
rent, particularly whenthe change in relative motion is small
or the apparent rate is low.
Computerbased vector systems offer a forecast role by a trial
manoeuvrefacility. The effect of different heading and speed
trails are displayed by the computer to assist the mariner in
arriving at a decision.
The ways of showing the forecast are, a simple presentation
of numerical data on an alpha-numeric display, and the move­
ment of echoes on the synthetic display in accelerated motion.
Beyondthese trial facilities no effort is madeby the vector
displays to assist in the decision makingprocess.
2- Graphic situation display system which is a product of spe­
rry Marine companyusing the concept of collision point and
dangerous area which previously mentioned in the first section.
In this system the solution is independent of the time. It ado­
pts a unique display which portrays the Probable Area of Danger
(PAD)of each target entered into the computer and the total
situation is displayed continously to assist in the decision
making process.
The ‘perry system approach outputs information in a manner whi­
ch combines the separate steps of hazzard determination and
safe manoeuvreidentification, steps which are conducted sepera­
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tely using vector techniques.
If ownship headings at present speed, which results in a
pre-selected CPAdistance, (the target can pass either a­
head or astern of own ship), are computed, and their points
of intersection with the target's track determined, the seg­
ment of track between the intersection points becomesthe
longitudinal axis of a hexagonal PADsymbol, whose trans­
verse axis is twice the selected CPAdistance. Both axis are
increased by a 300 yard allowance to represent a method of
error compensation (sensor and system error).
The target track line, which is an extension of its unit 6­
minute vector, is terminated conveniently in the centre of
the PAD;
The PAD,therefore, represents an area into which own ship
must not intrude if the pre-selected C.P.A. distance is not
to be breached. This area is the only one in which own ship
is capable of approaching the target closely and, in the lim­
it, colliding with it. This fact is indisputable and is based
on the realities of the relative motion of the encounter.
whendisplayed on the P.P.I., the PADhas a location relative
to ownship's present or planned direction and rate of pro­
gress, (both the heading marker and the electronic bearing
cursor are subdivided into 6-minute elements of own ship mo­
tion determined from the speed inputs).
The most critical PADis the one which intersects the head­
ing marker and the relative motion on the P.P.I. of the echo
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of the target creating it will confirm the degree of hazard.
The PADapproach establishes a simple but correct manoeuvre
convention for which time variable vector systems have no
equivalent:
‘Be prepared to take evasive action for PADson the heading
marker within the indicated time interval and in selecting
an evasive manoeuvre avoid close encroachment on any other
PAD“.The directness and simplicity of this convention has
a marked influence on familiarisation and training needs of
Sperry CAS.
The PADconvention remains consistent, irrespective of targ­
et category. A target alters its course and / or speed; its
vector will change in direction and / or length and the posi­
tion of the PADon the display will change (about 15 seconds
for the corrected PADto be drawn). A target stopped in the
water will exhibit a zero vector when the speed input is wa­
ter speed and will be enveloped by its PAD.A buoy, lights­
vessel or ship at anchor will display a vector which is the
negative of the tidal disturbance, a short track line and a
PAD, (if own ship heads towards this PAD, the tide will carry
her downon the target). A target whose speed is equivalent
to ownship's will place its PADon the perpendicular bisec­
tor of its line of sight, whichprovides the basis for a pat­
tern for PADlocations in respect to speed ratios. Faster tar­
gets exhibit more complex phenomena. with diminishing range. 3
faster target is likely to showa second PAD,reflecting the
ambiguity in the velocity triangle, but as the encounter pro­
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grasses and the target clears away. the two PADsmerge and
disappear as the target commencesto recede from own ship.
In this latter situation, the faster target is declared non­
hazardous and shows a 6-minute vector only, which is a unique
form and convenient economy in symbolism.
From this brief outline of the PADapproach, it will be ob­
vious that the necessity for time-variable relative vectors
to identify targets with critical C.P.A. distance is elimi­
nated. (The PADof the critical target appears inevitably
under the heading marker without any specific operator-initia­
ated task). Likewise, it is unnecessary to provide any time
variation with the target's time tracks; they are terminated
already in the PADin exactly the same relative position on
the P.P.I. as wouldbe defined as a critical area if vari­
able true vectors were cycled ahead in time until the close
approach of the target was observed. PADseliminate the nece­
ssity for a trial heading interrogation but preserve the fac­
ility for investigating the results of a trial speedchange.
It is not considered necessary; however, to apply dynamic
time lags or manoeuvre delays.
The location of PADSprovides a continuous representation of
hazard which is obtained on an intermittent basis by vector
manipulation:
The certain own ship headings and speed, (whether present or
trial values), held for specific time intervals, result in
inadequate C.P.A. distances.
when two different vessels produce PADswhich are over 1.9­
ping, special caution should be exercised, as one of the ves­
sels shall have to take action even after ownship has tak­
en avoiding action. In such a case one should keep well clear.
However, the following should be taken into consideration to
avoid errors in interpretation:
1­ The line joining PADto target is not a real vector, there­
foreit does not indicate speed. Short lines maybe attached
to fast targets and longer lines to slower targets.
The termination of this line when a PADis drawn, is not the
P.P.C. nor is the PADsymmetrical about the P.P.C.
It must not be assumed that in cases where the heading marker
intersects the PAD,reduction of speed before the vessel
actually encounters the barrier will resolve the risk. Re­
duction in speed changes the outline of the PADconsidera­
bly and may in fact produce two PADSin cases where only
one existed previously. If own heading marker cuts the PAD,
reduction of speed may infact cause the boundary to move
towards own ship.
The distance to the target is not necessarily the distance
which ownship must run before the situation is resolved
and own ship may resume course. For pass astern of targets
this maybe far less, and for pass ahead far more, than the
time implied by the own ship heading marker.
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Prom this brief outline of both vector and PADtechniques,
we may say that the fundamantal difference between the two
approaches, is that PADsdisplay the hazards in a graphical
and complete manner which the humanoperator finds easy to
assimilate, where as the time-variable vector system will
generate hazard and manoeuvring information in manycircum­
stances only if the navigator sees need to requice it.
The time-variable vector systems nmusauewhere and how fast
each of the tracked targets are going, while sperry system
indicates where own ship could not go. In other words, if
own ship manoeuvres in such away that she can keep clear of
the PADs,danger of collision is avoided.
To provide an indication of the impact of the PADdisplay,
it is proposed to explore the PPI scenes in both vector and
PADformat as seen by a number of ships engaged in a random­
ly selected multiple ship situation in a confluence region.
This is illustrated in the following figures.
The target density is representative of the level encounte­
red normally in the Dover Straits. Three vessels are showing
progressing in a SW-W'lydirection, with two vessels on app­
roximately reciprocal headings. Twovessels are heading in
a southerly direction, meeting three vessels comingin the
opposite direction. with one exception, the vessels are head­
ing into confluence region, with reducing separations.
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Figure (7/pshows the situation observed on the PP1's of the
target numbers 5, 7 and 10, firstly in terms of l8-minute
'true' vectors and secondly in the PADformat. The following
interpretations suggest themselves:
Target 5 - The vector presentation shows the close approach
of target pairs 1 and 9, 2 and 3 and 8 and lo and Ownship
proximity to targets 1 and 9. A suitable evasive heading
change would result from rotating Ownship18-minute vector
37 degrees to starboard to clear all hazard.
The PADformat provides an immediate and positive indication
of the hazard distribution ahead. A heading alteration of
33 degrees to starboard is suggested. The cresent of PADS
across either bowat roughly 18 to 20 minutes time interval
indicates mutual hazard affecting these targets and high­
lights their likelihood of manoeuvring.
Target 7 - In the vector format, allowing for the alteration
of target 5, this vessel select an alteration of 15 degrees
to starboard, bearing in mind that a broader alteration to
clear target 6 would create problems with target 4 later.
In the PADformat, the alterations of target 5 would change
its status to non-hazardous, leaving target 6 as the one of
greatest concern. Analteration of 15 degrees to starboard
is suggested, which avoids any problem with target 4. The
future threat of target 9 is seen clearly and enters into
the decision-making process.
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Target 10 - The vector evaluation would suggest a heading
alteration of 30 degrees to starboard; PADSshow that 23
degrees is quite adequate to preserve the required CPAdis­
tance.
These examples are selected as an indication of the rapid and
direct assessment of the total hazard situation against a
single fixed time interval scale that is madepossible by
the PADconvention. In any given situation, the Navigator is
presented with an unabiguius indication of the risks which
attach to continuing his present line of progress and is
made at a glance which is the optimummanoeuvre to alleviate
the situation.
3.2.2 Errors and limitations:
Three sources of errors could affect the computerized systems:
1 - Sensor errors.
2 - ARPA errors.
3 - Interpretation errors.
1- Sensor errors:
These are already itemized in the IMOARPApublications, and
will be briefly mentioned again. Their errors and standard
deviations are relatively small.
(1) Bearing Errors: These are due to:
(a) Target glint. It is not always knownexactly which
part of a target yields the strongest reflection.
To a certain extent it depends on the aspect of the
object.
(b) Somebacklash in the aerial drive gear.
(c) Rolling and pitching. This gives rise to a quadran­
tal error, maximumon relative bearings of 45°, 135°.
225° and 315° with the minima in between. It is due
to the angular tilting motion of the sanner. Super­
imposedon this quadrantal variation is a sinusoidal
wave form caused by the lateral displacement of the
scanner position.
(d) Beamshape in the horizontal plane.
(e) Quantification in azimuth.
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Range Haeasurement Errors:
(a)
(b)
These result from:
Target glint.
Rolling and pitching causing lateral displace­
ment of the scanner position.
(c) Pulse-length echo-chape and strength (associ­
ated with pre-set threshold levels).
(d) Quantification in range.
Course Input Errors: These are caused by gyro-compass
deviations and will affect tracking accuracy if their
time constants equal those of the tracker filters.
Speed Input Errors: These are caused by log errors and
can become important. They affect course and speed cal­
culations of the target and display true motion vector
errors and predicted relative motion vector errors wh­
en using the "Trial Manoeuvre"facility. Range, bearing,
CPAand TCPAvalues are not affected.
2- Errors generated in the ARPA“$9”?
(1) SmoothingErrors: Especially, owing to rolling and
pitching errors (a combinedeffect of scanner move­
ment and gyro-compass errors) slight changes in vec­
tor quantities and digital read-outs are continous­
ly taking place for all targets in rough weather.
It should, however, be rememberedthat a target’s
velocity vector, even under ideal conditions, is
always subject to slight changes, depending on tYPe
of steering facilities employed. weather and 5h1P’5
parameters 0
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when own ship or the target ship change their velo­
city vectors, smoothing will oppose the change and
true Velocity information of targets (vector and dig­
ital read-out) becomes unreliable. some ARPAsstop
tracking during these periods. The reason for this is
that in most ARPAsscalculations are based on the rel­
ative motion velocity vector. In one particular ARPA,
however, position and velocity of tracked targets are
stored in true motion format, so that true motion vec­
tors of targets do not need to be re-established after
a change in relative motion. In case of fast manoeuvre
the target may get out of the windowif it was small
and the tracker may lose the target.
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(ii) Computercalculation errors:
These are nearly always due to course and speed in-put errors.
(a) The influences on vectors:
Relative vectors will not be affected (excect in case of
trial manoeuvre), but true vectors will be affected lea­
ding to incorrect true course and speed of target.
incorrect speed
Figure ( 73 )
OW input speed correct
OW‘ input speed too low
OW: input speed too high
In-correct course
Figure ( 74 )
(b) The influence on P.P.C.
In-correct speed
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Incorrect course
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(c) The influence on the PAD:
Incorrect speed
Figure ( 77 )
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In correct course input will produce similar effect.
CPAdata (distance and time) is independent of fixed errors
in ownship speed and course inputs to the data processor, is
always indicated correctly, but the result of specific manoeu­
vre such as adopting a heading tangential to the PADmay fall
short of or exceed the navigator‘s expectations.
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Figure ( 79 )
Note that, with ships on collision courses, speed input error
will shift the P.P.C.butit willremain on the heading marker.
On the assumption that the HMis correct1y angned, course input
errors do not affect the P.P.C. positions with respect to the
HM.However, picture and heading marker will be disorientated
inside the tube, and correction has to be applied to obtain
the true course to avoid a PAD.
(iii) Vector Jumping:
(a) This may occur when targets are close to each other
and their two echoes are in the same tracking win­
dow. The two vectors may interchange and so will
the digital information (target information swop)
_or sometimes they combine or, when in manual acquisi­
tion mode, one target may lose all its information wh­
ile the other target mayyield data for the first time,
but they are the wrong data.
Target swop should be overcome by ‘rate-aiding‘ the
forecast of the target(s) predicted position ahead of
the echo during the next scan (so that the proper vec­
tor can be drawn if the position is later confirmed)
and by making the tracking windowas small as possi­
ble after the initial acquisition.
(b) It can also take place that while in automatic acquisi­
tion modefalse echoes are received due to side-lobe
effect or indirect reflection via superstuctures on
own ship. The remedy is to switch over the manual acq­
uisition modeor to put into action a minimumtracking
and / or acquisition range.
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(iv) -Spurious information owing to acquisitioning of rain
and sea clutter echoes and to tracking information
of land-based objects.
This can happen while using the automatic acquisition
mode. Not only does the observer get far too much un­
wanted information, it will also makethe radar pic­
ture confusing to look at.
Lastly it maysaturate the tracking capacity of the
computer and some of the targets may be dropped or
ignored even though they are important to the observer.
In these cases one should go back to the manual acquis­
ition modeor apply acquisition restriction for a min­
imumdesired range and use the Area Rejection Boundar­
ies or zones (ARBsor ARzs).
Use of a 10 cm. ARPAdisplay can be recommended to pre­
vent computer saturation due to rain echoes (but keep
on consulting a 3 cm. display if small targets can be
expected nearby), although risk of target swopis in­
creased as ship's echoes are "fatter".
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Interrupted tracking of targets, loss of targets or
even nondetection of targets.
This will happen with low-level thresholds having been
set too high. One may have to ask for technical ad­
vice, and in this connection it is wise to remember
that with ARPAnavigation consultation of a raw radar
display should never be neglected.
3 - Errors in Interpretation:
(1)
(ii)
Misinterpretation of Display Presentation and Vector
Mode.
The combination of different display and vector (plus
eventual history tracks) are so manythat mistakes are
easily made in interpretation. Sometimesspring-loaded
switches are provided for certain vector modesand this
can be helpful.
In the True Motion vector mode, using a Relative Motion
display, a vector will be attached to the point represen­
ting ownship although the point remains stationary on
the radar screen. Note also that in somecases the past
track does not coincide with the afterglow (for example
THpast track on a RMdisplay).
Misinterpretation of the Trial Manoeuvre(Simulation)­
(111)
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Here, also. the type of display presentation has to
be appreciated. with static simulation, showingthe
predicted situation immediately after the manoeuvre,
it seems best to use a Relative Motion Display with
Relative Motion vectors of moderate length. with dy­
namic simulation,.showing the predicted developing
situation up to thirty minutes after the manoeuvre
has been carried out, it will be better to have a
True Motion Display, for good understanding, plus
Relative Motion vectors (if possible). Although ‘Sim­
ulation’ will give guidance for a predicted safe man­
oeuvre, the observer should keep the “Rule of the Road‘
in mind especially Rule 19, during poor visibility.
The former prediction, which is based merely upon the
other vessel keeping her course and speed, may clash
with the latter requirement.
Misinterpretation of the Input speed (Velocity).
In open sea input speed to ARPAis generally manual
sea speed or one-axis "water-locked" speed. In calm
water-which is often the case during fog conditions­
one can be reasonably certain from true motion vector
what the target's aspect will be. Near the coast or
in estuaries, it is often advisable to use ‘Auto-Track‘.
or ‘Echo-Reference"facility, if these are available­
The true motion vectors will then show the ground vel­
ocity giving a good idea where the ships are 90139 t0
(this arrangement,under restricted visibility condi­
(iv)
(V)
tions does not clash with Rule 19).
This facility can be used with a True Motion or a Rel­
ative Motion Display.
Hhatever the speed input,.one must makecertain what
the type is- sea or ground speed- one-axis; sea or
ground speed dual axes (sea or ground velocity) - to
appreciate the meaning of and to understand the inter­
pretation of the true motion vectors. Also during rou­
9h weather, one should realise that somevessels will
have wind drift (leeway) superimposed on their direc­
ted motion and their real aspect maydiffer from the
one shownon the display or read out digitally. Error
in the speed or velocity input does not affect the acc­
uracy of range, bearing and RMpast track.
Misinterpretation of Display Symbols.
Itis a pity that symbols (and.the same is true for dis­
play controls) are not standardized, and that different
manufacturers use different symbols (circles,triang1es,
squares, diamonds etc.) for the samemessage. Putting
it in a different way: the same symbolon different
ARPAWoftenhas different meanings. For example, depend­
ing on the ARPAmake, a square symbol may indicate ‘ac­
quired' or ' Statkmary ‘Target’ or ‘Passing within the
set CPAdistance“.
Misinterpretation of Data in Display which are using
Points of Possible Collision (PPCs) and Predicted 31935
of Danger (PADS). -Thisvms previously mentioned.
Hidden limits togggllision avoidance automation:
Equipment complexity - Ergonom1c3
Reliability - Non-equippedvessels
Equipment complexity:
Complexityis the prime contributor to reliability and ergo­
nomiclimitations. Manycollision avoidance aids are still
rather complex. For instance, one has fifty-one switches and
other controls.
I8 it "0 wonder that a newmate, fresh out of the hiring hall,
is overhelmed to the point he is disinclined even to find out
howto turn the thing on if it is one of the systems f0rWid1hP
was not trained?
Further, he probably did not comeon board until almost sai­
ling time and is kept quite busy with other aspects of his job,
so that even if he has the initiative, he is probably too busy
to devote the time required to learn to operate the aid even
if some—bodywas available to teach him.
Therefore, simplicity of equipment is very important, it en­
mes the mariner to be easly familier with the equipment and to
deal with it quickly, correctly and efficiently without fear
and hence reducing the probability of humanerrors. some com­
panies started to produce ARPAsets which only fulfill IMO
requirements to be simple and cheap.
Ergonomics:
Ergonomics gmbraces the entire interaction between manand
machine. The ergonomic limits in the use of collision avoid­
ance aids go much deeper than a lack of training in how to
push some switches and twist some knobs. The most serious
limitation is the ability to understand the different presen­
tations and the graphic display, the meaning of each of the
different symbolsand to interpret the encounter situation as
presented. This is the samebasic limitation that generated
the phrase "radar assisted collisions", the failure to prop­
erly use the equipmentand correctly interpret the display.
This limitation can only be ceased by offering an extensive
planned training course which should be repeated after cer­
tain periods to provide sufficient training on the various
types of ARPAand the different technique used, to ensure
that the observer will be able to use each system properly
to gain all the benefits, considering the accuracy, under­
stand the limitations and knowthe possible errors and their
effect.
Reliability:
Computer-basedcollision avoidance aids are sophisticated
electronic equipments. As such they do have failures.
Therefore, watchkeepingofficers must practice radar plotting
frequently because who become accustomed to having solutions
provided by automatic plotting aids may becomeless capable
of making effective use of radar on occasions when the ARPA
is defective.
Non-eguipned vessels:
Several years are still neededbefore most ships will be fitted with
ARPA,during which many ships will have to rely upon basic
radar plotting. Then, in congested areas not all ships en­
gaged in the traffic will be working with ~the sametechniqueun­
der the Samet€fl9"'9'3-Theperformance of the watchkeeping offi­
cers will not be the same which could lead to inconsistent
avoiding actions.
It was found that the use of radar induced watchofficers to
operate a problem more deeply than they did with ARPA.Then,
with less time remaining in which to make a decision, many
watchofficers using radar chose to make unexpected manoeuvres
which wi11 confuse the watchofficers of nearby vessels and
there by increase the probability of collision.
Therefore, shipping companies should be encouraged to fit
their ships with ARPAeven before Iho schedule, by making
availabe simple, cheap sets easy to maintain and with longer
time between failure, particularly those ships under flag of
convenience.
3.2.3 Accuracy of ARPAglot:
1- Accuracy of CPA:
The standard deviation of the distance to the closest point
of approach ( cfzba) for ARPAplot will obey to the same
rules and praaahmesused for manual plot reflection plotter,
s.g. final equation will be the same.
Therefore ­
' 6 CpA= c7CTE- ( ( ?CPA / plot interval ) + l )
. . For one minute plotting interval
6'E§A= ¢fE}E. (TCPA + l )
and For three minute plotting interval
o'*CPA= 55.3. (1/3 TCPA + 1)
Remembering that
all
cfE&E= R68 (one plot ) / (2/3(n) )
and R68 (one plot)= 1.1 ( ( 12 distance of target)2 +
( 13 range in use )2 )0'5
Hence, the accuracy (M95) in the CPAcan be calculated.
A schedule which can be used for these calculations is shown
next
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Fromthe forgoing it will be clear that the numberof vari­
ables which govern the value of M95in the plotted Distance
to CPAis large.
In order to attain a simplified but justified comparison
between the accuracies of the various plotting methods on
the l2-and 6 Mile ranges the maxinunnvalues of N95 with re­
spect to the Distance of Target are pictured in the below
graph.
Fromthis graph it is concluded that:
- Accuracy from a 1-minute ARPAplot at the 12 Mile-range
is the worst.
- Accuracies improve with a factor two when the l2-Mile­
range is replaced by the 6 Mile-range.
—The belt accuracy is i?tained from a 3-minute ARPAPlot1 ' .
at the 6 Mile-range
Figure ( 32 )
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2- Accuracy of P.P.C. and PAD:
In the figure below these parametres are depicted for a cer­
tain close quarter situation, and in the following an analy­
sis of the accuracy (R95) of the PADwill be given for cer­
tain conditions
1
:7
Ddtaatc t C I
Figure ( 33 )
In the figure, the collision heading and the PPCare shown.
It is remarked here that there is a saxmd P.P.C. in this C359
which is not shown here.
The PPCis calculated by extending the speed vector of the
other ship (WA)with a distance equal to Vother shipx TCPA.
where TCPintact in the time to collision and this time in­
terval differs actually from the TCPAin case no change in
heading or speed is executed.
The R of the PAD:
Wewill proceed as before when we dealt with manual plotting
to show improvement due to avoiding some human errors.
The factors which will affect the accurarcy of the PADare:
1- The accurarcy of own ship vector (W0)used in the velocity
triangle which will depend on the accuracy of its direc­
tion and length.
at The direction of the (W0)will be influenced only by
wind drift and gyro alignement since the constructive
error of the observer will not exist.
Error in wind drift can be considered using same equ­
ation used before
_ O W V2( AU / AL ) Sine<V
By using here a moderate wind speed and ship‘s vel­
ocity the variance ( (72 ) can be estimated to be
(1-5)2 instead of (l.75)2 used before.
Error in gyro alignement will be estimated as before
t 2 _ loo3 6.‘ —1T 0
Then the direction error can be estimated at
2 = (
.'.cF‘ :: 1.5°
(1.5)2 + (1/12) ) = 2.33°°
and the accuracy = 3°
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It follows that the variance of cross track error will
be
6-2 - V2. (Plot interva1)2. -—3422E­CT . (57.3)?
b- The length of (N0) will also be influenced only by the
log error, e.g. by the accuracy of the water speed (V).
Assuming that the own ship‘s speed is greater than 10
knots, then the variance of the along-track error will
be
2 _ 25-KT - ( 2 3 . V . Plot interval)
9
.'. R68 of point W = 1.1 ( ¢rE% + (73% )‘ / sin 90°
22 2 2 _ 1 2 (Plot interval)
R68 = 1'21 ‘G CT +6AT ’ ‘-7714 ' V " 50'»: 60*" ' miles
= _:<18529 2 _<L1r£__i_nt_er_«fi ,.,et,e_.,
744 ' ' 60 X 60
= 1.28 (V. plot interva1)2 metres
WhereV in knots and plot interval in minutes.
2- The accuracy of the target relative vector (OA)used:
As already explained in plottingiuung the aids as reffection
plotter
2 2 VI
v
= 1.1 ( (12.target dist.)2+(13.range in use?)‘
- . 2 2
.°.n§8 (one plot) = 1.21( (12.target dist.) +(13.ran9e in use’)
= 175 (Dist)2 + 205 (mn9e)2
mm(mpmm
2 231 2 1104 2
1163of point (A) -( n (Dist in miles) T (Rangeinmiles) )IIBt.res
‘--~1h+g“fi‘£>
‘V
Figure ( 34 )
12 9 1104
. . R68 - plot = ( : (Dist in M)2 + n (Range in u)2
+ 1.28 (V. plot interva1)2) metres
Assumingthat plotting interval is 3 minutes, scanning per­
iod 3 seconds the number of plots by ARPAequal 60
II‘
.'.R68 PPC=(153(Dist of target)2+18.d(Range in use)2+11.5 V2)
X (1/3 TCPA + 1) metres
Accuracy R95 = 5 / 3 R68
The conditions for the formula are resumed agalng
o6 Drift - 1'5
V more than 10 knots
Log obeying IMOPerfonnance Specifications
Plot interval 3 minutes
Scanner period 3 seconds
TCPAin minutes
Range in use more than 2.5 miles
From the above formula some numerical values will be calcula­
ted and presented in the following tables for 12 Mand 6 M
ranges.
Range 12 M
R95/(1/3 TCPA+ 1)
ist
12 10 8 _6~
20 163 157 151 147
18 155 149 143 139
16 148 141 135 131
14 141 134 128 123
l2 135 128 121 116
10 128 122 116 110
Range 6 M
R95/(l/3 TCPA+ 1)
ist
Span 6 5 4 3
20 127 125 124 123
18 117 115 114 112
15 108 105 104 102
14 98 96 94 92
12 B9 67 84 E3
10 81 78 76 74
Fttnlthe tables the graph whichis pictured belowis oostructed.
As the influence of the Distance of the target is of nunor inportanoe
to u1:tabuhu:values,tids aqnnent is1rxflecuaiin'UE:gmaph.
Further it is enphasized that the value given is R95of the PFCwhich
means that in order to acquire R99.7, the R95- values should be multi­
pliai by 1.4.
Also attention is drawn to the fact that (TCPA)is different fItnITCPA
on a clearing Heading and that (TCPA)in fact is TCPAon a oollisio heading.
This also explains that in ‘exact’ PAD's the PPCis not
the centere of the PADbecause (TCPA)differs from the
TCPA'| on the clearing headings on both sides of the PAD,
the last two TCPA'salso differing from each other.
1 .0 H .
Ship cw -_ I:on nun; l0lh_n_'
Log open -DD
{IRA-3:F1'o:"ih:cdvn1 ruinucu ;:
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Figure ( 35 )
Advantages and disadvantages of ARPAsystem:
The potential advantages arising from these newdevelopments,
both for timely decision making and in relieving the work­
load of the navigator, are evident.
The system provides a fuller and more up-to-date and objective
presentation of the data on which the navigator must makehis
decisions and a facility for assessing the outcomeof any in­
tended manoeuvre.
Enumerating the advantages:
1- Rawdata up-dated every scan (3 sec).
2- The selected echoes are vectored and displayed simultan­
eously.
3- There will be no discontinuities from re-setting processes
or alterations in course or speed of ownship or target.
4- Elimination of humanerror in the mechanical task or plott­
ing. .
5- Collision Risk alarm based on C.P.A. distance selected by
operator.
6- Information renewal rate about 15 secs.
7- Digital readout of target range and bearing, course and
speed, C.P.A. distance and time for selected echo instantly
on demand, i.e. continuous monitoring.
8- Trial manoeuvre presented dynamically and speeded up to
30 times.
9- Absence of discontinuities and renewal rate of 15 seconds
permits plotting to continue during manoeuvring by ownship
or targets.
The automatic systems, therefore, provide the mariner with a
continuous supply of intelligence in the form in which he ne­
eds it and with a minimumof delay. It could enable the obse­
rver to study the effect on the situation of a projected al­
teration of course and/or speed, or several alternatives,
within a few second.
Hence. it can readily be seen that with such equipment, time
will be available to spend in studying up-to-date intelligence.
rather than in the laboriousproduction of muchless timely and
comprehensive information.
Although the system has all these advantages, it still has
somelimitations and disadvantages such as:
l- A confusion of vectors or PADSis possible in dense traffic.
2- Specialised training is required to be familiar w1th the
correct use of the equipmentto gain all its benefits.
3- Over-reliance on a system could lead to a false sense of
security and hazardous encounters.
4- It's effectiveness remains closely dependent upon radar in­
puts and setting; the radar should be tuned correctly.
5- Still expensive.
6- Tendency for ARPAusers to pay less attention to the visual
look-out and to neglect other requirements of the collision
regulations.
7- Mariners who became accustomed to having solutions provid­
ed by automatic plotting aids may become less capable of
making effective use of basic radar on occasions when the
ARPAis defective.
Summary:
In this section a wide range of plotting devices has been dis­
cussed. On the one side of the spectrum is the simple plotting
sheetfstill used by manyobservers,- and on the other side the­
re is the ARPA.a sophisticated plotting aidh, which, gradually,
will be introduced on all ships of the mediumand large tonnage
C1883.
IMOhas already adopted a Resolution on the “MinimumRequire­
ments for Training in the use of Automatic Radar Plotting Ai­
ds (ARPA)”which starts with the paragraph:
Every master, chief mate and officer in charge of a naviga­
tional’ whatchon a ship fitted with an automatic radar plotting
aid shall have completed an approved course of training in the
use of automatic radar plotting aids.
The contents of this course is published in IMOARPAPublica­
tion. Recently the Merchant Navy Training Board (U.K) has is­
sued a booklet, entitled "Training in the Operational Use of
Automatic Radar Plotting Aids", which contains a course spe­
cification which is based on the IMOspecification.
It isworthwhile reading through the specification; two short
sections are quoted blow.
l. The possible risks of exclusive reliance on ARPA.
Appreciation that ARPAis only a navigational aid and that
its limitations including those of its sensors, makeexclusive
reliance on ARPAdangerous, in particular for keeping a look­
out; the need to complyat all times with the basic princi­
ples and operational guidance for officers in charge of a
navigation watch.
2. Manualand automatic acquisition of targets and their re­
spective limitations.
Knowledgeof the limits imposed on both types of acquisition
1n multi-target scenarios, effects on acquisition of target
fading and target swop.
Reading through these it seems that raw radar displays, in­
cluding a 10 cm. set will remain as desirable and valuable
aids.
Conclusion
Shipping has always been more or less a hazardous enterprise
and safety at sea has long been a preoccupation of the mari­
time community.
Collision in particular, has always been a prominent problem
in maritime history and the rapid progress in allthe aspects
connected with the sea, specially in recent decades, led to
the continuity of its occurrence with alarming regularity.
This problem has resulted in the addition of a new and dif ­
ferent dimension to safety equations and has led to changes
in both the scope and difficulty of maritime safety work.
The simple and relatively similarly designed ships of earlier
days have, to a large extent, been replaced by technically
very sophisticated specialized ships. Increased size, speed
of ships and cargo turnover, the growth in volume of traffic
and the advent of a large amount of several types of haz ­
ardous cargoes transported by sea. Thus the situation became
more and more complicated and led to an increase in the prob
ability of collision risk with the seriousness of itsreants
which have pushed strongly to give a greater concern to the
safety at sea and the efficiency of shipping operations.
The increase in the numberof ships together with the trend
to spend less time in ports with more time at sea led to a
large increase in the volumeof traffic. As a result of the
geographical distribution of trade, the traffic flow haslxen
concentrated in certain areas creating high congested type
of traffic proceeding in several different directions. some
of these waterways are restricted in width and hence reduce
the latitude for manoeuvring decisions and the margin for
errors.
Larger ships are less manoeuvrable and more difficult to
stop, and they are also restricted in where they can go in
safely, thus increasing the encounter rate in some areas,
and constitute a considerable collision hazard.
The sophisticated specialized ships have complicated oper­
ating conditions and demandhigher organizational and op ­
erational qualities in the interaction between manand ma­
terials.
The commercial world demands that the sea voyagesshmud be
completedas efficiently as possible, usually with respect
of time. Therefore, modern ships are of high speed and mag
ters of these ships normally proceed with full speed incng
gested areas even in restricted visibility whichincrease
collision risk tremendously.
Several shipowners have been using the so-called flags of
convenience to keep their ships at a lower standard level
(sub-standard ships). Someof these shipowners have norms;
tation in sending old,ill-equipped ships to sea with poor­
ly qualified and trained officers in charge.Tn6SB Ships m3Y
cause disastrous consequences and often not only to them­
selves.
This situation has led to an increase in the numberof col
lisions involving the probable loss of property, life and
or pollution. If the hazardous nature of cargoes is taken
into consideration, such casualties will need a huge ammmt
of money, considerable period of time and concerted effort
to removeits effect.
The importance of reducing the shipping losses, environmental
damageand loss of lives that are often associated with mar ­
ine collisions is well recognized and has tended to persuade
the maritime community to explore ways to enhance and promote
the safety, accuracy and increased effectiveness of collision
avoidance and navigation practices on board ships to improve
the situation.
In response to the persistent need of active preventive
measures, strenuous efforts and comprehensive work have been
conducted, and are still going on, by the international organ
izations, national administrations, classification societies,
firms, research centres and various institutions to eliminate
this risk and put it under control.
As a result of extensive studies, investigations, research
work and experiments, several measures have been taken and dg
veloped, the major of which are:
- The Rules of the Nautical Roads, to direct the actions ummm
by mariners so that a safe conduct results.
Ship-to-ship communication, to makeclear the intentions.mfi
exchangeanti-collision advice.
Optimal bridge design and arrangement, seeking for the most
efficient navigational operations.
Suitable well defined bridge routines and procedures, to en
sure that the necessary tasks are carried out correctly at
the right time.
- Vessel traffic services, to regulate the traffic in the con
gested areas and provide invaluable advice to prevent acci­
dents within those areas.
Reliable ship's control systems, for better ship handling
and more effective manoeuvres.
Organized education and training systems, for upgrading
mariner's qualifications, promotingtheir practical ex­
perience and improving the navigators skills to handle
effectively their ships and avoid collision risks.
Marine casualty investigation techniques, to check the
effectiveness of the preventive measures and explorenew
adequate ideas for successful safety work.
Developed bridge equipment to improve both navigation
accuracy reducing the work load, and threat assessment
avoiding ambiguity.
someadjustment is still needed to gain the full benefit
of these measures to improve the situation and increase
the safety level.
The Rules of the Nautical Roads, as one of the principal
means for preventing collisions, must be well arranged ,
very clear and simple.
The verbiage of the rules should be in a better form to
give the correct meaning; more restrictions on the behav­
iour of ships in collision avoidance situations in poor
visibility are required, the cooperation betweenthe give
wayvessel and the stand-on vessel still need better ar­
rangement and more effort is still needed to makethe rules
simpler to be used easily and correctly without tesitaticn.
Communicationsare very important for the safe conduct of
shipping and therefore additional steps should betaken to
ensure its effectiveness.
Morestrict regulations are needed to ensure greater circuit
discipline. Communicationfacilities should be more recog ­
nized in the 1972 International Rules which shouldspanfiauly
acknowledge the existence of the V.H.F. equipment. An ‘anti­
collision message‘ section has to be included in the Interna
tional Code (INTERCO)and its content should be closely
aligned with the International Regulations. The adoption of
a separate worldwide V.H.F. channel is necessary to be used
during ship encounters in international waters to ensurethat
the passing of vital navigational and anti-collision infor ­
mations are not prejudiced.
Shore-to-ship communicationstill needs to be promotedtarset
ting a better arrangement of procedures and adequate equip­
ments to increase its range, so ships can ask for an advice
when needed and can be continuously informed with the naumg
ary intelligence of the traffic and local environment uuouwm
which they pass. This will be quite useful in areas ofltavy
shipping traffic, particularly whenbad visibility is luely
to occur.
Bridge design and arrangement has been recognized as an im.­
portant measure. A concern for ergonomics has become axrxesg
ity in today‘s maritime industry.
Morecareful work is still needed to ensure the most effi ­
cient navigational operations.
A serious continuous contact between ship designers, owners
and operators is essential to have a wheelhousewhich suits
the ship's function and route and enables the officerstotfig
charge their duties correctly and in time. Classification sg
cieties should contribute to help in finding out the best
suitable design and arrangement taking into account theforrJ_a
cominginternational regulations. The societies should also
advice the owners of existing vessels for the necessary, not
muchcostly, modifications needed to improve the working con
ditions on the bridge by having a sensible layout of instru­
ments and equipment, enough area of visibility, etc.
Well defined bridge routines and procedures are very import­
ant and can be considered as a necessary measure needed to
increase the safety at sea. The reason for the existing higher
safety standards in air navigation is actually due to the
successful extensive routines and procedures.
Moreeffort is still needed to formalize adequate bridge rog
tines and practices on board ships and not leaving it up to
the individual navigator. The traditional attitudes should
be changed and the work on the bridge must be regulated and
organized to stop the widespread improvisation which often
leads to accidents.
Bridge teamworktraining should also.be included in thexvnmi
cal colleges curriculum.
Vessel Traffic Services (V.T.S.) can provide a higher level
of safety and efficiency whentailored to meet the needs of
the specific areas serviced.
Traffic Separation Schemeshave been found very effective in
reducing the incidence of collisions especially meeting and
fine crossing collisions in poor visibility.
More IMOapproved T.S.S. are still needed in some congested
areas such as some coastal regions off Japan and Korea.
Extension of shore based radar surveillance and improving
identification methodsmight be necessary, perhapsouulxny
fitting of transponders is a good idea. Better arrangement
techniques and equipment are also needed for successful ac­
curate communicationand reporting procedures.
The sudden failure of some ship;s systems could lead to an
accident particularly in close quarter situations.Therefore
careful structures, maintenance and repair under the class;
fication societies supervision is always necessary.
Moreattention is required to ensure a good rudder effective­
ness, an active back up or parallel system is necessary to
increase the reliability of the steering gear. Anextensive
well established engine roomroutine is essential, and more
serious check by the chief engineer is needed to always
have a well maintained machinery. There is a need for a
greater use of fault—diagnosis and control systems, amisudct
state of readiness procedures.
It has been found from marine casualties analysis that the
factor of humanerror predominates. In a lion's share of
cases, humanfactors were cited as causes of collision. Ac­
cordingly, upgrading the education and training of ship per
sonnel can be considered as a direct preventive measure.Edg
cation and training must be sufficient and efficient to ful
fil the needs.
There is a need to agree internationally on entrance quali­
fications for maritime colleges which have to be high axzgh.
‘Hose pipe‘ systems must be stopped and I personally belne
that officers following that system never receive sufficient
amountof education and training.
Naval officers who like to join merchant ships must attend
a certain course of education and training to adapt their
knowledgeand skills to suit the working conditions onhind
merchant ships and not considering them automatically
holding a master certificate of competencyon reaching a
certain rank which is the case in manycountries.
There is still a need for more serious training on pro ­
cedures aimed at the avoidance of collisions, and how to
deal correctly with the emergencycases. Radar simulators
are quite useful for such courses which should be compul­
sory. Somecountries such as Panamaand Liberia still be ­
lieve that it is not necessary. Within this courses marine
casualty statistics should be analyzed and the navigators
have to study special cases with the aim of finding causes
and recommendmeasures. Such courses ought to be made maul
able in the education programof the navigational colleges
as manylives and ships are lost each year simply because
the lessons learned from accident investigations do not
reach those whoare most concerned: the mariners.
Cooperation between maritime colleges is essential to ex­
change knowledge and experience to reach a high interna ­
tional standard of education and training.
Investigation of marine casualties is necessary to improve
the existing measures to suit the modernsituation and to
initiate extra adequate preventive actions to avoid the rg
currence of similar accidents. Reduction of collision prob
ability can not be achieved to any significant extent un­
less a serious investigation of collision cases is carried
out. The investigation should be based on correct informa­
tions, therefore recording devices should be installed on
board ships to be as the black box on the airplanes in or­
der to preserve the vital information prior to the acci­
dent and at the instant of its occurrence.
Developmentof an international system for collecting, ang
lyzing and presenting marine casualty data (data bank) is
required to recognize where and howthey occurred uoarrive
at a quantitative and qualitative description of the ammal
factors to determine the correct recommendations for in­
creasing the safety at sea.
The role of IMOshould be increased; efforts made by the
various maritime countries and their achievements in im­
proving safety as a result of casualty investigations are
still, with very few exceptions, not communicatedto other
countries.
In the past 50 years there has been a vast development in
bridge equipment to increase the safety and improve the
efficiency of ship’s operation. The advancedelectronic ng
vigation aids have improvedthe situation to a considerable
degree. The equipment used to determine the ship's posi­
tion are nowproviding accurate enough position fixes. The
accuracy will further improve -with the introduction of
Navstar (GPS)which is expected to have extremely far
reaching effects not only on position fixing but also on
the whole spectrum of navigation.
This type of equipmentplays a principle role in reducing
the work load of watchkeeping officers, leaving more time
for themto evaluate the traffic situation and taking the
correct action in time. Anynavigator, in confined and con­
gested waters, will have his attention divided between pure
navigation and collision avoidance. Therefore, any step done
to simplify the navigation will leave him with more freedom
to attend shipping in the vicinity and hence safety of navi
gation will increase.
There is still a need to recognize a good enough training
course for the proper use of these equipment to analyzecor
rectly the informations available taking into account their
limitations. This course should be repeated at certain
periods to clear any ambiguity and ensure that the navi ­
gator is capable to deal with themperfectly, particularly
with the new generation.
Radar and ARPAare, perhaps, the most useful aids that Mme
been given to the navigator. They have a direct contribu ­
tion to collision avoidance procedure. Collision avoidance
is an important task facing the navigator and anylmxmannufl
assistance which improves the information flow, accelerates
decision making, and reduces stress and indecision, is per­
forming a worthwhile service to the mariner.
The introduction of radar to merchant ships has broughtbeqg
fit in terms of collision avoidance. whenused properly, it
can greatly benefit the navigator in determining the riskof
collision, but if it is not used and interpreted correctly
it can do more harm than good.
Probably the most famous case of misuse of radar was on
26th. July 1956, when the Andrea Doria and Stockholm amlnkd
off Nantucket lightvessel. Although the radar pips of the
other vessel were detected by the Andrea Doria atlJ miles
and the Stockholm at 12 miles, neither vessel made proper
use of the available information.
So, there can be no doubt that almost every collision has
been caused by a human aberration of some kind which led
to failure to recognize early enough that action was gmng
to be called for, the time left to get clear has been too
short to permit coherent planning with the means avail ­
able plus the actual manoeuvreperforming. Possibly the
knowledgeof this constraint promptedthe irrational behay
ior which followed.
The object of any kind of marine plot is to give an explg
nation for the radar picture, producing a plan oftie area
around own ship with the vessels moving on it. The plot
will be expected to showthe current position of each tar
get vessel, the expected forward movementof each and the
risk of collision, if any, then guide the observer to de­
termine the manoeuvrerequired to avoid that collision tak­
ing into consideration other vessels in the area.
some excuse may be offered for the manual plotting defi ­
ciency since the work load of manual data extraction, and
the difficulties of situation analysis on a conventional
radar display are considerable. They are both time consug
ing and tedious. It is not surprising that in high tnniic
densities formal attempt to extract data is often aban ­
doned.
The principal deficiencies of the manualtransferred plot
lie within the observer/PPI combination; they are of poor
accuracy, slow delivery, they have low maximumcapacity ,
and produce fatigue. The PPI is a poor discriminator of
small changes of bearing and the observer can only deal
with one problem at a time concerning one echo at a time.
If there is more than one target to study, the delay in
providing the required intelligence accummulatesin pro­
portion.
However,the only effective and reliable methodofgettug
the necessary information from radar observations is to
computethem. It is quite feasible for this to be done
automatically, or to have some of the process automated
A very great deal has been done in efforts to make the
work of computation easier, faster, accurate enough, and
accommodateseveral targets simultaneously.
A variety of manual plotting aids has been produced, per­
haps the most generally useful device is the reflection
plotter, somesemi-automatic plots-are introduced,butrtme
of them have come into major use; also some attempts have
been made to produce electronic computation on theface of
the PPI, but to obtain a complete computeddata it is stnl
necessary to do a certain amount of manual plotting. Al ­
though it is reasonable to suppose that the use ofnechmrv
electronic devices reduce the work load and the possufility
of humanerror to some extent, each system has a limited
capacity in terms of the numberof targets which can be
dealt with and the quantity and quality of intelligence
which can be provided.
The introduction of collision avoidance systems has improved
and sustained.the performance by eliminating manyof thelunun
limitations of radar plotting. It is a considerable step for
ward in the constant battle against collision.
The system provides the mariner with a continuous supply of
updated information in the form he needs it with a minimum
delay. It also enables the observer to study the effectontie
situation of a projected alteration of course and/or speed,
or several alternatives, within a few seconds, to recognize
the effective manoeuvre.
Do the ARPAsystems really make the navigation safer and re­
duce the probability of collision?
A series of experiments have been run on the simulator at
CAORF(USA) from early 1976 to the spring of 1979 to analyze
the performanceof navigators utilizing visual techniques
compared to radar and a collision avoidance system.
The collision avoidance program had initiany ascertained that
the overall watch officer performance while using a collisnam
threat assessment system was superior to his radar aided per
formance or his performance using only visual clues. These
results were then extended and it was found that the super­
iority of a threat assessment system over radar was also evi
denced whenmore than one ship in a potential close quarters
situation had collision threat assessment aiding cmqnradudth
radar aiding. This supports the argument that fitting more
ships with ARPAsystems would result in safer vessel oper ­
ation.
In an attempt to verify the results of the CAORFstudy and
overcome somecriticisms of an earlier study (1974-1975). the
Liverpool Polytechnic Maritime operations Research Unit con­
ducted further research and the overall conclusion indicates
that the results align closely with CAORP.
Then an attempt was made to locate comparisons with the ef ­
fectiveness of the stored history devices. The following ude
summarizes the results which are drawn from the analysis of
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Computerized CAS Storgg_history
Casualty cases helped cases helped
Collisions 14 9
(17)
Rammings 4 0
(6)
Collisions and
Rammings 18 9
Table (9)
Later CAORFhad the following results from a further study :
S.H.wit.h - S.l:l..with
Measurevisualradar PADvector
CPA(n.m.) 0.57 0.61 0.96 0.77 0.8 1.14
TCPA(min.) 8.7 7.4 11.4 10.8 10.8 12.7
Manoeuvre 24 24 38 39 35 47(deg.)
Narunans l3 l0 9 7 2 2
5 0. 3n.m.
Collision 0 l l l 0 0
Table (10)
CPAI closest point of approach
TCPA-time of closest point of approach
In a field visit, I have done three voyages on three ferries
each of which is equipped with a different type ofcollisnzm
avoidance system.
1. 14th. of July 1980, Sea-Link Ferries —Vortigers Ferry ,
from Folkestone to Boulogne and back (1410 to 1900). The
ferry was equipped with Digiplot of Iotron.
2. 15th. of July. Sea-Link, Hengist Ferry, from Dover to
Calais and back to Folkestone. The ferry was equipped
with CASII, Sperry.
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3. 23th. of July, P 5 0 Ferries, N.F. Panther, from Dover to
Boulogne and back. The ferry was equipped with Raycas
Raytheon.
The captain and officers on each ferry were quite happy and
satisfied with the equipment they had got on board sayhxgit
makes life easier, reducing the load quite a lot and incnagg
ing their confidence in complexsituations, whichltdpsiiem
to act quickly and correctly. Most of the officers wherenot
familiar with the other types of ARPAso believing that the
one they had got on board is one of the best, always pre ­
ferring to deal with the same type. Maybethey gave this
answer because a representative from the companywas with
meeach time, but I think that the point is that they suc­
ceed to be familiar with the equipment they have on board and
are able to use most of its benefits, if not all,which helped
them to successfully avoid dangerous situations, so trey prefer
to keep going with the same type. The reason for thiflfifi amuse
is due to the lack of training courses which should soon be
covered.
The visit indicated that the navigator really needs such
equipment to be on the bridge and an adequate training should
be available for the different types and to be compulsory.
An ARPAshould, in order to improve the standard of collision
avoidance at sea, reduce the work load of the observer.
Therefore, simplicity of equipment is very important; the com
panies should produce ARPAsets which fulfil IMOrequirements
with an emphasis on compactness, simplicity and reliability .
This will also be beneficial in avoiding an excessive tnauung
requirement and expensive sets.
Controls should be arranged in a way that their functions can
be recognized from the first glance and that can be achieved
by appointing only one function to each control, not difflammt
functions to the same one.
The meaning of the symbols used in the different types should
be standardized to avoid ambiguity and its number should be
reduced to avoid the possibility of maskingsmall targets.
Positive steps should be taken on board ships to avoid over­
relience of navigators on an ARPAset, perhaps by not using it
in areas where few traffic of ships is expected,kaqnng it on
stand-by and insisting in carrying out a manual plotting in
case of meeting any. The tendency of ARPAusers to give less
attention to the visual look-out, neglect other collision
avoidance requirements and be less capable of making effect1ve
use of basic radar could lead to a false sense of security and
thus to hazardous encounters causing an ‘AREAassisted colli­
sion'.
Recommendations
1. Strengthening the training and examination methods re­
lated to International Regulations for Preventing Col­
lisions at Sea to ensure that all officers are well
prepared to abide by them intelligently and correctly
in time without hesitation. International unification
of these methodswill give better results.
2. Testing and analyzing the application of the rules ex­
perimentaly and adjusting them when necessary to keep
them abreast of development in marine technology . The
rules should always be suitable for the infinite var ­
iety of maritime circumstances; any amendmentmnstcome
into force as quickly as possible for faster hqnowmnnt
of the situation.
hi
ship communication should be promoted and regulated in
a better wayto increase its effectiveness,cooperation
between ships is very important particularly in heavy
traffic portions.
4. The bridge design should be evaluated in relation to
the requirements of functional analysis and foruxxmung
international regulations. It should allow the housing
of new technology without affecting negatively exnndng
functions and routines.
U1 0 Ergonomical approach to bridge arrangement. It is bmner
to group equipment according to function, which means
having regard to inter alia usage, circumstances, preg
entation and back-up facilities. Only equipment which
is actually required for the navigation of the ship
Greater emphasis on the use of communication, ship-to­
\l I
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should be placed in front of the navigator, and all other
equipment relegated to the back of the bridge.
Continuous contact between ship designers, buildersrxmers
and operators is necessary to ensure that the bridge will
suit the user providing all the needs for most efficient
operation of the particular ship and trade.
Well defined job requirements on board ships is very im ­
portant, extensive bridge routine and procedures are es ­
sential and strict watch rules and orders are necessary,
followed by consecutive checks and serious control by the
master to ensure adequate coverage of the watch,executing
properly the vital tasks.
Regular and frequent check of the performance of bridge
equipment by officers and never allow them to completely
rely upon a single device, therefore certain back —up
systems are necessary to increase the safety of operation
Owners who fit their ships with an ARPAsystem have a duty
to ensure that their staff are clearly aware of both the
virtues and the vices of the system chosen, as wellas
their ownfallibility. It could be better to standardize
on one system as that staff could be confused by thesmmie
differences between marks when they have to be transferred
to another ship.
It is better not to use ARPAwhen few traffic is expected
(to be on stand-by) to keep the officers aware of the im­
portance of the visual look-out, practicing manualphnxing
and developing their manoeuvringskills, and not toheame
accustomed to have all the solutions provided by ARPA.It
must be completely understood at all times that ARPA is
just an aid rather than an automatic control.
11.
12.
13.
14
15.
16.
The safety advantage of ARPAactually increases substag
tially whenthe two interacting ships are both equipped
with threat assessment systems. Therefore, shipping com
panies should be encouraged to fit their ships wiuaaflflh
even before IMOschedule by making available simple and
cheap sets, easy to maintain and with longer times be­
tween failure.
Improvement of performance of aids interfaced withhflwm
such as radar, gyro and log.
Development of two-component logs measuring speed thnxgh
the water in two directions ( X and Y axis of the Sup L
Development of ARPAin combination of radar picture and
navigation maps (electronic maps). In addition, it is
necessary to have a rate of turn measuring device which
can be connected to the ARPAcomputer.
Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)is a very effective pre ­
ventive measure in congested areas, and an international
survey is needed to determine the location of the necesg
ary ones where the risk of collision is greatest and
wherecollision effects are the most serious.
Extension of the areas which require a compulsory pi ­
lotage in heavy traffic portions.
There is a need to identify, in connection with the li­
censing and certification programs, the general emerg­
ency ship handling procedures expected to be followed
that will reduce ship collisions caused by vital con ­
trol system failure. A model simulator training program
related to this matter should be developed.
Well established engine room procedures and maintenance
programs are important; main engine and steering gear
17.
18'
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must always be kept in good order and seriously checked
an approaching congested areas.
Using standardized formats for presenting clear concise
ship manoeuvring data such as the rate of turn, the ad
Vance distance and the stopping distance under different
ship conditions. '
Marinecollege courses, educational tools,training tech
niques and test materials must be well arranged and dg
veloped so as to be always suitable for the ramnxeuyms
and cope with the developments that so frequently occur
in the maritime field.
Renewalof certificates and training at certain periods
is very important and should be done according to STCW
requirements.
The appreciation of collision avoidance problems by
seafarers, must be widened beyond knowledge of the col
lision regulations and the recognition of risk, to en­
compass a knowledge of the limitations imposed by self
and other ships manoeuvrabi1ity‘and equipment.
Further objective study should be undertaken to under­
stand better howofficers use the data presented to them
and howthey percieve the overall collision avoidance
problem to find out why human factors have a large con­
tribution in marinecasualties. It is not sufficient to
just indicate that the cause of the accident is due to
humanerror, it is necessary to find out whythe offuxx
acted in such a way which led to the accident.
Ship owners must not fit their ships with any new piece
of equipmentbefore they are sure that the staff isatfle
to use it properly and effectively, as the incorrect
use of equipment could cause more harm than good.
23. Reducing the officer's work load to an adequate levelgthis
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could be achieved by changing the framework condition gov­
erning the running of the ship, the manning arrangement ,
hours of work and watchkeeping plan.
Ship manning must never be reduced before adjusting the
ship to suit the limited numberof personnel, otherwise a
gap will exist in the bridge organization.
The social climate on board ships should be improved to
get the officers best effort.
No pressure should exist to complete the voyage in a cer­
tain period of time. Masters of ships must consider safety
as the major goal and not proceed with a speed more than
that permitted by the circumstances; the higher the speed
the faster the situation will develop and the lesstie time
available for decision making.
Passage planning must be well prepared and discussed in ad
Vance taking into account the needs of each phase of the
voyage for safe passage.
Introduction of automatic registry of operational data on
board ships for the purpose of obtaining more relevant and
correct data for casualty investigation.
Morecontribution by IMOto regulate investigation of casg
alties and establishment of a well structured and active
international system for investigating, analyzing and re­
porting marine accidents as that organized by ICAO.
A modest start has been made by the Maritime Safety
Committee of IMO,which has begun to issue statistics of
serious accidents, but the reports are not complete and
detailed enough to be of muchpractical value.
Fairways must be adjusted to suit the development occurred
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in marine industry, the increase in ship‘s size and draft
and the increase in the amount and types of hazardous ma­
terials.
The overall responsibility for the control of maritime
safety must be held by the national administrations. In
the light of this, a system must be developed that emnfles
work on safety to be arranged in such a way that the over
all responsibility held by the national administration is
effective in practice, at the sametime as servicescfi the
classification societies are utilized to the extent con­
sidered justifiable and appropiate. The national adminis­
tration must keep abreast of developments in the field of
maritime safety in all aspects as regards shipping in gen
eral. It is necessary to examineits future abilityto per
form both current and future duties taking into account
all convention requirements.
The national administration must play a central role in
cooperation with education and training centres, owners
and ship masters to ensure that ships staff have an ad ­
equate competency. The administration should make a record
for each officer containing a detailed information about
him, particularly his acts on board ships according to
which the officer mayhave to repeat a certain training
course or to sail as an extra officer or officer of lower
rank for a certain period of time.
The administration must take over the entire responsibi ­
lity for reformedsigning-on activities for this purpose.
Increase the cooperation betweennational adinistrations
and the classification societies to ensure that a ship ,
whenit is being operated, is actually seaworthy,adequately
33.
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crowed, equiped and maintained in such a way that it pro
vides adequate safety in order to prevent marine casu­
alties, with regard to the ship's operation and the trade
in which it is operated. To-day's technically advanced
shipping requires the coordination of the technical,
structural and operational aspects.
The classification societies must, in spite of the com­
petition between them, collaborate in the work of inter­
national maritime safety, exchange experience and de ­
tailed information, carry out research work and objective
studies to explore ideas which could improve the oper ­
ational safety. They must cooperate on a mutual basis to
be able to offer relevant professional assistance and
guidance in this field. Det Norske Veritas Research Di ­
vision has carried out a project in the period 1977 - 80
on cause relationships of collisions and groundings to
evaluate its classification rules for ships and proposed
a voluntary class for nautical safety. The data used was
based upon the collisions and groundings involving
norwegian ships. If same work could be done in ouqxuatnm1
with the other classification societies, the data would
be wider, the experience greater and the work more exten
sive, which surely would lead to more comprehensive and
accurate results for greater benefit.
Cooperation between the national administrations of vari
ous countries must be extended for better control of
ship‘s standards, to prevent owners of sub—standard shun
to continue and keep them operating in this condition.
Ships not complyingwith internationally agreed staniuds
must be stopped.
35.
It is of greatest importance to ensure that IMOoper ­
ational and technical standards are maintainedcmdupe.
In the North Sea area, the national administrations of
the North Sea states, i.e. Belgium, Denmark, France ,
West Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, England and
Sweden, as well as Greece, cooperate in port inspection
of all ships to ensure the maintenance of certain stag
dards. This cooperation is based on the so-called
Memorandumof Understanding between certain maritime
authorities.
Similar cooperation should be organized in other re ­
gions.
The assistance provided by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO)for maritime countries,particularly
the developing ones, should continue andto be increased
whennecessary to develop their maritime industry and
to be able to implement the requirements of the STCW
convention as quickly as possible in the near future .
The establishment of the world Maritime University(wMU)
under the auspices of IMOis a magnificent work and
correct positive step towards a better future.
I BELIEVE THAT, IF THE MENTIONED SHORTCOHINGS ARE
OVERCOME AND THESE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE REASONABLY
SATISFIED. THEN HE HILL BE ABLE TO GAIN THE FULL
BENEFITS OF THE PREVENTATIVE MEASURES AND REACH A
REASONABLE SOLUTION FOR THE COLLISION PROBLEM, HENCE
INCREASE THE SAFETY OF NAVIGATION.
HORLD MARITIME UNIVERSITY MALMD - SHEDEN
AN INVESTIGATIQN INTO MARINE CDLLISIONS
AND INTO METNQDS FOR THEIR REDUCTION
wmi AN EMPHASIS o_u RADAR AND A335
Volume II (Appendices and References)
BY
SALAH AHMED MOHAMED SALEH
Egypt
A paper submitted to the Faculty of the HORLDMARITIMEUNIVERSITYin
partial satisfaction of the requirements of the MARITIMEDUCATION
(NAUTICAL) COURSE.
The contents of this paper reflect my own personnal views and are not
necessarily endorsed by the UNIVERSITY;
Signature:
01 July 1985
Paper directed and assessed by
GUENTHER ZADE
Professor HORLDMARITIME UNIVERSITY
Paper co-assessed by:
J. MULDERS
Director
Dutch Maritime Teachers‘ Training College
Amsterdam
Visiting Professor HORLDMARITIMEUNIVERSITY
/4/’Pcnd/X 1
::7c:2.'"::..':;,*:.2*.: ml
'~ 9. V (hid-D11:1.3
WBUIZIYOP
mat - 6th ssssionL304
IMCO
HNITEESE.A!I!.'E!DT0 N3 1972 COLLIBICITERI
COLLISION EI'A'1'IS'1'ICS AND ANALYSIS 0? E3
CAUSESOF OOLLISI
th Internati Associationof Institutes
FEB
Ills sttsobsd report "Collision statistics md analysis of the oausosof
oollisions", compiledby LN. Oooln-oft,is broudzt to tbs attention of the
Bub-Canittse for any notion it deemsappropriate.
OI-I
IMVZ6/4/l
IEEEE
IMKJJBIOHEENRHHCBAlD.flfluJBIS(H'TEE GENES OPIIHJJSIOIB
INTRODUCTION
OBJECTIVESThe investigation is related to collisions which
have occurred outside port areas, in coastal waters or in the
open sea. Statistics of all knowncollisions have been used
to determine trends according to regions and to investigate
the effects of other factors such as darkness and visibility.
From the data bank of knowncollisions it has been possibleto seek out further details of the circumstances of the
accidents from various sources for the purpose of analysis ofthe causes of collisions.
SCOPEOF THE lNVESTIGATION'The survey has been restricted
to collisions between vessels of over 100 tons gross under way
and proceeding on passage and not engaged in special
activities such as fishing, replenishment or naval exercises.
It applies to collisions occurring world-wide in coastal watersor t e open sea but does not apply to accidents in harbours,
rivers, canals or inland waters. Narrowstraits such as the
Sound, the Bosporus and the Straits of Messina have been
excluded from consideration but collisions in the Straits of
Gibraltar and Singapore have been included. Data has been
obtained for collisions which have occurred since the lst
January 1956. The data bank will continue to be up-dated in
the immediate future.
SOURCESOF DATA The initial data relating to the incidence
and location of collisions for statistical purposes has been
obtained from Lloyd's Weekly Casualty Reports published by the
Corporation of Lloyds. Data on collisions in the Dover Strait
area has been checked by comparison with the reports of the
National Maritime Institute of the United Kingdomand
supplemented by information received from the Channel NavigationInformation Service.
Moredetailed information about the circumstances of collisions
has been received from various national administrations and from
other sources. Data based on Japanese investigations has been
pioxidid by Professor Kandori of the Shimonoseki University ofs er es.
BACKGROUND
NUMBEROF SHIPS IN SERVICE This report is concerned with
collisions Between ships proceeding on passage, which are almost
invariably merchant ships engaged on commercial voyages. when
considering trends in the incidence of collisions accout must
be taken of the numberof trading ships in service, which has
increased considerably over the period covered by the investi­
gation. Estimates of the numberof trading ships in service at
ten yearly intervals are shownin Table l for different size
(2 >
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categories. The figures are based on the Statistical Tables
of L oyd's Register of Shipping and on data published by theGeneral Counc 1 of British Shippi g.
Table 1 Numbersof trading ships in service according l
to/size category (g.r.t.)
,/
Year 100-999 1000-9999 l0000over latal
1950 5100 11200 1100 17400
1960 7400 12300 3000 22700
1970 11400 13000 6200 30600
1980 11800 13600 9500 34900
REGIONALTRAFFICDENSITIES During the first part of the period
covered by the survey the densit arine traffic was highest
in the coastal region off q9ILh_H£Sfi?§g;ggg;)particularly onthe route from Usha t to t e Elbe. raffic surveys m de in
1972 and 1977 indicated that the volume of through traffic was
of the order of 300-400 ships per day in the Dover Strait,‘
with 150-200 crossing ships per day in the peak summermonths)
Traffic off N.W.Europe mayhave been slightly higher in earlier
years when there was a larger number of small coastal ships
operating in the area. In 1962 the number of through ships on
the Borkum-Terschelling swept route was estimated to be about
350 per day.
The volume of traffic in,ggp§%g§g_5g§%t;§:E§EEE§)hasincreasedconsiderably during the perio covere ' investigation
and traffic density off somesections of the coast is now
higher than in the DoverStrait and all other coastal regions.
The high traffic density is due to the large numberof small
coastal ships trading in this region, apart from the considerable
numberof fishing vessels.
Other coastal regions with a high traffic density are the
Malaccaand Singapore Straits, the southern part of the BalticSea and the Strait of Gibraltar. In 1978 the flow of traffic
through the Strait of Gibraltar was found to be of the order
of 100-150 ships per day.)
(3)
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RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATIQE
1. STATISTICS OF WORLD-HIDE COLLISIONS
It is difficult to obtain completestatistics of world-wide
casualties, especially with respect to the numerousminoraccidents vhic occur in port areas. A very high proportion of
collisions which occur in coastal regions or the open sea will
be re orted by Lloyd's as at least one of the ships involved
is licely to suffer appreciable damage. However, it has been
found that some collisions between small ships in Japanese
coastal waters have not been included in Lloyd's Lasualty
Reports and the data bank has been supplemented by additionalinformation received from Japan.
INCIDENCEOF COLLISIONS The annual incidence of world-wide
collisions is shownin Table 2. Despite the considerable
increase in the numberof ships in service the incidence
of sea collisions, as reported by Lloyd's, has remained
relatively constant.
Table 2 Annual Incidence of Reported Collisions/I
1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1956-80
Both ships 46 51 48 41 34
over 1000 tons 46 41 36 45 36
41 48 45 34 46
45 51 S5 40 43
50 41 52 57 35
Totals 228 232 236 217 194 1107
Both ships 80 77 87 105 79
over 100 tons 68 S7 73 85 81
65 87 87 77 79
76 83 105 93 76
70 94 100 94 66
Totals 359 398 452 454 381 2044
U1)
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RATIOT0 NUMBERAT RISK The total number of ships of different
s ze categor as H c are known to have been involved in a sea
collision are given for each five year period in Table 3.The ratio of t e nean annual rat to the number of ships in
service is also shown. The ratio of ships in collision to ships
at risk was appreciably higher for larger ships before 1970,
but has decreased in recent years to be about the same as for
small ships.
Table 3 Numbersof ships involved in collision and rnnual
ratios to the numbersin service, for different
size categories
Period Size Category in g.r.t.
100-999 1000-9999 10000 I over
1956-60 No of ships in 141 450 110
collision
Ratio to number .0043 .0074 .0088
in service
1961-95 Ships in collision 171 435 140
~ ' Ratio .0041 .0070 .0081
1966-70 Ships in collision 261 384 212Ratio .0049 .0060 .0081
1971-75 Ships in collision 298 347 239Ratio .0051 .0053 .0069
1976-80 Ships in collision 220 319 189Ratio .0039 .0047 .0045
REGIONALINCIDENCEThe regional totals of collisions for five
year perio are s own in Table 4. The figures for Japan and
Koreaare likely to be incomplete, especially for the earlier
years. Collisions in the bays of Japan and in restricted waters
of the Inland Sea have not been included.
(5)
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Table 4 Regional totals of collisions for five year periods,
1956 to 1980 {><
legion 1958-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 TOTALS
Baltic Sea 37 42 39 33 21 172
Southern North Sea 82 80 71 32 22 287
Dover Strait 60 69 45 19 16 209
English Channel 25 29 23 22 15 113
E Coast UK 34 19 17 12 10 92
I Coast Spain-Portugal 13 29 17 15 12 86
Gibraltar Strait 10 13 13 3 17 56
Mediterranean 22 19 15 29 31 116
E Coast N America 27 22 20 18 ll 98
Malacca 8 SingaporeStraits 5 13 26 20 66
Coasts of Japan and
Korea 5 29 114 163 125 436
s.v. Pacific 2 6 11 24 17 so
Other regions 40 34 55 58 52 239
7
occurring off north west Europe in recent years which cannot be
accounted’for by the possible slight decrease in traffic density.
The coastal region from Ushant to the Elbe will be considered
in moredetail in the next section of this report.
The increase of collisions occurring off Japan during the period
of the survey can be attributed to the growth of international
and coastal trade and the considerable increase in the number
of Japanese ships. There are no IMCOapproved traffic
separation schemes in the coastal regions off Japan and Korea.
EFFECTOF RESTRlCT§QVISIBILITY It is not possible to determine{Fe exact proportion of collisions occurring in restricted
visibility for all regions as the extent of the visibility isnot always indicated n Lloyd's Casualty Reports. Restricted
visibility (less than 2 miles) was reported in 505 of the 742
collisions (68!) for which details have been received.
(6!
There has been a considerable decrease in the numberof collisions
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During the 10 year period 1956-1965 over 80%of collisions inthe DoverStrait area occurred in restricted visibility, but
during the last 10 years this proportion has been reduced toless than/50|­
The roportion of collisions in restricted visibility has been
of t e order of 60%or more in the coastal regions of N.H. Europe,
Japan, N.B. America and in the Gibraltar Strait. Less than 301
of collisions in the Malacca and Singapore Straits have occurredin restricted visibility, due mainly to heavy rainfall.
EFFECTOF DARKNESSThe effect of darkness on the incidence of
collisions, for which information relating to time and
visibilit was available, is shownin Table 5. For collisions
knownto ave occurred in clear visibility the numberof
collisions occurring in darkness is approximately three times
the numberoccurring in daylight. In restricted visibility
collisions occur as frequently in daylight as in darkness.
‘Table 5 Effect of darkness on the incidence of collisions
Daylight Darkness
Collisions in clear visi­
bility 60 184
Collisions in restricted
visibility 427 405
In conditions of clear visibility the higher incidence of
collisions was found to apply evenly throughout the period
of darkness. The incidence during the period of twilight
goeinnot appear to be greater than during the period ofar ess.
2. COLLISIONS on: NORTHWEST euaope
The coastal region of north west Europe ‘etween Ushant and the
Elbe merits special consideration. During the period 1956-65
over 40%of reported world-wide collisions occurred in this
region but during the last 10 years the proportion has reduced
to less than 201 of the world total. Traffic separation
schemeswere first established in this_region in 1967-68, and
have subsequently been revised and extended. The effect of
traffic separation in this area will be investigated.
Thecoastal region can conveniently be divided into three
sections: the English Channel west of the Greenwich Meridian,
the Dover Strait and the southern part of_the North Sea.
Thethree sections will be considered separately.
L7’
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THEDOVERSTRAIT For the purpose of this investigation thsover tra a ea is considered to extend from latitude S0
to latitudeosl l5'N and from the Greenwich meridian tolon itude 2 00'E. A traffic separation scheme nowextends
ent rely through the area so that all navigable water lies
within the scheme or the adjacent inshore zones.
1S'N
Traffic separation was first introduced on a voluntary basis
in September 1967. A radar surveillance scheme was brought
into operation in July 1972 and has since been extended to cover
the full width of the Strait in the narrow section. Compliance
with the principles of traffic separation was mad. compulsory
for some ships during the period 1972 to 1977. In July 1977
the new Collision Regulations came into force requiring all
ships to complywith the principles of traffic separation.
Voyagedata has been obtained for almost all ships involved in
collision,in this area and in manycases information about
coursesgsteered has also been received. Table 6 shows the
numberof collisions according to the category of encounter
situation for five year periods between 1st July 1956 and30th June 1981. The number of collisions in clear and
restricted visibility are also given for each period.
Table 6 Numbersof collisions in the Dover Strait according
to encounter situation and visibility, for five year
periods.
Encounter Situation 1956-61 1961-66 1966-71 1971-76 1976-81
Opposite directions 43 52 25 7 4
Broad crossing 0 0 O 0 1
Same direction 7 7 8 6 6
Not known 1 2 l l 0
Totals 51 62 34 14 ll
Restricted visibility 49 52 26 10 7
Clear visibility 2 9 8 4 4
In recent years the numberof collisions between vessels
proceeding in opposite directions has been reduced to approximately
10%of the incidence before traffic separation was introduced.
There have been no collisions between vessels proceeding in
opposite directions within the traffic lanes of this area since
1972. The last 10 collisions between vessels proceeding in
opposite directions have occurred within the inshore zones.
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Since traffic separation was introduced in l967 there have been
20 collisions between vessels proceeding in the opposite
directions in the inshore zones of the Dover Strait and 18 of
these have involved at least one ship which was neither calling
at a port or pilot station within the zone nor proceeding
to or from a nearby port on the adjacent coast.
Despite the considerable volume of both through and crossingtraffic and the relatively high incidence of fog there is no
record of any collision involving ships crossing at a broad
angle during the 21 years before the 1972 Collision R-gulations
came into force.
The number of collisions between vessels proceeding in the same
direction has remained relatively constant throughout the 25
year period of the survey. The majority of collisions between
vessels going in the same direction (22 out of a total of 34)
occurredin restricted visibility.
The incidence of collisions in clear visibility in the Dover
Strait has also remainedrelatively constant. The introduction
of traffic separation does not appear to have affected the low
incidence of collisions between vessels proceeding in oppositedirections in conditions of clear visibility.
SOUTHERNORTHSEA This area is considered to extend from the
eastern Boundaryof the Dover Strait area to the Elbe estuary,
and to include the traffic separation schemes and deep water
route off the European coast. The region off the east coast
of England has been considered separately.
During the first half of the 25 year period of this survey
channels swept clear of mines were established as NEMEDRI
routes. Centre line buoys provided a form of traffic
separation but in periods of restricted visibility vessels
tended to move into the wrong side of the channel and there
were numerous collisions. The swept channels were relatively
narrow causing vessels to overtake at close distances.
Traffic separation schemeswere introduced in parts of this
coastal region in 1968. There is no radar surveillance of the
schemes and no procedure for identifying ships which are
contravening Rule 10 of the Collision Regulations.
Table 2 shows the numbers of collisions related to encounter
situations for five year periods between mid 1956 and mid 1981.
The numberof collisions between vessels proceeding in oppositedirections has decreased to less than 20%of the incidence
before traffic separation was introduced. During the last 5
years there have been 10 collisions between vessels proceeding
in opposite directions within the region, but 5 of these occurred
in areas well clear of the traffic separation schemes.
(7:
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Table 7 Nuabers of collisions in the southern North Sea
according to encounter situation
1956-61 1961-66 1966-71 1971-76 1976-81
Opposite directions 56 60 47 12 10
Broad crossing 7 6 6 9 4
Same direction 10 10 6 6 4
Not known 10 10 7 3 2
Totals 83 84 66 30 20
The numberof collisions resulting from broad crossing situations
has remained relatively constant. The majority of broad
crossing collisions occurred in restricted visibility and
involved a small ship.
There has been a decrease in the incidence of collisions between
vessels proceeding in the same direction. This was to be
expected as the traffic lanes are wider than the swept channels
of the NEMEDRIroutes.
ENGLISHCHANNELThis area is considered to extend from the
wsstern Boundaryof the Dover Strait area to longitude7 N and to include the southern approaches to the traffic
separation scheme off Ushant.
Traffic separation schemeswere established off Ushant and
Casquets, and off south west England in 1968 but most of the
area is not covered by separation schemes. Extensive changes
to the separation schemes off Ushant and Casquets came into
force in January 1979.
Table 8 shows the number of collisions according to type of
encounter situations for 5 year periods since 1st July 1956.The decrease in the number of col1is;ons between vessels
proceeding in opposite directions is less pronounced than in the
other coastal regions of north west Europe but in the vicinity
of the traffic separation schemesestablished in 1968 the
number decreased from 18 in the period 1956-66 to 6 in theperiod 1971-81. ‘
There have been very few collisions between vessels in broad
crossing situations in this region. The incidence of collisions
betweenvessels proceeding in the same direction is relatively
low and there is no apparent trend.
(/0)
lxvzm/4/1
Mum:
lhanlo
Table 8 Numbersof collisions in the English Channel
according to encounter situation
1956-61 1961-66 1966-71 1971-76 1976-81
Opposite directions 19 27 17 16 11
Broad crossing 0 1 1 0 1
Same direction 2 Z 4 3
Not known 1 1 0 1 0
Totals 22 31 22 20 14
SUMARYTable 9 shows the totals for 5 year periods for the
entire coastal region, and the totals of collisions which have
occurred in areas where traffic separation schemes have been
established. There has been a considerable reduction in the
incidence of collisions between vessels proceeding in oppositedirections in restricted visibility through areas wheretraffic
separation schemes have been established. The incidence of
collisions involving vessels crossing or proceeding in the
samedirection within those areas, and of all types of collisions
outside those areas has remained relatively constant.
Table 9 Numbersof collisions in the coastal region
off North West Europe for five year periods
Area 1956-61 1961-66 1966-71 1971-76 1976-31
Dover Strait 51 62 34 14 11
Southern North Sea 83 84 66 30 20
English Channel 22 31 22 20 14
Totals 155 176 122 (54 45
Vicinity of rss 123 140 ' 39 34 24
Away from T85 28 36 29 30 21
l//)
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Inforlafion about the circumstances preceding collisions in the
e an sea or coastal waters has been received for approximately
7gOcases. For the years 1968 to 1977 inclusive it has been
possible to obtain data relating to at least one ship in 50%
or more of knownsea collisions. Someinitial results of the
analysis will be summarisedin this section of the report.
Table l0 shows a breakdownof reported collisions with respect
to category of encounter situation and condition of visibility.
The categories of encounter referred to in the table are defined
as follows:
Meetingend-on Esch vessel initially subtending less thanS on the bow of the other ship.
Fine crossing Bash vessel initially subtending less than
30 on the bow from the other ahip. One
or both subtending more than 5 .
Broadcrossing Each°vessel_initially subtending less than1121 on the bow from the other shi .
One or both subtending more than 30 .
Overtaking One vessel subtending more than 11210 on
the bow from the other ship.
The figures should only be regarded as close approximations,
owing to the imprecise nature of the evidence available.
Table 10 Numbersof collisions according to encounter
situation and visibility for different regions
Meeting Fine Broad Overtaking
end-on Crossing Crossing
Clear visibility
N-W. Europe 8 18 23 23
Japan 3 24 40 24
Other areas 7 26 21 14
Totals 13 68 84 61
Restricted Visibility
in 26/41
mm
Fig! 12
COLLISIONS IN CLEAR VISIBILITY
MEETINGEND-ON Only 18 cases have been considered to be in this
Ei?3i3?§T'l3?? than 3%of the total for which information about
the circumstances has been received. For post o these cases
the angle on the bow was of the order of 3 to S on the bowfor one or both ships so that the Crossing Rule would probably
have been applicable.
Someof the collisions in this group could be attributed mainly
to poor look-out on one or both ships - usually in cases
involving small vessels. In a few cases the close p esence
of a third vessel was a contributory factor. A third cause,
in several collisions of this type, was a late starboard turn
by one ship in what was initially a starboard to starboard
passing situation.
CROSSINGSITUATIONS The Crossing Rule would have been
applicable In approximately 701 of the collisions which occurredin clear visibility. The predominant cause in almost every
case was poor look-out by the watch officer of the give-way
ship. In a very high proportion of collisions of this type
action was not taken by either ship until very close range.
The Stand-on Rule of the 1972 Regulations, which came into
force in July 1977, permits the stand-on vessel to take action
at an earlier stage than was permitted under previous
regulations. '
Information/has not been received for sufficient casualties
which have occurred since July 1977 to assess the effectiveness
of the change but it will be possible to make a comparisonat a later ate.
Somecollisions have occurred as a result of a crossing
situation in which a change of course was made on rounding a
headland. Traffic separation is believed to have been
effective in reducing the incidence of collision of this type.
Although the majority of collisions which occurred in clear
visibility have been classed as broad crossings only about
lS%(27 collisions) involveg vessels crossing with an initial
course difference within 30 of a right angle. Collisions
between vessels crossing at a very broad angle tend to occurin areas of low traffic density where less vigilance is
maintained. Several accidents of this type have occurred in
the central Mediterranean and the open rceans. Broad crossing
collisions are relatively frequent in Japanese waters, where
small vessels are usually involved.
OVERTAKINGCASES As in the case of crossing situations the
principal cause of collisions between vessels involved in
overtaking in clear visibility is poor'look-out on one orboth ships. At least 8 collisions have resulted from a sudden
change of heading by one vessel due to failure of the steering
system whenovertaking at close distance. Several others
involved the close presence of a third vessel or other special
circumstances.
(I3)
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COLLISIONS IN RESTRICTEDvxsxnxurv
MEETINGOR FINE CROSSINGSITUATIONS Before the introduction
5T—T7FTTIE'7?B3?3TT3fi_E3TTi?i3fi?'EEtweenvesse s on nearly
opposite courses, each subtending less than 30 on the bow
of the other shi , represented over 90%of collision in
restricted visibility. Traffic separation is reducing the
incidence of this type of collision but there have been
numerous instances in recent years, some involving very
large ships.
The frequency of meeting or fine crossing collisloas in
restricted visibility is mainly due to improper use of radar
and faulty interpretation of radar data, associated with a
relatively high speed of approach. Manycollisions of this
type featured starboard helm action by one ship and port helm
action by the other, usually at a late stage.
The 1972 Regulations have placed more emphasis on starboardhelm action but it is too soon to assess the effectiveness
of this change. Several meeting/fine crossing collisionsin restricted visibility have resulted fromstarboard
helm action by one ship in a starboard to starboard passing
situation. _
It should be possible to reduce the incidence of this type of
collision by introducing further traffic separation schemes,
especially off the coast of Japan, and by additional routeing
measures - such as those agreed for the English Channel.
Someof the existing traffic separation schemesare relativelyineffective.
BROADCROSSINGSThere are relatively few collisions between
vessels crossing at a broad angle in restricted visibility.
This type of situation can be more readily interpreted from
the radar display and the rate of approach is less than forfine crossings.
Host of the reported cases have involved a small vessel and/or
a ship without operational radar so that detection was made
at a late stage. n each of the 27 cases involving vessels
crossing within 30 of a right angle detection was madeby one
or both vessels at a range of less than 5 miles, and in 25
of the 27 cases one vessel was less than 3000 tons gross.
OVERTAKINGCASES Overtaking collisions account for less than
0 e to a occurring in restricted visibility. The annualincidence of this type of collision is less in restricted
visibility than in clear visibility.
As in the case of broad crossing situations the majority of
cases are associated with a low detection range. Several
collisions of this type have occurred as a result of action to
avoid a third ship, particularly in the traffic lanes oftraffic separation schems.
(/4!)
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CONCLUSIONS
1) The incidence of world-wide collisions in the open sea
1)
4)
C9
5)
7)
3)
9)
10
\-4
and coastal waters has remained relatively constant over
the last 25 years despite the considerable increase in
the nunber of ships in service.
There has been a decrease of over 50%in the incidence
of collisions off north west Europe during the second
half of the 25 year period whereas the incidence of
collisions in the coastal regions of eastern Asia has
greatly increased.
Before the introduction of traffic separation schemes
the proportion of collisions in restricted visibility
was about 70! of the total. This roportion is now
decreasing. In the DoverStrait t e proportion
occurring in restricted visibility was over 80%before
traffic separation was introduced, it is nowless than
50%.
of clear visibility the incidence of
darkness is three times greater than
in daylight.
In conditions
collisions in
the incidence
Off the coast of north west Europe collisions between
vessels proceeding in opposite, or nearly opposite,
directions constituted approximately 80$ of the
total before traffic separation was introduced. The
incidence of this type of collision has been very much
reduced in this region and is now almost negligible
within the limits of the separation schemes.
Traffic separation has not appreciably affected the
incidence of collisions between vessels proceeding in
the samedirection, or crossing at a broad angle, off
the coast of north west Europe.
The incidence of collisions in clear visibility has not
been appreciably affected by the introduction of traffic
separation schemes.
Almost all collisions which have occurred within the
inshore zones of the DoverStrait since traffic separation
was introduced have involved at least one ship which was
not calling at a port or pilot station within the zone,
.nor proceeding to or from a nearby port on the adjacent
COISC.
In clear visibility the Crossing Rule would have been
applicable in approximately 70$ of collisions. e
predominant cause of this type of collision is poor look out.
Collisions between vessels crossing at a broad angle in
clear visibility tend to occur in areas of lowtraffic
density or to involve small vessels.
U5)
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ll) In clear visibility overtaking collisions are usually
attributable to poor look out and/or a sudden change of
heading whenpassing at a close distance.
In restricted visibility approximately90%of collisions
involve vessels proceeding in opposite or nearly
opposite directions. The predominant cause is improper
use of radar and faulty interpretation of radar data,
associated with a high speed of approach.
l3) There are relatively few collisions between vessels
crossing at a broad angle in restricted vis.bility.
Such cases usually involve a small vessel and/or vessels
without operational radar.
14) overtaking collisions account for less than 5%of the
total occurring in restricted visibilit . Collisions
of this type are usually associated wit low detection
range or action to avoid a third ship.
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.' MODEL ELIFDIC COURSES l
!ote b1 the Secregiat
iastzasfiisn
1 ‘Io develop frameworks of model courses in response to recommendations made
U! the Joint BC.iP[D!0 Regional Meeting of hperte in Hariti.me '1‘:-ainingand
Certification ‘Bangkok,April/Hay 1980), the D19Secretariat prepared terma of
reference for the guidanceof connfite contributing to the project.
:eg of Reference
2 be main points of these terms of reference are set out in the Anne: and
aubject to the advice and cements of the £mb—Counittee.will he need as
guidance for any further model coureee prepared under or aeeociated with D10
technical oo-operation projects.
Material developed to date
5 llodel oouree material for the following has been developed to date:
.1 certificate an Officer in Chargeof a lavigational Hatch on ehipe
of 200 G1‘or more;
.2 certificate an Engineer Officer in Chargeof a Watchin a traditionally
mannedengine room as a sea-going ehip powered by propulsion machinery
of 150 W propulsion power or more;
.5 lodel rrunovoxxi and teaching ayllabuaea for aafety training for
hetero. offioere and rating: of oil tankera, ehenioal tankera and
liquefied gu tankere.
¥ frelininaq drafte of other material have been prepared by 130 consultant:
I: n ad hoe haaia in reaponee to project demamla./
1/\
CIII
(/7)
Terms of Reference
on the Development of Detailed Teaching Byllabuees, lrameworke
of Iodel courses and SpecimenIramination Papers based on
the l97B STCHconvention and associated
1910sw Conferencesuoiutiony
£3 1 - project Development and Co-ordination
l Darts 2 and 5 of the project dealing with basic courses shall be co-ordinated
three project co-crdinators. one for deck department, one for engine
partment and one for radio department matters.2
2 !he work is to be distributed by the co-ordinators in such a manner that
s institution will take full responsibility for the production of the detailed
aching eyllabuses, the frameworks of courses and the specimen examinations for
complete subject at all basic course levels. and so that the resultant work
presents the combinedefforts of as manycountries as practicable.
3 Drafts of the detailed teaching syllabuses. frameworksof model courses
d specimen examinations shall be validated by a small group of experts and
O consultants.
rt 2 - Be uirements for "Unrestricted Certificates"
(Basic Courses;
1 General
l.l The general objective is to develop detailed syllabuses, frameworksof
del courses and specimen examination papers in the English languag
imarily reflecting:
Only the Parties to the 1978 STCHConvention may authoritatively
pronouce on its meaningand application. The detailed syllabuses,
frameworks of model courses and specimen examination questions
developedunder this technical co-operation project are only to
be regarded as an effort to provide and harmonize technical assistance
in maritime training.
To be developed in cosultation with ITU.
Subsequentto validation of the English versions, all material will
be translated into appropriate languages.
(/3)
saw 11/9All!
Inge 2
.1 the mandatory minimumrequirements for the 1978 STCVConvention ‘Esdes
or classes of certificates and authorizations whichare valid for
vsyuges which are more extensive than near-coastal voyages and those
certificates issued under the Radio Regulations that are required to
he held under the provisions of the 1978 STCHConvention or
recommwndedas a minimum requirement by the 1978 BTUConference
Resolution 7; and’
.2 the minimumrequirements for ratings made mandatory by the STCH
convention or recommendedby the 1978 STUConference Resolution 9:
and
.5 the mandatoryminimumrequirements for certificates of proficiency
in survival craft.
- 2.1.2 The completelist of certificates and qualifications concerned is as
follows:m
Chapter II - Master - Deck Department
Master of ships of 1600 GTor more (unrestricted).
Chief late of ships of 1600 GTor more (unrestricted).
Master of ships of 200 - 1600 GT(unrestricted).
Chief Mate c ships of 200 - l6OOGT(unrestricted).
Officer in Charge of a Navigational Hatch on ships of 200 GTor more
(unrestricted).
Mandatory MinimumRequirements for a Rating forming part of a
Navigational Hatch.
Cha ter III - ine De artment
Chief Engineer Officer of ships powered by main propulsion machinery
of 3000E! or more (urestricted). .
U9)
Beoond igineer Officer of ships powered by I111! P1'°P'-|1|1°3 333511131‘!°‘
30!!)W or more (unrestricted).
Engineer Oftiosr in Charge of s Hatch on ships poweredby min propulsion
IIQLLBOI1of 750 W 01‘3°"­
Chief hgineer Otticer of nhips poweredby main propulsion machinery
between 750 end 3000 W (unrestricted).
Secondhgineer Officer of ships powered by main propulsion machinery
between 150 and 3000 kw (unrestricted).
Mandatory MinimumRequirements for a rating forming part of an Engine
RoomHatch.
MinimumRequirements for a Rating nominated as the Assistant to the
Engineer Officer in Charge of the Hatch.
Chapter IV - Radio Department
Radiocoununication Operator's General Certificate for the Maritime Mobile
Service including the additional lcnowledgerequired by the 1978
STCHConvention
First Class Radio Telgraph Operator's Certificate including the
additional knowledge required by the 1978 STCUConvention.
SecondClas-. Radiotelegraph Operator's Certificate including the additional
knowledge required by the 1978 STCUConvention./
RadiotelephoneOperator's General Certificate including the additional
knowledge required by the 1978 STCHConvention.
Restricted RadiotelephoneOperator's Certificate including the additional
knowledge required by the 1978 SNU Convention.
RadiotelegraphOperator's Special Certificate including the additional
knowledge recommendedby the SW Conference Resolution 7.2T
1/ Ln authorisation to serve as Chief Engineer Officer of ships powered
5! III-inpropulsion machinery of less than 3000 W (unrestricted)
lily be endorsed on the SecondEngineer Officer Certificate but no
separate course for this is necessary.
K’ Chapter 7 requirements are being dealt with as specialized courses.
(20)
Cha erV'1
Certificate of zgofigiency in Survival Craft
LL, 5. ¢.u11ed teaching eyllabuses, frameworksof basic modelcourses
and specimen examination papers are intended to provide information on minimum
levels for use by technical advisers, consultants and experts i.Iplemsntin.g
technical assistance projects for developingcountries in the field of the
fifigyg and certification of seafarers so that their approach and the minimum
gundu,-as implemented may be as uniform as possible. The work must not be
gggaggedas an official interpretation of the Convention. The following note
is therefore to be inserted immediatelybelow the title of each detailed
syllabus, model course framework and specimen examination paper:
"NJ. mly Parties to the 1978 STCHConvention may authoritatively
pronounce on the meaning and application of the Convention and the
information contained in this documentmust be regarded as reflecting
only the consensus of opinion of the contributing consultants."
2.1.4 Since levels of development vary from country to country and
progressively improve, the entry requirements identified with the course
i‘rameworksfor 'first' certificates mayin somecountries necessitate
augmentation of the academic knowledge of students whopossess the most
suitable general education qualifications, by preparatory upgrading courses
or by academicenrichment of the technical courses at entry levels.
2.1.5 In other countries the level of development maypermit ‘the implementation
of a more ambitious training prey-ammewhich exceeds the basic requirements of
the 1978 STCUConvention. In such cases the CCHMONCORECUERICUIJreflected
in the model courses would be enriched to‘ the extent appropriate by the
consultant or expert concerned as part of the technical assistance being provided.
2.2 Etailed '1‘each_i_.ngfillabuses
2.2.1 A detailed teaching syllabus shall be drawnup for each master - deck
II-bu-taunt and engine departmentcertificate and qualification listed in
DI!-'lF~'|Ph2.1/.2. based on the general objectives listed in the 1978 S‘1Y.‘H
cmventien regulation concernedand its appendix. if am. taking into account
s. inthelevelofhiowledge,th relevantresolutions
“WW5 57 the 1978 STVconference and relevant—fi1Orecomsndationa.
(2/)
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2.2.2 A detailed teaching syllabus shall be drawn up for each radio department
oertifioate listed in paragraph 2.1.2. based on the provisions of the Radio
'.‘u;.g3¢.., :3. general objectives listed in the 1978STCHConventionregulation
concerned and its appendix, the provisions of the 1974 5°L‘3 c°"V°fl‘1°n.
chgpggg IV, the relevant resolutions adopted by the 1978 STUConference and
relevant IMOrecommendations. It shall be assumed that the additional
:nsu1edge specified in the 1978 STCHConvention and STUConference Resolution 1
is included in the examinationfor the Radio Regulations certificate.
2.2.} A detailed teaching syllabus shall be drawnup for the certificate of
proficiency in survival craft based on the provisions of the 1978 STCH
Convention, V/1. the provisions of the 1914 sous Convention. Chapter III, the
1978 STUConference. Resolution 19 and relevant IMOrecommendations.
2.2.4 Eachdetailed teaching syllabus shall:
.1 be drawnup in an appropriate subject order:
.2 primarily reflect the basic minimumrequirements but incorporate where
appropriate any supplementary provisions recommendedin the related
documentsas identified above, indicating their recommendatorynature;
.3 clearly identify the source of each subject element incorporated in
the sy111busby paranthetic inclusion or marginal notation of
appropri .e cross references to the paragraph or sub-paragraph of the
convention. resolution or recommendationconcerned.
2.} Post-Sea Service Course Frameworks
2.3.1 Each course frameworkshall be specific to the certificate or :.quirement
concerned and shall:
.1 not assume that any maritime training has been undergone by the course
participants other than the minimumtraining specified for the
certificate or qualification concerned;1_T
}/ Whereoptions are provided, the option requiring the least formal
training is to be assumed.
(.22.)
2 gqggtlty the minimumentry requirements appropriate to the
qualification and knowledgerequirements of the appropriate regulations
and the academic biowledge presupposed in designing the course framework
in each subject;
_3 ,r;ng:11y reflect in appropriate subject order and sequence only the
basic or mandatory requirements;
,4 incorporate where appropriate any supplementary provisions recommended
13 the relevant documentsidentified in paragraphs 2.2.1 to 2.2.3 in
an appropriate sequence but clearly indicate their recommsndatory
nature;
.5 clearly identify the source of each subject element incorporated in
the course by parenthetic inclusion or marginal notation of appropriate
cross-references to the paragraph or sub-paragraph of the Convention.
its annex or resolution adopted by the 1978 STUConference or by IMO;
.6 indicate the amountof lecture and laboratory time allotted each
main subject element;
.7 identify the personnel, accommodation,laboratory. teaching aid.
equipment, consumables and other resource inputs that are:
- essential, and
- desirab1e;2/
.8 indicate the order of priority of those resource inputs identified as
being desirable;
Since no uniform academic structure exists, the presupposed academic
knowledgemust be specifically identified.
This involves Judgementof the minimal reasonable interpretation of the
convention requirements bearing in mind the needs and difficulties
experienced by developing countries as well as the needs of safety.
Wherepossible the course outline should be provided in learning
objective format. Appropriate explanatory material drawnfrom a
umber of sources can be madeavailable. '
an intake of 20-25 students is to be assumedfor resource input
estimates. Appropriate guidance should be provided re: scaling u.
(23)
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9 ho suported by appropriate performancespecifications;/and
spprolimste costs in 03 dollars for the Ip°¢191° t0l¢h1D6 3143 '04
gqnipmsmtand indicating the estimate year:
_1o 5. gupportod by layout plans or diagrams where necessary;
.11 indicate any applicable course loading or teacher/student ratio
limitation;
.12 indicate siting or location requirements, limitations or considerations
whererequisite and any support or outside services necessary;
.15 indicate the numberof teaching staff required and their minimum
academicand professional qualifications, industrial experience and
pedagogical training which are appropriate to the level of the course;
.14 utilize whenpossible course modules that are commonto more than
one department and level of certificate, the commonalityof such
modulesbeing identified.
2.4 Specimen Examination Questions
2.4.1 Twoseparate sets of specimen examination questions shall be drawn up
in the selected subject order (see paragraph 2.3.1.3) for each subject for
whicha written examination is appropriate, one illustrating the use of
traditional (subj rive) type questions and the other illustrating the use
of objective (preferably multiple choice) type questions.
2.4.2 The advantages and disadvantages of the two examination techniques and
the effect this mayhave on training are to be briefly summarizedto assist
officials in maritime training administrations to choose whicheverexarination
system or mix of systems is best suited to their needs
Part 3 - Detailed s llabuses and frameworks of courses re arded as
eauivalent to sea-Eoiig service Ispiroved education and training,
pre—seaor sandwich type courses. etc.
3.1 In addition to the basic material specified in Part 2, detailed
syllabusee. model course frameworks and specimen examination questions shall
be drawnup for the deck, marine engineering and radio disciplines so as to
1/ Reference should be made to applicable IMOoperating requirements
and performancespecifications.
(n29)
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wide a broader based career oriented maritime education primarily for new
wants to the ind\Il¢-l'¥­
In the ease of officer trainees, the above material shall be drawnmm
the basis of a career pattern that allows the trainees to obtain the highest
ropriate certificate in their discipline in the shortest penaitted time
1.3‘ mm sdvantage of examination exemption and similar provisions. The
io provision shall be enriched to the extent necessary to provide a sound
cational basis for easy assimilation of all specialized training identified
the 1978 BMWConvention. the associated Conference resolutions and D10
osnendations (see Part 4 for a sample list of specialized courses).
In the case of rating trainees the detailed syllabuses, modelcourse
networksand specimen examination questions should be sufficiently comprehensive
to provide a sound basis for both safety and career purposes and for such
sequent training as maybe required to fill key rating positions.
hoept as provided in paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3, the frameworksof these
sl courses shall take full account of the provisions of Part 2.
n‘P°r1°‘°°d 3.“-73-1-‘°1‘3I33 in some circumstances enter such courses.
(2 5)
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zart 5 - List of ModelSgecislized Courses[or Selective Offering
flbjoct Participants Course Level Remarks
Dangerous and Officers
lnsnrdous cargoes and Advanced STUConference
(Other than Key Resolution 13
Special Rgquirw Ratings Assemblyunto o reso utions
chemical .£a A.537El3;(and
liquefigd as 1.437 XI )tank rs
Bridge Tun Masters and STCURegulation
Draining and Senior Deck Advanced II/1. 6(a)
Ptlllgl Planning Officers (S'IVConference
‘ Fesolutions
I, 17. 18 and 20)
Spocializedbil, Officers Pamiliarization STCHConvention
chemical and and Chapter V
15-Q30-T105633 33“-D85 Resolutions l0.
“nk.r courgea Masters Specialized 11 and 12
senior Training éllesolution l6)
Officers Programme ‘aging?’reso u ions
fiflgsfifizel (‘dV“"°°d) A.286EVIII) and457 x1))
3”“ Supervisor STUConferenceAd d3'1‘t1°°|h-1-P3 Personnel Vance Resolution 22
Mastersa-nd SWconference
Simulator Senior Deck Advanced Resolution 17Officer:
Radar Simulator Masters and 51g C n;
77313138 Deck Officers ‘dvanced Resolfitigfifinfe
and 18
(Assembly
reso11(1tion1.433 XII)
Autuntic Rndar Ms t and P1­
nofims uh us 19;; Uactigal STUConference
up‘) or 39 3-“ _ Resolution 20f1CO1'Bin L1flit8t10!1B (tggembly
Shipsfitted (‘dnncefi ruohtion
Use of simulator
included
C26‘)
subJQct Participants Course Level Priority Remarks
hdb/Eleotrmie Primarily Supplementary 2 SW ConferenceBquipnent 354.10 or Resolution 1.4.
Hnintennnoe Officers Updating gal-rt II­urse any
advanced) include use of
simulator
Medical Care Persons in
charge of Advanced 2 1010resolution
Hed.ics.l cm A.4}8(XI)
Aboard Ships
on Certain
Voyages
Electronics Engineer Course may
Officers and “""‘“°°“ 1 include use of
Electrical simulator
Officers
Control Senior ‘d d 1 Course may
Bzgineeringend Engineer ""‘°° use ofAutoaauon Officers 8 3 01-‘
lxtellptllioittruetion Senior” Advanced 2
Efficiency Officers
Planned Senior
Maintenance for Engineer Advanced 2
Machinery OfficersInstallations
Engineering Senior
Department Engineer Advanced 2
Financial, Officers
Technical and
Personnel /t
(27)
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?rsc:1cal Use of an ARPX
In this paper I will try to give an impression of the practical use of an
AIPAas it is usually applied on board snipe and hydrofoils (jetfoils)
today.
fly experience of the practical use of ARPA'sdates from the early
‘iisties, when the first prototype of ARPA.thfl "Ph111P| 51-9105" VII
esperisentally installed on board someDutch ships. .
This experience was amongother things gained on board ships and
hydrofoils from constantly observing the proceedings on different sakes
of AIPA's. Further I may add sy experience gained in the use of a
lsytheon LRPA"Raycss" linked up with the radar simulator of the
AmsterdamNautical College. Further I sailed on the training vessel
'Prinses flsrgriet" equipped with the Racal-Decca ARPA./
Particular attention was paid to utilizing and testing what was possible
and impossible on ARPA:
1. The interpretation of the vectors of targets which were only recently
acquirid.
2. The interpretation of the "Target Hindow".
3. The use of the "Trial Hanoauvre".
4. The false safety feeling whenusing "Guard Zones" for automatic
acquisition.
5. Judging "Target Trails" (equally tine—spacedhistory spots).
6. Realising what log the ARPAis linked to.
7. Using the various "Navigation Lines" and "Navigation Marks".
8. The false safety feeling whenusing the "Potential Collision Points
(PCP's)" of the Raytheon Raycas.
9. Using the "Syten Clear" on the Raytheon Raycas.
10. Havinga reflex plotter at one's disposal on the ARPA-display.
11. The incompleteness of ARPAaanuals.
sub 1. The inter retation of the vectors of tar ets which were onl
recently acquired.
There are ARPA'swhich after the acquisition of a target only show the
relevant vector whenit has been found to be reliable by the
scroprocessor. Or in any case showa figure round the target to show the
more or less reliability of the vector shown.
In the Iaytheon Raycas the calculation of the ARPAis as it were shown by
the development of the vector from zero to a reliable vector. By
expressing the vector into readable digits it can be checked whether the
vector has becomestable.
Uith this method the user should be careful not to draw premature
conclusions on the basis of too early shown Vector3_
sub 2. The interpretation of the "Target Window",
Lfter the acquisition some systems do not show the "Target Uindow" or
Inly showit after typing-in the relative code figure.
(2 9)
I am convinced that this search windowshould ae visible at all times.
for only then does the user know tnat the _ i by the
microprocessor. If in the case of Raycas the arorementioned code figure
is not used and consequently the windowis not shown. than after the
acquisition of targets of. say a fishing fleet whenthe windows.if
o' y1.1b1., would overlap each other. these targets are not accepted by the
microprocessor and therefore never get a vector either! They would not
even activate the signal of a lost target!
lloreover if the windowsof various acquired targets are shown on the same
bearing. the process of time sharing would also be clearly visible.
through whichit is understandable that the result of eventually reliable
vectors will be slow in coming.
sub 3. The use of the "Trial Hanoeuvre".
It is a good system when in the case of the "Trial Hanoeuvre" aode one
automatically proceeds from the present heading and speed. However. in
the trial aode manysyatms still showthe previous "Trial Course" and
."Trial Speed". Andin most cases the safe distances to surrounding ships
are found with the "Trial Course". but the "Trial Speed" is not on the
present right speed. Already manytimes these manipulations have led to
dangerousclose-quarters situations.
There are systems with a d namic vector resentation in the "Trial
Hanoeuvra"..in which the vectors leave the present positions of the
targets to showthus. say ten to thirty times as quickly as in reality
the relative or true future movementsof the echoes on the radar screen.
The advantage of this system is that the manoeuvringcharacteristics of
the ownship are more or less included in the "Trial Hanoeuvre". This is
of course splendid provided the user knowswhat the starting points of
the programmedmanoeuvring characteristics are. Such as: for what rudder
angle or rate of turn has a trial course-change been programmedor. say a
stopping lanoeuvre?
A disadvantage may be that because in the "Trial Hanoeuvre" the vectors
on the radar screen leave the echoes. it maysometimes be difficult to
cinch zhat vector proceeds from what echo. Especially if manyechoes areD otte .
I3 ll! I180 happen that in the "Trial Hanoeuvre" new echoes are added
which are not immediately noticed as such.
°‘h¢r iiitcls have a static vector presentation in the "Trial Hanoeuvre"
in which the vectors remain in the present position of the targets on the
radar screen to immediately show the result of the "Trial Hanoeuvre" as
if the ownship is already at once heading on the simulated course or
"“°d13‘01! running the simulated speed. In this case the effective
result of a trial manoeuvrecan only be checked correctly vhgn the
relative vectors are used.
In View of the delay in the movementsof the own ship the user himself
should then determine a safety margin as to the future shortest approach
and this again in connection with the safe distance.
Moreoverit should be noticed that the "Trial Hanoeuvrg"passibility has
f°“fl¢ VOIYlittle application on board. One simply changes cogrse and/or
(30)
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speed (Ea than looks for the result as :o :32 safe aistance at the
:elac;ve vectors. _
Corrections are subsequently made then by means or course and/or speed
changes to obtain the safe distance as yet.
gub 5. The false safet feelin when usin "Guard Zones" for automatic
.
In contrast to the earlier system of Iotron with the Digiplot the system
with "Guard Zones" may be called semi-automatic. And in this
semi-automatic system a target must cut these "Guard Zones" before it is
automatically presented to the microprocessor for calculation and then
gives s signal of "Target in Guard Zone".
I! a target comes within radar view between the "Guard Zones". it may be
a considerable time before the signal "Target in Guard Zone" can be heard
and the target is acquired. Meanwhilethe object may have arrived at too
short a distance.
In some cases when the echo is too weak or comes within radar view within
the innermost "Guard Zone". the target is not acquired at all and not any
warning signal is heard.
lacal-Decca gives very justly the following warning in its ARPAmanual:
"The (semi-)automatic detection and acquisition facility must always be
considered as an aid but never as a substitute for proper watchkaeping".
Even the fully automatic target acquisition of the earlier system of
Iotron is not infallible. Especially not in the case of weakchoes which
are not at all "automatically acquired" and therefore do not give an
alarm. Consequently the following statement in the Digiplot manual should
be read with great reserve:
"Fully automatic target acquisition provides unattended radar
watch-keepingon both opensea and in restricted waters.........".
sub 5. Judging "Target Trails" (equally time-spaced history spots).
Uith these history spots one should realize that the distance and the
direction between the first two dots (the two leg: showndoc; gfger the
target echo) in the beginning of the tracking do not give reliable
indications about the movementof the echo. As was already described 33;}, the vector is still unreliable in the beginning of the tracking and
consequently the distance and the direction between the first two dots
after the acquisition are not correct.
sub 6. Realising what log the ARPAis linked to.
The important speed information of the own ship can be intraducgd into
some ARPAmicroprocessors by means of:
a. Manualadjustment of the speed in the direction of the heading (singleaxis stabilised).
I3!)
This introduction or the dead reckoning speed through the water is
applied it there is no other possibility. However.if this dead recxonuq
speed through the water is practically correct. the precticlllv correc:
true vectors through the water are also obtained and therefore they cgn
serve {or anti-collision.
b. A log showing the speed through the water in the direction of the
heading (single axis water stabilised. for examplea pitot log or an
electroeagnetic log).
This aathod also gives the practically correct true vectors through the‘
water and is therefore correct for anti-collision.
"Practically correct true vectors": because whencourse is altered with a
large rate of turn. the vectors becoae unreliable during the process of
turning. This because the athwartships componentis not recorded by the
above logs .
c. In electroeagnetic log or doppler log showing the speed in the headflq
and athertahipa direction through the water (double ease water
stabilised).
This aathod would. if the radar is suitable for this. be very good for
anti-collision . .
d. A doppler log showing the speed in the heading course over the ground(single axis groundstabilised).
This sethod should in any case be discouraged both for anti-collision and
for radar navigation!
e. A doppler log showing the speed in the heading course and in the
athwartshipa direction over the ground (double ares ground stabilised).
This aathod gives true vectors over the ground and is therefore correct
for radar navigation. but is no good_£oranti-collision!
f. A geographic "fixed target" (double axes ground stabilised. with the
"Echo Reference" of Racal-Decca and with the "Autodrift" of Raycas).
This system also shows the true aovenents over the ground and is as such
very goodfor radar navigation. but again unsuitable for anti-collision!
sub 7. Using the various "Navigation Lines" and "Navigation Marks".
Veryoft,n'there is a possibility to makeelectronic dots and/or lines
visible on the ARPAdisplay. For example the "Nav. Lines" of the Digiplot
03 I°tf°fl. the "Nev. Lines" and "True Marks" of the Reycas of Baytheon
and in the case of the Racal-Decca ARPAthe so-called "Elements"("Straight Lines" and/or "Dots").
The user should be thoroughly aware of:
a. Uhat lines are suitable for the Parallel Index method (PI ngghgd) and
:;t;::§ lines and dots are suitable for the True Tracking aethod (TT
n suitable for the PI method should be "fixed" with regard to the own
3519. as it were sail with the own ship. Thus the "Nev. Lines" of the
K32)
Digiplot are exclusively suitable for PI. '
The "Nev. Lines" of Raycas and the "Straight Lines’ of lacal-Decca are
unsuitable for PI. as these lines are fixed with regard to the water.
All lines of the Raycas and Racal-Decca ARPAare therefore unsuitable for
PI and also the "EBL-free" of the two makes. but also the "Acquisition
Exclusion Lines" of Raycas (if not in the 62 node).
The "Acquisition Exclusion Lines" (CV0) Of 38Y¢8| I30 13 ‘hi 42 3049­
.=though not intended as such. suitable for PI. as these are "fixed" in the
° 62 node with regard to the own ship.
‘Ins. in‘ ‘Q5: ,H;;.b]§ £9; gag :1 method should be geographicallyfixed‘ with regard to the ground. The Nev. Lines" end the "True Harks"
of Iaycas end the "Straight Lines" end "Dots" of iacal-Decca can be
ground stabilised. In the case of Iaycas by aeans of the resulting input
of a duel axes ground stabilised doppler log or with "Autodrift" on a
geogrephically "fixed" and suitable object on the radar (buoy. vessel
riding at anchor. an isolated tower or a very small island OtC-)­
In this way the "Straight Lines" and "Dots" of Racal-Decca can be ground
stabilised by aeans of the "Echo Reference" on a geographically "fixed"
and suitable object on the radar.
In the standard type of the Iecal-Decca ARPAthe straight lines and dots
can be shifted by aeans of the "I-Y shifts". so that the position of the
true tracks (straight lines) and the conspicuous points such as capes.
buoys and lightvessels (dots) in a fairway can be previously prepared on
the radar display. '
Oncearrived in that fairway. they can. siaply by aeans of the "I-1
shifts". be aade to cover the corresponding conspicuous radar points
after the "Echo Reference" has been applied. ­
On the standard type of the Baycas an "X-Yshift" of the "Nev. Lines" and
"True Harks" is iapossible. Consequently the planned tracks should be
prepared on the spot by aeans of these "Nev. Lines" and "True Harks" and
at the seas tine one should be carefully on one's guard that the used
Nsv. Lines" and "True Marks" are not geographically replaced on the
radar screen aeanwhile. in consequence of possible current and/or wind
drift. Therefore one should first find a conspicuous point for the
Autodrift and then construct the planned tracks on the radar screen by
aeans of the "Nev. Lines" and "True Marks". However. if for soae reason
the autodrift object should becose a lost target. the "Nev. Lines" and
"True Marks aay drift with regard to the ground (current and/or wind
drift) and should then again be introduced one by one.
All thisr s tine-consuming and is consequently not applied on board.
In the case of Raycas one is for the PI method dependent on the two
"Acquisition Exclusion Lines" in the 62 node ("fixed" with regard to the
own ship).
sub 8. The false safetv f 1‘ h u " ­
------r-1r--——-—-————JL_____.___JL_________________________Points (PC?’) of the Raefihign;ae:a:sin the Potential Collision
The PCPfacility provides the user with a visual indiggtign on uh‘;
::“"" ‘ ‘°1115i°“ W135‘Pike Place. Assumingthat the target retains
a present course and speed and that the nun ship also maintains its
(33)
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;::, ;..; rggggg ;; very important. The position of the PC?is greatly
dependent on the log input of the ownship and the tine-lag of the
ad ocessor system.
Anciflgle margin of safety should therefore be taken round this PC?. un;¢,
is difficult to determine by the user by showing the PC? only. One of the
first LIPAassisted collision affords s good example:
"On August 16th 1981 at 07.52 s jetfoil equipped with s conventional
radar and an ARPAconnected to an electromagnetic log was on its way free
Ostend to Dover.
Andwhile crossing at right angles the traffic separation schemeof the
DoverStrut. collided in a position 2.5 miles east-south-east of the HPC
buoy with s cargo ship in the north-east lane of the sbove—mentioned
scheme on its we! to Rotterdam. '
The jetfoil entered s fogbsnk 2 minutes prior to the casualty.
The jetfoil is normally travelling at s speed of about 42 knots. This
speed can be reduced to 35 knots leaving the crsft's hull lifted out of
the water. If the speed is reduced under this norm the jetfoil drops down
and becomeswater-borne. enabling it to proceed at only 8 knots.
The cargo ship. automatically plotted. wss showinga north-east true
vector (through the wter). . oAt 07.50 course was altered from 270 to 310 in order to cross the T55 st
right angles. The jetfoil wasstill "on foils" .
The AIPAplot gave a PCPinformation of the cargo ship just free to
starboard. The echo of the cargo ship being just fine to port of the
course line.
Hhsn finally the echo of the cargo ship remained ahesd instead of
shifting to starboard (eccording tot the PCP). at close range a hard port
rudder was executed in an attempt to pass sstern.
Unfortustely this occurred a few seconds too late".
from the foregoing report it appears that the use of s PC?only is
dangerous. Even if the momentary position of the PCPshould be accurate.
it does not give the user any information about the shortest approach
with regard to the safe distance.
In this case the PADsystem of Sperry is better. If the navigator stays
gutgids s PAD.he is sure that he stays outside the safe distance choseny .
To this PADa certain safety factor has been applied by Sperry to keep
the target absolutely outside the preset ssfe distance in spite of any
inaccuracies of the system.
sub 9. Using the "System Clear" on the Raytheon Razcas.
"SystemClear" resets the RaycssV to the initial turn on state. i.e. all
'°fll°1ng tsrget information and processing is cancelled.
30V0VIr. there say be the danger that together with "System c1¢.r" the
log input is automatically changed into Vfianual Log".
If the "Hsnual Log" was not set at the present speed. the plottgd targets
I0! Vfong true vectors and a wrong impression about the surrounding ships
18 Obtained and moreover s wrong "Trial Hanoeuvre". This may contribute
I0 I decision for a dangerous manoeuvre.
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sub 10. Reflex Plotter on the ARPAdisnlav7
I: is well-knownthat ARPAsystems experience difficulties with "clutter"
in generel end "see-clutter" in psrticulsr.
As soon es tsrgets get into sesclutter the vectors belonging to then ere
\1fl£1UIBCIdby this sesclutter end the vectors becone unrelisble or even
lesve the tsrgets et greet speeds.
Veryoften the target echo cen still be distinguished fros the reder
screen with the eye end s nsnusl plot could offer e solution for this
circusstence. _
For this purpose s reflex plotter on the ARPAdisplay could be nscesssry.
The resction to this is of course thst the reflex plotter on the nearest
conventionel rsdsr will serve the purpose. But in prsctice this is hsrdly
ever done. Oneprefers trying to get the target echo into the processor
egein for one vents to keep informed of the targets with the correct
vectors outside the sesclutter. Therefore it wouldbe recossendsble to
heve e reflex plotter on the ARPAdisplay for this purpose slone.
lowever. such s reflex plotter is hostile to "daylight displsy". it
reeoves e lerge percentage of the light intensity end provides sdditionsl
snnoyingreflections. '
However.first things should cone first!
sub 11. The incompleteness of the ARPAannuals.
The completeness of the ARPAnsnuels occesionnlly leeves Inch to be
desired. Hhens certsin ARPA-enkeis purchssed this ssy led to
dissppointsents whendenonstrstions sre ssde end the (incolplete) lnnusls
ere perused egsin. _"._.;.:. ­
Esssples of the omissions ere:
s. Not sentioning the nsxinun rste of turn wheneutoastic tracking isstill relisble.
b. Csn the "Rev. Lines" be used for the PI sethod or for the‘?! sethod?
c. Nosention is ssde thst e groundstebilised displsy is right for rsder3lV1l|t1¢fl. but is no good for snti-collision.
d. Further omissions ere closely related to what was discussed nub 1 up
to end including sub 10.
(35)
aneral
Although on the one hand the user is warned of dangers which may occur M
implicitly relying on an ARPA.it should be noted that on the other hang
the aanufacturer adds "novel features" which often give the user a false
appearance of accuracy and safety.
Horeover too aany ARPAproceedings can still be done wrongly by the ujgr
whichany give rise to the risk of collision and/or stranding. '
It is true that the ARPAuser should be trained in everything that is
possible and impossible for ARPA.but nnny wrong ARPAproceedings should
be aade impossible by the aakerl
Bans llerk.
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